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The work described in this report was performed by the technical divisions of 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, under the cognizance of the Mariner Mars 1971 
Project. 
This four-volume document constitutes the Mariner Mars 1971 Project Final 
Report. Volume I of this Technical Report consists of Project development through 
launch and trajectory correction maneuver. Volume I1 presents the preliminary 
science results derived from data evaluation to December 14, 1971. (The informa- 
tion contained in Volume I1 has appeared in Science, Vol. 175, January 1972.) 
Volume 111 describes the Mission Operations System and covers flight operations 
after trajectory correction maneuver through the standard orbital mission up to 
the onset of solar occultations in April 1972. Volume IV consists of the science 
results derived from the standard orbital mission and preliminary experimenters 
interpretations of the data obtained from the extended mission. 
Detailed information on project organization, project policies and requirements, 
subsystem development, and other technical subjects has been excluded from the 
Project Final Report volumes. Where appropriate, reference is made to the JPL 
informal documentation containing this information. The development of most 
Mariner Mars 1971 subsystems is documented in JPL Technical Memorandums. 
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Abstract 
The Mariner Mars 1971 mission was another-step in the continuing program of 
planetary exploration in search of evidence of exo-biological activity, information 
on the origin and evolution of the solar system, and basic science data related to 
the study of planetary physics, geology, planetology, and cosmology. The mission 
plan was designed for two spacecraft, each performing a separate but comple- 
mentary mission. However, a single mission plan was actually used for the 
Mariner 9 due to the failure of the first launch spacecraft. 
This Technical Report, the first of four volumes of the Mariner Mars 1971 
Project Final Report, describes the major pre-operational project activities, includ- 
ing planning, design, development, and system testing, and the operational activi- 
ties from spacecraft launch through the Mariner 9 trajectory correction maneuver. 
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Mariner Mars 1971 Project Final Report 
Project Development Through Launch and Trajectory 
Correction Maneuver 
I. Introduction 
In the exploration of space man has been extending the 
frontiers of his knowledge further from Earth. Early space 
efforts probed and examined Earth's upper atmosphere 
and the near-Earth space environment. Later, Moon 
orbiters (Lunar Orbiters) and landers (Rangers and 
Surveyors) studied our closest celestial neighbor, while 
flyby missions were sent past the pIanets Venus (Mariners 
2 and 5) and Mars (Mariners 4, 6, and 7). With the 
Mariner Mars 1971 (MM'71) Project, a spacecraft, 
Mariner 9, has beemsent to study Mars for a period of 
months from an orbit around the planet. A comparison of 
Mariner spacecraft sent to Mars is contained in Table 1. 
To reduce risk and cost while progressively building a 
sound technological base, space exploration of the Moon 
and planets has evolved a series of space vehicles of in- 
creasing complexity. Following the flyby past Mars in 
1965 (Refs. 1-6) by the small Mariner 4 spacecraft, two 
spacecraft with greater capabilities for data gathering, 
Mariners 6 and 7, were successfully sent past Mars in 
1969 for a closer look (Ref. 7). Extensive data coverage of 
Mars necessitates that the spacecraft be placed in orbit 
around the planet (Ref. 8). NASA issued an Announcement 
of Flight Opportunity in the spring of 1968 to the science 
community of the impending MM'71 Project, which was' 
approved in the summer of 1968. 
As a follow-on to MM'71 in the continuing investigation 
of Mars, the Viking Project has been authorized to launch 
two spacecraft in 1975. Each spacecraft will carry a 
capsule which will be landed on the surface of Mars to 
make measurements that cannot be obtained from an 
orbiting spacecraft. Information gathered by Mariner 9 
will greatly assist in the selection of desirable landing 
sites for the Viking capsules. 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of the California 
Institute of Technology was assigned project management 
responsibility for the Mh4'71 Project along with Space- 
craft System, Mission Operations System (MOS), and 
Tracking and Data System (TDS) responsibility. The 
NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) was assigned 
Launch Vehicle System responsibility. Details of the 
management assignments and interfaces are contained in 
Ref. 9. Internal JPL MM'71 Project policy, requirements, 
and organization can be found in Ref. 10. Significant 
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Table 1: Mariner Mars spacecraft 
Mariner Mariner 
Parameter Mars 1964 Mars 1969 
Project Project 
Spacecraft designation Mariner 4 Mariners 6 
and 7 
Total spacecraft weight 261 384 
( at launch ), kg 
Science instrument 23 59 
weight, kg 
Propellant weight 10 10 
( at launch), kg 
Attitude control gas 2.36 2.45 
(N,), kg 
Propellant pressurant N/A N/A 
gas (N,), kg 
Computer memory No computer 128 
capacity, words 
Power supplied at 194 380 
Mars, W 
Mariner 
Mars 1971 
Project 
Mariner 9 
1031 
68 
476 
2.45 
14.5 
512 
450 
(1) To search for evidence of exo-biological activity, or 
the presence of an environment that could support 
exo-biological activity. 
(2) To gather information that might provide answers 
to questions concerning the origin and evolution 
of the solar system. 
(3) To gather basic science data related to the general 
study of planetary physics, geology, planetology, 
and cosmology. 
(4) To gather data that would assist in the planning 
and design of the Viking Program's Lander Mission 
to Mars in 1975. 
Specifically, the principal scientific objectives of the 
MM'71 mission were: 
(1) To map the topography of the planet surface at a 
resolution significantly higher than that achievable 
from Earth-based measurements and over a large 
portion of the surface. 
Electrical part count 39,220 24,250 27,863 (2) To study the time-variable features on the surface 
( actual) ( approx of Mars associated with the Wave of Darkening. 
Electrical part count 39,220 98,764 112,900 (3) To measure and understand the composition, struc- ( equivalent) ( approx ) 
ture, thermal properties, and gross dynamics of the 
Duration of near-Mars 30 nlin 30 min 90 days 
(2160 planet's atmosphere. examination 
hours ) (4) To make measurements leading to an understand- 
minimum ing of the temperatures, composition, and thermal 
Closest approach distance 9844 3379 1250 properties of the Martian surface including the 
to Mars, km polar caps. 
milestones and their completion dates are listed in Ap- 
pendix A. A list of serious problems (P-List), which if 
uncorrected in a timely manner would have either 
jeopardized or significantly increased the risk of launch 
or the mission, was ideritified by  the Project Manager and 
flagged for attention by the appropriate Division Mana- 
ger, and is contained in Appendix B. Information on the 
planned use of resources, manpower, and dollars is con- 
tained in Ref. 9, while annual resource plans and actual 
expenditures were reported monthly in the Mariner Mars 
1971 "Project Management Report" to the Office of 
Space Science. 
I I .  Mission Objectives and Requirements 
(5) To perform measurements directed toward an 
understanding of the internal activity, mass distri- 
bution, and shape of Mars. 
To meet these specific science objectives, a mission 
plan was designed consisting of two spacecraft, each per- 
forming a separate but complementary mission. The com- 
bination of the two missions would result in the gathering 
of in-depth infornlation for all of the above scientific 
objectives. 
These two different, complen~entary missions planned 
for MM'71 were Missions A and B. 
Mission A was designed primarily as a 90-day recon- 
naissance mission; the spacecraft would attempt to view 
a large portion of the Martian surface with the highest 
The MM'71 mission was another step in the continuing possible resolution, I t  would utilize an Earth synchronous 
program of planetary exploration, which included the or subsynchronous direct orbit inclined about 50 to 80 
following general objectives: deg to the Martian equator, with periapsis near the 
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evening terminator at the time of insertion. Periapsis alti- 
tude would be in the range of 1600 to 2000 km; apoapsis 
altitude would be about 17,000 km. The typical orbital 
period would be 12 h. 
Mission B was designed primarily to study the time- 
variable features of the Martian atmosphere and surface 
for 90 days. It would utilize a Mars synchronous or a 
harmonic of a Mars synchronous direct orbit inclined 
about 50 to 60 deg to the Martian equator, with periapsis 
near the evening terminator and apoapsis over the morn- 
ing terminator at the time of insertion. Periapsis altitude 
would be in the range between 1800 km and the minimum 
altitude consistent with quarantine requirements; apoapsis 
altitude would be about 41,500 km. The typical orbital 
period would be 32.8 h. 
Additional information on Missions A and B, requiring 
two spacecraft, is contained in Ref. 8. Because of the 
launch failure of the MM'71-1 spacecraft (Mariner 8), 
neither of these missions was flown, nor described in 
detail. The actual single mission pIan used for Mariner 9 
is discussed in Section X. 
Ill, Inheritance 
A. Spacecraft 
The Mariner series of spacecraft has evolved in support 
of planetary missions since 1962. In each subsequent pro- 
gram, changes were incorporated (1) to adapt the previ- 
ous design to unique requirements for the new mission, 
(2) to overcome difficulties demonstrated in the previous 
mission, and (3) to incorporate new technology when a 
major improvement in technology would provide a signi- 
ficant benefit in cost, weight, or reliability. 
The consideration of inheritance was primarily directed 
toward the carryover of the overall design of the space- 
craft and its ground-based support equipment, as well as 
their associated hardware. It should be pointed out that 
additional benefit was gained in areas of test, launch, and 
flight operation by the repeated use of experienced per- 
sonnel, procedures, and documentation, as well as facili- 
ties which were carried forward from past programs. This 
discussion, however, will be directed primarily toward in- 
heritance of the spacecraft design and hardware. 
The spacecraft system was made up of 20 subsystems, 
including 4 science instruments. The discussion of space- 
craft inheritance will focus on the various subsystems, 
some with major changes where the inheritance factor 
was low and the other extreme when design changes were 
small or nonexistent and a high inheritance factor was 
realized. 
One of the major changes in this mission, as compared 
to earlier Mariners, was that the 1971 Mariner was to be 
an orbiter. Thus the propttlsion stibsystem was required to 
be completely redesigned to provide the necessary pro- 
pulsion capability to inject the spacecraft into orbit upon 
its arrival at the planet. The new propulsion system re- 
quired the capability of a 1600-m/s (about one mile per 
second) velocity change, and the design incorporated a 
1334-newton (300-lb) thrust engine. Practically all com- 
ponents, i.e., valves, regulators, etc., were used on space 
programs previously, but never had this design as a whole 
been flown. The engine and the tanks were modified from 
existing designs. Some inheritance was, therefore, realized 
at the parts le\7el by using flight-proven components, but 
the subsystem was a new design. 
The data storage subsystem (DSS) was a completely 
new design (all digital, reel to reel) derived from earlier 
laboratory development efforts. This design incorporated 
selectable playback speeds of 16, 8,4,2, and 1 kilobits per 
second (kbps) with an 8-track capability using 2 tracks at 
a time. High packing density provided a total storage 
capability of 1.8 X los bits on the 168-m (550-ft) tape. 
Data was recorded at 132 kbps. Each playback rate was 
controlled to a pre-recorded speed (frequency). In this 
case, little or no design or hardware inheritance was 
realized from previous flight programs. 
The central computer and sequencer (CC&S) design 
was changed primarily by the increase in memory to 
512 words over the 128 words used previously. This pro- 
vided the flexibility required for orbital operations to set 
up automatic sequences for repetitive orbital work. Lesser 
changes were incorporated to provide improved opera- 
tions between computer and sequencer, better checking 
of stored information, additional systems requirements of 
accelerometer control and autopilot conditioning, etc. 
Of the four on-board science instruments, one scientific 
instrument was new to the Mariner series of spacecraft. 
This was the IRIS, or infrared interferometer spectrometer. 
The instrument had flown before on the Nimbus Earth 
orbiting spacecraft. However, a new beamsplitter, addi- 
tional data processing circuitry, and new power supplies 
were required as well as a new thermal design. New 
interface adaptation to the Mariner spacecraft was also 
required, which included power and thermal design. The 
inheritance was that of previous instrument design; how- 
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT 32-1550, VOL. I 3 
ever, from the system standpoint, it was a new inztru- 
ment to be incorporated into the spacecraft design. 
Another subsystem which underwent extensive change 
was the television (TV) subsystem. This subsystem em- 
ployed two cameras, and much of the circuitry, optics, 
vidicons, etc., could be carried forward. However, the 
Mariner Mars 1969 subsystem had noise problems, re- 
quired a great deal of processing of both analog and 
digital signals into usable video, had less dynamic range, 
and was not as adaptable as considered necessary to cope 
with possible variations of planet surface conditions for 
the orbiter. Therefore, an all digital system was devel- 
oped with eight selectable filters in the wide-angle 
camera, automatic and commandable shutter speeds and 
picture sequencing, and reduced effects from aging and 
temperature variations. The functions of centralized 
timing and control were removed from the TV subsystem 
and transferred to the data automation subsystem. Optics 
were retained. Again, the experience factor with com- 
ponents, circuits, and functions provided a significant 
inheritance factor, minimized developmental costs and 
risk, and provided a high-performance TV subsystem. 
The attitude control (A/C) subsystem underwent major 
changes to adapt to the orbital requirements. The attitude 
control electronics (ACE) was new to accommodate the 
logic changes and the new autopilot. The inertial refer- 
ence unit (IRU) was redesigned to include an accelerom- 
eter to control the firing duration of the propulsion sub- 
system rocket engine and electronic integrators to pro- 
vide both position and rate information separately from 
the gyros. The gyros were of a modified MM'69 design. 
The rocket engine autopilot gimbal actuators were new. 
There were considerable changes in the Canopus tracker 
(C/T) electronics. The Sun sensors were re-packaged to 
accommodate the configuration changes. The gas system 
was similar, with only minor modifications, to that of the 
MM'69 spacecraft. 
The data automation subsystem (DAS) was a com- 
pletely new logic design to accommodate the new instru- 
ment payload and mission requirements of MM'71. The 
integrated circuit logic family and the packaging tech- 
niques used were inherited from the Mariner Venus 67 
and Mariner Mars 1969 DAS. 
The strtrcture subsystem underwent considerable change 
primarily to incorporate the new propulsion subsystem. 
However, in some areas inheritance was relatively signi- 
ficant since the changes had only moderate impact on the 
basic octagon structure. The structure carried over from 
MM'69 was modified successfully. 
The cabling stsbsystenz was changed considerably, but 
the carryover in technique, experiences, and materials 
provided a high degree of efficiency in cable fabrication. 
The pou;er subsystenz underwent moderate changes to 
accommodate the new autopilot design, and the battery 
and switching requirements necessary for the peculiar 
aspects of the orbital mission. The design incorporated a 
new, high cycle life, nickel-cadmium type battery and its 
associated charger. A 30-V regulator was added to pro- 
vide power for the autopilot, engine gimbal actuators, 
and the propulsion solenoid. The power switching capa- 
bility was increased, as was the power capability of the 
booster regulators and the 2.4-kHz inverters. The solar 
panels were of the MM'69 design. 
The radio subsystem carried over from MM'69 had a 
troubled operational history. Several key problems re- 
quired correction and many lesser problems existed. A 
great deal of emphasis was placed on establishing a clear 
understanding of the problems and then deciding which 
ones required correction and how. A major change was 
made in the exciter, where a design used in Apollo was 
incorporated. Another change incorporated a new 
traveling-wave tube (TWT) in the power amplifier. Many 
other changes minor in nature but providing significant 
improvements in performance were carried out. The 
inheritance factor remained high, however, because a 
great deal of the complexity and R F  idiosyncrasies were 
well understood or problem characteristics were reason- 
ably established, permitting a rigorous analysis and test 
program to be established. 
Subsysten~s incorporating minor changes included 
command, telemetry, antennas, scan control, infrared 
radiometer (IRR),  and zrkraviolet spectrometer (UVS). 
While each did have changes, they were considered of 
minor nature; thus a high degree of inheritance was pro- 
vided. 
I t  may be seen that the inheritance by the Mariner Mars 
1971 Project of the Mariner spacecraft design varied from 
subsystem to subsystem. This varied from one extreme, 
a completely new propulsion subsystem design, to very 
minimal changes in the command subsystem design. The 
design changes which were incorporated underwent con- 
siderable review and debate prior to approval so that the 
maximum inheritance could be realized. The importance 
of a high inheritance cznnot be over-emphasized in opti- 
mizing reliability, cost, and schedule. 
Table 2 summarizes the spacecraft design and hard- 
ware inheritance by subsystem. 
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Table 2. Spacecraft design and hardware inheritance 
Hardware 
Subsystem Design 
Flight Test 
Power 
Hardware 
Subsystem Design 
Flight Test 
Structure 
Octagon Basic MM'69 
with minor 
nlodifications 
MM'69; 1 spare None 
None None 
MM'69; 1 spare None 
MM'69; 2 spares MM'69; 3 test Solar panels MM'69 
models Battery None 
Conversion Basic MM'69 
with major 
modifications 
Propulsion None 
support 
None None 
None MM'69; 1 test 
model 
High-gain MM'69 
antenna 
MM'69; I spare MM'69; 4 test CC&S Basic MM'69 
models with minor 
None None 
modifications 
Telemetry Basic MM'69 
Low-gain Basic MM'69 
antenna with minor 
nlodifications 
MM'69; 1 spare MM'69; 1 test 
model with minor 
modifications 
Solar panels Basic MM'69 
with minor 
modifications 
MM'69; 2 spares MM769; 10 test Attitude 
models 
control 
Electronics None None None 
MM'69; 2 spare MM'69; 3 test 
roll gyros roll gyros 
MM'69; 1 test 
pitch and yaw 
gyro 
Adapter Basic MM'69 
with minor 
modifications 
MM'69; 1 spare MM'69; 1 test 
model Inertial None 
reference 
Solar panel 
outriggers, 
cable trough, 
tank covers, 
engine 
None 
structure, 
NERF bar," 
medium- 
gain antenna 
Gimbal None 
actuators 
None None 
None None Canopus Basic MM'69 
tracker with major 
modifications 
None MM'69; 2 test 
models 
Sun sensor None 
Gas system Basic MM'69 
MM'69; 15% MM'69; 30% with minor 
spares spares modifications 
None MM'69; Pyrotechnics None 
structural Mechanical 
mockups devices 
None None 
MM'69; 1 spare MM'69; 2 test 
models Chassis and MM'69 
subchassis 
None None Cabling Basic MM'69 
with minor 
modifications 
Radio Basic MM'69 
with selected 
minor 
modifications 
MM'69; 1 spare MM'69; 2 test Pyrotechnics 
models arming 
switch, 
separation- MM'69 
initiated 
timer 
V-band, 
MM'69; 1 spare MM'69; 3 test 
models platform MM'69 
None None latch 
Separation MM'69 
None None springs 
MM'69; 2 spares MM'69; 3 test 
models 
S-band 
antenna 
High MM'69 
MM'69; 2 spares MM'69; 2 test 
models 
Medium None 
MM'69; 2 spares MM'69; 1 test 
model 
MM'69; 16 MM'69; 16 test 
svares models 
Low MM'69 
Command MM'69 None MM'69; 1 test Boost MM'69 
model damper 
"NERF bar supports top of propulsion module thermal blanket, holding it away from sharp propulsion components. 
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Table 2 (conld) 
Hardware 
Subsystem Design 
Flight Test 
Scan MM'69 MM'69; 2 spares MM'69; 2 test 
platform models 
Deploy None None None 
damp and 
linkage, 
high-gain 
antenna 
deploy 
Propulsion 
Engines, None 
tankage, 
and 
plumbing 
None None 
Temperature 
control 
Louvers MM'69 MM'69; 14 MM'69; 12 test 
spares models 
Shields Basic h4M'69 MM'69; 2 sets MM'69; 1 set 
with nlinor lower channel lower channel 
nlodificntions 
Blankets None None None 
Data storage None None None 
Data Basic MM'69 None None 
automation with major 
modifications 
Scan 
Electronics Basic MM'69 MM'69; 1 spare MM'69; 1 test 
with minor nlodel 
nlodifications 
Actuators MM'69 MM'69; 2 spares MM'69; 2 test 
models 
Television h4h1'69 camera None Mh4'69; 2 
A lens, and n~odels 
camera B lens 
and shutter 
test 
Ultraviolet Mh1'69 hlM'69; 1 spare Mh.1'69; 3 test 
spectrometer models 
Infrared Modified None None 
interferometer Nimbus 
spectrometer 
Infrared M h1'69 MM'69; 1 spare hfM'69; 3 test 
radiometer models 
Science None None None 
support 
equipment 
B. Mission Operations System 
The concept of active daily operations was new to the 
Mariner projects. For experience and operations of this 
type, the Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor projects were more 
useful. Using the experience of those two projects, a 
basically new organization philosophy for operations was 
evolved. The organization was divided into a planning 
and analysis level of activities, and an execution level of 
activities. 
The launch, maneuver, and cruise portion of MM'71 
was basically similar to previous Mariners. The only sig- 
nificant difference was the requirement for more accur- 
acy in navigation. The double precision orbit determina- 
tion program, completed by the Mariner Mars 1969 
(Mh4'69) Project, provided the basic tool to provide the 
required accuracy to reach the planet. In the orbit in- 
sertion and orbital phases of the mission, no navigation 
tools were available from any previous projects. A new 
satellite orbit determination capability and instrument 
pointing capability had to be generated. 
Within the mission design of MM'71, the return, dis- 
play, and near real-time analysis of science data were 
implied. None of these capabilities was available from 
previous projects with the exception of a limited TV data 
display capability from MM'69. The daily updating of 
spacecraft activities at Mars would also require a set of 
mission control programs to generate the daily command 
load for updating the CC&S. A very limited start on 
these programs was inherited from h4M'69 in the Com- 
mand Generation Program (COMGEN) work. 
All of the data processing equipment used on MM'71 
was different from that used on any previous project. 
Consequently, any software that was usable from any 
previous project had to be rewritten to be capable of 
operating with the new computing equipment. 
C. Launch Vehicle System 
The Launch Vehicle System used on MM'71 was the 
Atlas (SLV-3C)/Centaur, managed by the NASA Lewis 
Research Center (LeRC), Cleveland, Ohio. Both the Atlas 
and Centaur stages were manufactured under NASA 
Contract by General Dynamics Corporation, Convair 
Aerospace Division (GD/CA), San Diego, California. 
Atladcentaur vehicles AC-23 and AC-24 were essen- 
tially the same as the vehicles used on the last three 
Surveyor missions and the two MM'69 launches. All of 
these vehicles, starting with AC-13, made use of the Atlas 
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booster SLV-3C, which incorporated an extended pro- 
pellant tank, increased propellant loading, and up-rated 
engines. The major difference between AC-23 and these 
prior launch vehicles was a further up-rating of the Atlas NOSE FAIRING 
engines for greater thrust. 
SPACECRAFT 
COMPARTMENT 
FORWARD The SLV-3C Atladcentaur vehicle (MM'71 spacecraft 
encapsulated in the nose fairing) was approximately COMPARTMENT 
35.7 m (117 ft) long and weighed about 147,870 kg 
(326,000 lb) at liftoff. The basic diameter of the vehicle 
was a constant 3 m (10 ft) from the aft end to the base 
of the conical section of the nose fairing. The configura- 
tion of the Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle is illustrated in 
INSULATION PANEL (4) Fig. 1. In the following paragtaphs, no attempt will be CENTAUR 
made to give complete descriptio~ls of the various items STAGE 
involved. More detailed information is available in 
Volume I of the Mariner Mars 1969 Final Project Report 
(Ref. 7). For purposes of this report, only the pertinent 
differences between the MM'69 and the MM'71 launch 
vehicles are described. A detailed flight report on launch 
vehicle performance was published by LeRC. INTERSTAGE ADAPTER 
1 .  Atlas stage. Tlie first stage of the Atladcentaur 
vehicle was a modified version of the Atlas used on many OXYGEN TANK 
previous Air Force and NASA missions. The SLV-3C 
Atlas used an up-rated Rocketdyne MA-5 propulsion sys- 
tem which burned RP-1 and liquid oxygen in each of its 
engines to produce a total liftoff thrust of approximately 
1,794,145 newtons (403,340 lb). This value compared 
with 1,757,047 newtons (395,000 1,) for MM'69. The 
individual seal level thrust ratings of MM'71 engines were 
two booster thrust chambers at  760,646 newtons (171,000 
lb) each, one sustainer at 266,892 newtons (60,000 lb), 
LIQUID OXYGEN DUCT ATLAS 
and two vernier engines at 2,980 newtons (670 lb) each. STAGE 
An additional significant difference of MM'71 over the 
MM'69 launch vehicle was the conversion of the launch 
vehicle transmitters from P-band to S-band, the signi- 
ficance of this being that the launch vehicle transmitters 
would now operate in the same general frequency range 
at  which thc spacecraft radio operated. ATLAS RETROROCKET 
2. Centaur stage. The Centaur, or second stage of the 
launch vehicle, was essentially the same as the ones used 
to launch the MM'69 spacecraft. The differences were as 
follows: 
(1) The addition of spacecraft destructor, made neces- 
sary by the amount of propellant carried by the 
spacecraft. SUSTAINERTHRUST 
CHAMBER (2) The conversio~l of Centaur from P-band to S-band 
telemetry. Fig. 1. Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle 
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(3) The routing of air conditioning ducting in the nose 
fairing. 
(4) AC-23 and AC-24 Centaurs had only one telepak 
apiece as compared to two on each of the MM'69 
launch vehicles. This was brought about by the 
fact that weight had to be saved somewhere, and 
the removal of one telepak was a convenient means. 
Having only one telepak was also reflected in 
telemetry channel assignments for spacecraft use. 
On MM'69, there were 10 channels dedicated to 
spacecraft purposes. MM'71 had only three chan- 
nels available for spacecraft use. 
(5) One further change to the Centaur was the addition 
of the IRIS purge line. 
3. Spacecraft adapter. For launch, the MM'71 space- 
craft was mounted on the spacecraft adapter (33 kg) 
(forward payload adapter) by a V-band clamp. The space- 
craft adapter was attached through a bolted joint to the 
Centaur adapter (aft payload adapter). 
The MM'71 spacecraft adapter design used MM'69 
residual structures. The MM'69 dynamic test model 
(DTM) and flight spare structures, modified to MM'71 
specifications, became the proof test model (PTM)/spare 
and Flight 1 spacecraft adapters, respectively. One new 
spacecraft adapter was fabricated for Flight 2. Modifica- 
tion of the MM'69 structures consisted of: 
(1) Installation of adjustable shear keys on the eight 
upper ring support feet. 
(2) Installation of nitrogen purge plumbing. This 
plumbing was routed from the umbilical island to-a 
slip fit disconnect located on the IRIS instrument. 
(3) Installation of two electrical strip heaters used as 
on-pad science stimuli for the IRR and IRIS instru- 
ments. 
(4) Scarfing a portion of the thermal diaphragm to pro- 
vide clearance for the scan platform-mounted IRIS 
instrument. 
(5) Changing the 66 field joint fasteners from locking 
to non-locking basket nuts. 
(6) Relocation of the adapter accelerometer. 
(7) Installation of a sheet metal "shoe horn" guide for 
the deployable IRIS shade. 
IV. Spacecraft 
A. Spacecraft Mission Requirements 
The technical design of the Mariner Mars 1941 space- 
craft was derived from the interaction of a number of 
factors, objectives, and constraints. In addition to the 
constraints placed on the spacecraft implicitly by those 
mission design and science objectives, NASA head- 
quarters approved these specific guidelines and con- 
straints in the program plan: 
(1) Spacecraft would be an orbiter. 
(2) Mission should survey major portion of Mars sur- 
face. 
(3) Mission orbital lifetime requirement was 90 days. 
(4) Use of MM'69 spacecraft design and hardware was 
to be maximized. 
(5) The missions would utilize two identical spacecraft. 
(6) Low total cost was a firm requirement. 
(7) Spacecraft would not be sterilized. 
(8) Launch vehicle would be the Atlas/Centaur. 
(9) The MM'69 nose fairings would be  used. 
(10) The DSN would support the two missions with one 
26-m (85-ft) net and one 64-m (210-ft) antenna. 
(11) Only developed and flight-qualified science instru- 
ments would be used. The science payload to be 
employed should consist of: 
(a) Two television (TV) cameras. 
(b) An infrared radiometer (IRR). 
(c) An infrared interferometer spectrometer (IRIS). 
(d) An ultraviolet spectrometer (UVS). 
(12) In addition to experiments utilizing the above in- 
struments, the following experiments would be 
performed: 
(a) Celestial mechanics. 
(b) S-band occultation. 
Implicit in the science payload were requirements 
placed on the spacecraft design to implement the desired 
science capability. Four of the six experiments (television, 
infrared radiometry, infrared spectroscopy, and ultraviolet 
spectroscopy) required specific on-board instrumentation 
to achieve scientific objectives. The S-band occultation 
and celestial mechanics experiments utilized the space- 
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craft radio subsystem and specialized ground equipment 
for processing of the doppler and ranging data. The four 
on-board experiments also utilized specialized ground 
processing of the received telemetry data to transform the 
raw data to an interpretable form and to remove instru- 
mentation effects and bias by application of calibration 
information. On-board formatting of the instrument data 
output and control of the instrument functions were 
shared by the instruments and the data automation sub- 
system. 
I t  was recognized that one of the most difficult aspects 
of the mission was the reliability of operation during 
planetary insertion and orbit. The design, therefore, took 
advantage of the equipment and experience gained in the 
previous Mariner projects and in state-of-the-art, thor- 
oughly qualified, new equipment to the greatest extent 
practical. (See Inheritance, Section 111.) 
The MM'69 design and equipment (Ref. 7) were 
adapted for use in the MM'71 spacecraft to the maximum 
possible extent. Any design modifications to this equip- 
ment were limited to changes: (1) required by the dif- 
ferent payload complement, (2) required to achieve the 
necessary reliability for a nominal cruise and a 90-day 
operational lifetime in orbit, (3) required for the space- 
craft to perform the orbiting mission, and (4) that in- 
creased performance within the resource allocations and 
schedule constraints of the Project. 
B. Spacecraft Design 
The spacecraft design evolved into the Mariner Mars 
1971 spacecraft, Mariner 9, which was inserted into orbit 
around Mars. The MM'71 spacecraft was composed of 
20 subsystems (Refs. 11-26): 4 science instruments, 2 
directly supporting the science subsystems, and 14 con- 
tributing to the operation of the spacecraft as a semi- 
automated device. The features in the MM'71 design 
included: 
(1) A 3-axis attitude control subsystem with a high 
accuracy autopilot for maneuvers, orbit insertion, 
and orbit trims. 
(2) A programmable central computer and sequencer 
with a 512-word memory. 
(3) A 1334-newton (300-lbf) propulsion subsystem cap- 
able of performing a minimum of five maneuvers. 
(4) An all-digital data storage and handling subsystem. 
(5)  A multiple-channel telemetry subsystem with vari- 
able high-rate telemetry. 
(6) A two-way cor~lrnunication and command capability 
based on the use of a low-gain, a medium-gain, and 
a two-position high-gain antenna mounted to the 
spacecraft. 
(7) Four solar power panels, power storage and con- 
version equipment. 
(8) Temperature control equipment. 
(9) A computer-controlled two-degree-of-freedom scan 
platform for holding and pointing the science in- 
struments. 
(10) Planetary science instruments. 
1 .  Structure and configuration. MM'7l's basic structure 
was an 18.4-kg eight-sided (octagon) magnesium frame- 
work with eight compartments (Fig. 2). The electronic 
assemblies fastened within the compartments provided 
additional support to complete the spacecraft primary 
structure. Total weight of all spacecraft structures was 
131 kg. 
Four solar panels, each 2.15 m long and 0.90 m wide, 
were attached on outriggers to the top or sunward side 
of the octagon structure. 
The gas bottles and regulators for the dual attitude 
control subsystem were also attached to the top of the 
basic structure. The propellant tanks for the liquid bi- 
propellant propulsion were supported on top of the 
octagonal structure by a support truss structure with the 
rocket nozzle located on the Z-axis (roll axis) above the 
propellant tanks. 
Four sets of attitude control jets, consisting of two 
pitch jet assemblies and two roll/yaw assemblies, were 
mounted on the ends of each solar panel. These jets were 
the actuating elements of the three-axis attitude control 
subsystem. 
The high-gain antenna was attached to the side of the 
propulsion support truss structure. The aluminum honey- 
comb parabolic reflector was 1.02 m in diameter and 
weighed about 2.04 kg. A pyro-actuated device provided 
two-position capability, which enabled optimum pointing 
toward the Earth during the latter half of the inter- 
planetary flight and for 90 days after orbit insertion. 
The low-gain omnidirectional antenna aperture was 
located at the end of a circular aluminum waveguide; 
it was 10 cm in diameter and extended 1.45 m from the 
top of the octagonal structure. 
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LOW-GAIN ANTENNA--\ 
FAMANEUVER ENGI E 
mfi i rPROPULSlON TANKS (2), 
HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA 7 
\Y 
CRUISE SUN SENSOR? 
,-PROPULSION 
PRESSURIZATION TANKS (2) 
ATTITUDE CONTROL JETS 
CRUISE SUN SENSOR 
MEDIUM-GAIN ANTENN 
CANOPUS SENSOR 
INFRARED INTERFEROMETER 
SPECTROMETER 
INFRARED RADIOMETE NARROW-ANGLE T 
NOTE: PROPULSION MODULE AND SCAN PLATFORM INSULATION BLANKETS NOT SHOWN 
Fig. 2. Mariner Mars 1971 spacecraft 
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The medium-gain antenna, similar in construction to 2. Radio-frecltcency szlbsystem.Theradio-frequencysub- 
the low-gain antenna but shorter in length and of nar- system (26 kg) received commands and ranging signals 
rower aperture, was mounted to a solar panel outrigger transmitted by the deep space stations on Earth, and 
adjacent to Bay I11 of the octagon. I t  was oriented to transmitted science data, engineering data, and ranging 
provide communication coverage during orbit insertion. signals back from the spacecraft. 
The Canopus star tracker assembly was located on the 
upper ring structure of the octagon, between solar panels, 
for a clear field-of-view. Acquisition Sun sensors were 
located at the out-board end of each solar panel, provid- 
ing a composite view that subtended the full celestial 
sphere. A cruise Sun sensor and Sun gate assembly, of 
narrower field-of-view, were located on the Bay I11 
outrigger and were aligned parallel to the Z-axis. 
Received and transmitted frequencies were in the S- 
band part of the spectrum. When no uplink signal (i.e., a 
signal transmitted from Earth "up" to the spacecraft) was 
being received, the transmitted frequency was governed 
bjr an on-board auxiliary crystal oscillator. When the 
receiver detected and achieved phase lock with an uplink 
signal, the transmitted frequency froin the spacecraft was 
coherent with and 240/221 times the received frequency. 
When the spacecraft-transmitted frequency was under 
The eight compartments of the octagon structure con- control of the uplink received frequency, two-way doppler 
tained the following electronic assemblies: tracking was accomplished. 
(1) Bay I: Power regulator electronics assembly. The telemetry data and denlodulated ranging signal 
phase-modulated the transmitter carrier. The spacecraft 
(2) 'I: Power conversion/IRIS/scan electronics transmitter had two exciters and two traveling-wave tube 
assembly. amplifiers ('ITVTAs) to.increase reliability through re- 
(3) Bay 111: Attitude control/central computer and dundancy. The TWTA output level was either low hower 
sequencer electronics assembly. (10 IT?) or high power (20 W). 
(4) Bay IV: Command/telemetry electronics assem- Three S-band antennas (high-, medium-, and low-gain 
bly. antennas) comprising the antenna subsystem were used 
by the radio-frequency subsystem. Early in the MM'71 
(5) Bay V: Data storage electronics assembly. spacecraft design, two switchable low-gain antennas and 
a high-gain antenna were examined. Due to cost and per- 
(6) Bay VI: Radio electronics assembly. formance considerations, the current low-, medium-, and 
high-gain antenna coilfigurations evolved. (7) Bay VII: Data automation/television electronics 
assembly. 
(8) Bay VIII: Battery assembly. 
The high-gain antenna (HGA) was a two-position, 
pyrotechnic-activated device that would allow optimum 
pointing of the antenna toward the Earth late in the 
six of the electrollics compartments were temperature- cruise phase and during the standard orbital mission. 
controlled by lightweight 1o;ver assemblies on the outer 
surfaces. Thermal shields covered most of the remaining The low-gain antenna (LGA) would be used to receive 
area. The octagon propulsion module enclosure was uplink signals throughout the entire mission and to trans- 
insulated by multi-layer Mylar thermal shields (blankets) mit downlink signals when the spacecraft-Earth range 
a t  both the top and bottom. Electrical wiring for transmit- was not so large as to require the additional gain of the 
ting power and signals as needed between subsystems and HGA. It  was mounted on the sunward side of the space- 
assemblies formed the cabling subsystem (35 kg). craft and had a hemispherical pattern almost symmetrical 
about the roll axis. 
The spacecraft carried four planetary science instru- 
ments. These were a TV subsystem consisting of a wide- The medium-gain antenna (MGA) was coupled pas- 
and narrow-angle camera, an ultraviolet spectrometer, an sively to the LGA for both receiving and transmitting. I t  
infrared radiometer, and an infrared interferometer spec- was mounted almost diametrically opposite the LGA and 
trometer, all mounted on a movable scan platform below would be used, when the spacecraft is turned off Canopus 
the octagon. and the Sun, for propulsion motor firings. 
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During periods when a ground station is transmitting 
the S-band uplink to the spacecraft, the spacecraft re- 
ceiver, operating continuously throughout the mission, 
would receive the uplink signal via the low- or medium- 
gain antenna. The uplink signal might be the S-band 
carrier alone or the S-band carrier containing command 
and/or ranging information. The carrier containing com- 
mand and/or ranging modulation would then be pro- 
cessed and routed to the appropriate user location. The 
command data would be sent to the flight command 
subsystem; the ranging data, when present in the uplink 
signal, would be sent through the radio-frequency sub- 
system ranging channel to nlodulate the spacecraft- 
transmitted signal in order to provide the turnaround 
ranging function. The ranging channel would be turned 
off and on either by ground command or the on-board 
CC&S (Command 2A). 
3. Flight command szlbsystem. The spacecraft received 
ground commands from Earth in addition to. commands 
from the on-board CC&S (see Table 3). The radio sub- 
system received these ground commands and relayed 
them to the flight command subsystem (5 kg), which 
detected and decoded the commands and issued them to 
the appropriate subsystem. Ground commands would be 
required to execute trajectory corrections, to update func- 
tions related to spacecraft orbital operations, or to choose 
redundant elements in the event of certain component 
failures. 
Table 3. Ground command list 
Symbol Name Subsystem destination Symbol Name 
Subsystem 
destination 
Direct commands 
Engineering mode 
CC&S readout select ( T )  
Playback mode 
DSS ready mode 
Engineering data rate switch ( T )  
FTS redundant elements switch ( T )  
Power amplifier switch ( T ) 
Exciter switch ( T )  
Ranging on/off ( T )  
Transmit low 
Transmit high 
Adaptive gate step 
Maneuver inhibit 
Maneuver enable 
Canopus gate override 
DSS record mode 
Canopns cone angle step 
Inertial roll control step 
Canopus roll control 
Roll control inhibit 
Roll search step 
Select CW reel direction 
Select CCW reel direction 
Spare 
FTS 
FTS 
FTS 
DSS 
DSS 
FTS 
FTS 
RFS 
RFS 
RFS 
RFS 
RFS 
A/C 
A/C 
CC&S 
A/C 
A/C 
DSS 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
AIC 
A/C 
DSS 
DSS 
PYRO 
Direct commands 
DC-25 RT science No. 1 mode 
DC-26 Spare 
DC-27 Initiate maneuver sequence 
DC-28 Select scan stow position 
DC-29 Accelerometer scale factor 
DC-30 Computer inhibit 
DC-31 Computer enable 
DC-32 Computer maneuver initiate 
DC-33 Tandem maneuver 
DC-34 Scan onloff ( T )  
DC-35 Select variable scan reference 
DC-36 Initiate TV mapping sequence 
DC-37 Boost mode enable inhibit ( T )  
DC-38 Battery charger on/off ( T )  
DC-39 DSS slew mode 
DC-40 Gyros inhibit 
DC-41 Select scan cone position 
DC-42 TWT high power 
DC-43 TWT low power 
DC-44 RT science No. 2 mode 
DC-45 Platform unlatch 
DC-46 TV cover deploy 
DC-47 DSS on/off ( T )  
DC-48 Spare 
FTS 
PYRO 
CC&S 
SCAN 
CC&S 
CC&S 
CC&S 
CC&S 
CC&S 
PWR 
SCAN 
DAS 
PWR 
PWR 
DSS 
A/C 
SCAN 
RFS 
RFS 
FTS 
PYRO 
TV 
PWR 
IRR 
DC-49 High-gain antenna update PYRO 
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Table 3 (corttd) 
Symbol 
Subsystem 
Name destination 
Direct commands 
Battery test load onloff ( T )  
Disable tolerance detector 
Computer flag 7 interrupt 
Spare 
Downlink on 
Downlink off 
Select 16-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 8-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 4-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 2-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 1-kbps PLBK rate 
Simulate Sun gate 
Select pre-aim backup mode 
Roll gyro on 
Switch pre-aim backup bias 
Open press, PlfProp. 01 ,  F1  
Close pressurant P2 
Close propellant 02 ,  F2 
Open pressurant P3 
Open propellant 03,  F 3  
Close pressurant P4 
Close propellant 04,  F4 
Open pressurant P5 
Open propellant 05 ,  F5  
Charger auto. switchover onfoff ( T )  
PWR 
CC&S 
CC&S 
PYRO 
PWR 
PWR 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
PY RO 
PYRO 
PY RO 
PY RO 
PYRO 
PYRO 
PYRO 
PY RO 
PY RO 
PWR 
Symbol Name 
Subsystem 
destination 
Direct commands 
Propulsion heater onloff ( T ) PWR 
DAS on PWR 
UVS and IRR &/off ( T )  
TV on/off ( T )  
IRIS onfoff ( T )  
Science off 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
Select battery charge rate ( T )  PWR 
Spare D AS 
Switch RTS No. 2 data rate ( T )  DAS 
Computer flag 6 interrupt CC&S 
Enable tolerance detector CC&S 
Computer flag 8 interrupt CC&S 
High-power slew DSS 
Quantitative commands 
-- 
QC-1 Platform cone slew positive SCAN 
QC-2 Platform cone slew negative SCAN 
QC-3 Platform clock slew positive SCAN 
QC-4 Platform clock slew negative SCAN 
Coded commands 
CC-1 Computer load 
CC-2 Computer load 
CC-3 Word interrogate 
CC-4 Sequencer load 
CC-20 DAS coded command 
4. Power subsystem. The power subsystem (75 kg) pro- 
vided a central supply of electrical power to operate the 
electrical equipment on the spacecraft. It  also provided 
the required switching and control functions for the effec- 
tive management and distribution of that power, as well 
as a timing function for some elements of the spacecraft. 
The power, which was derived from four photovoltaic 
solar panels and a rechargeable battery, was converted 
and distributed in the following forms: 
(1) 2.4-kHz, single-phase, square-wave power for engi- 
neering and science subsystems, and for the propul- 
sion module and cone actuator heaters as required. 
(2) 400-Hz, three-phase, quasi-square-wave power to 
the attitude control subsystem for gyro motors. 
(3) 400-Hz, single-~hase, square-wave power for the 
scan platform actuators. 
(4) Regulated 30-Vdc power for the engine valve and 
gimbal actuators. 
(5) Unregulated dc power to the battery charger, other 
heaters, and radio-frequency subsystem (RFS) for 
the TWTA power supply. 
5. Central computer and sequencer s4bsystem. The cen- 
tral computer and sequencer (CC&S) subsystem (10 kg) 
provided timing and sequencing services for the other 
spacecraft subsystems. The memory capacity of MM'71 
CC&S was increased from the 128 words for MM'69 to 
512 words. This new MM'71 design capability provided 
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for verification of the contents of the CC&S memory and 
the contents of the fixed sequencer. 
The sequencing was generated by a special-purpose 
conlputer with fixed sequencer redundancy in the maneu- 
ver mode. Timing and sequencing (except the fixed se- 
quencer) were programmed into the CC&S before launch 
and could be modified during flight by coded command 
P C ) .  
The trajectory correction maneuver was, in the normal 
operating mode, fixed in sequence with roll and yaw 
turns, and spacecraft velocity change (motor firing) in 
that order. Duration and magnitude of turns and magni- 
tude of motor burn were variable by coded commands. 
The normal operating mode, defined as the tandem mode, 
operated the computer part of the CC&S concurrently 
with the fixed sequencer and required that events coin- 
cided between each part. Either the computer or fixed 
sequencer might execute the maneuver independently if 
so directed by direct command (DC). 
The CC&S was capable of sending the commands to 
the subsystems listed in Table 4. Timed events would be 
initiated in six basic sequences: 
(1) Launch. Sequence started with the loading of the 
CC&S program before liftoff, and ended when the 
spacecraft became fully stabilized in flight. The 
first event after launch was programmed to occur 
one hour or more after CC&S inhibit release. 
Launch events were normally programmed with 
minutes resolution after the first event. 
(2) Cruise. Sequence started at the same time as the 
launch sequence and lasted for the duration of the 
mission. Launch, maneuver, and orbital sequences 
were essentially superimposed on the cruise se- 
quence. Cruise events were normally programmed 
with hours resolution. 
( 3 )  Maneuuer. Sequence started by DC command or by 
computer event 5A (see Table 4). CC&S logic was 
modified for MM'71 to include this automatic ma- 
neuver and orbit insertion capability. Four modes 
of maneuver sequencing were possible: the tandem 
mode (normal), the fixed sequencer mode, the 
computer mode, and the parallel mode. The ma- 
neuver sequence was programmed for seconds 
resolution between events. The fixed sequencer 
maneuver could be interrupted by computer event 
5B (see Table 4). 
( 4 )  Pre-orbital insertion. Sequence was comprised of 
calibration sequences for the scan platform and 
TV cameras, conducted during interplanetary 
cruise. Several days before insertion into Mars 
orbit, science data acquisition would begin with 
science instrument turn-on. 
(5) Orbital insertion. Sequence started by DC com- 
mand or by computer event 5A. The orbit insertion 
sequence was the parallel mode where the com- 
puter and sequencer operated in parallel. The 
sequence required both minutes and seconds reso- 
lution between commands. 
(6) Orbit operations. Sequence started after a correct 
orbit was attained and continued for the life of the 
mission, or until changed by coded command. The 
sequence required hours, minutes, and seconds 
reso1,ution with timing controlled by CC&S and 
DAS signals. 
6. Flight telentetry subsystem. The flight telemetry sub- 
system (10 kg), by suitable modulation of the radio sub- 
system RF signal, enabled the formatting and transmitting 
of data on any of three channels: one for engineering, one 
for high-rate science data, and one for low-rate science 
data. While the engineering channel transmitted con- 
tinuously, only one of the two science channels could be 
on at any one time. This subsystem also provided data 
rate, data mode, and modulation index switching. 
7.  Attitude control subsystem. The at t i tude control 
(A/C) subsystem (30 kg) provided continuous spacecraft 
flight stabilization and orientation after separation from 
the launch vehicle. During normal cruise and orbital 
operations, it would automatically orient the spacecraft 
with respect to the lines of sight to the Sun and the star 
Canopus and maintain that orientation by means of the 
A/C cold gas mass expulsion system. 
Upon receipt of commands from the CC&S, the A/C 
subsystem would orient the spacecraft to align the pro- 
pulsion subsystem thrust axis in the direction commanded 
for the trajectory correction maneuver, orbital insertion 
maneuver, or orbital trim maneuvers. During the maneu- 
ver rocket engine firing, the A/C subsystem would main- 
tain spacecraft orientation and stability in pitch and yaw 
by two-axis gimbal control of the rocket engine and in roll 
by the attitude control roll jets. An accelerometer signal 
was provided to the sequencer in the CC&S for control 
of the velocity magnitude. At the end of a maneuver 
sequence, a signal from the CC&S would initiate attitude 
control reorientation of the spacecraft to the Sun and 
Canopus. 
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Table 4. CC&S command list 
Symbol Name Destination Symbol Name Destination 
Test radio 
Transmit low 
TWT low power 
TWT high power 
Transmit high 
Select battery charge rate ( T )  
Battery charger on/off ( T )  
DAS on 
UVS and IRR on/off ( T )  
TV on/off ( T )  
IRIS onloff ( T )  
DSS on/off ( T )  
Scan on/off ( T )  
DAS/TV 2.4 kHz off 
Propulsion heater on/off ( T )  
Downlink on 
Downlink off 
Initiate maneuver sequence 
Sequencer maneuver interrupt 
CC&S B frame start enable 
Engineering mode 
Engineering data rate switch ( 8 %  ) 
Engineering data rate switch (33% ) 
RT science No. 1 mode 
RT science No. 2 mode 
A/C on 
Canopus sensor on 
Adaptive gate step 
Canopus cone angle step 
Autopilot on 
CC&S stray light signal 
Gyros inhibit 
Gyros on 
All axes inertial 
Turn polarity set 
Roll turn 
Yaw turn 
A/C maneuver mode 
RFS 
RFS 
RFS 
RFS 
RFS 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
CC&S 
CCKS 
CCKS 
FTS 
FTS 
FTS 
FTS 
FTS 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
AIC 
A/C 
A/C 
AIC 
A/C 
A/C 
A/C 
Deploy solar panels 
Spare 
Platform unlatch 
High-gain antenna update 
Open press, Pl/propellant 
Close pressurant P2 
Close propellant 0 2 ,  F2 
Open pressurant P3 
Open propellant 03 ,  F3 
Close pressurant P4 
Close propellant 04 ,  F4 
Open pressurant P5 
Open propellant 0 5 ,  F5 
Open/cIose engine valve 
Select 16-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 8-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 4-kbps PLBK rate 
Select 2-kbps PLBK rate 
Select I-kbps PLBK rate 
DSS ready mode 
DSS record mode 
Playback mode 
Advance to track 1 LEOT 
Switch RTS No. 2 data rate ( T )  
Initiate TV mapping sequence 
Take TV picture pair 
Reset DAS orbit logic 
IRIS IMCC mirror enable 
TV beam current on/off 
Platform clock slew positive 
Platform clock slew negative 
Platform cone slew positive 
Platform cone slew negative 
Select scan stow position 
Select scan cone position 
Select variable scan reference 
TV cover deploy 
IRR mirror stow 
PY RO 
PY RO 
PY RO 
PY RO 
PYRO 
PYRO 
PYRO 
PY RO 
PY RO 
PYRO 
PY RO 
PYRO 
PYRO 
PYRO 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DSS 
DAS 
D AS 
DAS 
DAS 
DAS 
D AS 
SCAN 
SCAN 
SCAN 
SCAN 
SCAN 
SCAN 
SCAN 
TV 
IRR 
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Pre-aim logic n7as added for MM'71 to point the engine 
thrust vector through the spacecraft center of mass. A 
digital word that represented the required initial gimbal 
actuator displacement was sent from the CC&S and 
appropriately biased the null extension of the actuators 
before the commanded turns for a specific maneuver. 
The orbital mode of operation was similar to the transit 
cruise mode except that a CC&S signal would be pro- 
vided during expected stray-light conditions. The stray- 
light signal would be generated to coincide with condi- 
tions where the lighted crescent of Mars or reflected light 
from the Martian satellites entered the Canopus sensor 
stray-light field of view. If uncorrected, these conditions 
could cause the Canopus sensor error signal to be unreli- 
able. The mode of operation during these stray-light con- 
ditions would be one in which the A/C subsystem logic, 
upon receiving the stray-light signal, turned on the roll 
gyro and started the fixed-interval timer. The inertial 
reference unit would be commanded into the roll inertial 
hold mode after the fixed interval, and the Canopus 
sensor signal would be replaced as the position referenced 
by signals from the inertial reference unit. When the 
stray-light signal is reset, the Canopus sensor would be 
coinmanded to reacquire Canopus and would be switched 
back into the control loop. Flyback and sweep logic was 
added for the MM'71 attitude control subsystem to pre- 
vent unnecessary roll searches during this sequence. All 
intentional spacecraft torques would be produced by the 
A/C gas system by expelling small amounts of cold gas 
(nitrogen) from the jets at the ends of the solar panels. 
8. Pyrotechnics stcbsystem. Electrically initiated explo- 
sive devices were used for spacecraft separation from the 
Centaur, solar panel release, high-gain antenna position 
change, scan platform release, and propulsion system 
valve actuation. Functions were initiated by either direct 
command to the spacecraft or by commands stored in the 
spacecraft CC&S. Pyrotechnic firing was accomplished by 
capacitor discharge into the intended device. The pyro- 
technic subsystem, including its electronics, weighed 4 kg. 
9. Mechntzical devices subsystem. The devices used in 
this subsystem (25 kg) were associated with latching, 
structural damping, nonservo-controlled actuation, plan- 
etary experiment support, and separation-activated 
switching and release. Mechanical devices included: 
(1) Solar panel boost dampers. 
(2) Solar panel deployment and cruise damper, includ- 
ing the latch and switch assemblies for indications 
of deployment of panels. 
(3) High-gain antenna deployment mechanism. 
(4) Planetary scan platform and scan platform latch. 
(5)  Pyrotechnic arming switch. 
(6) Separation-initiated timer. 
(7) Spacecraft-separation mechanisms. 
(8) Spacecraft V-band clamp (separation from Centaur 
adapter) and ejection springs. 
(9) Medium-gain antenna energy attenuation plug and 
deployment device. 
10. Proprclsion subsystem. The function of the propul- 
sion subsystem was to provide directed impulse, upon 
command, to acconlplish in-transit trajectory corrections, 
an orbital insertion maneuver at encounter to transfer 
from a flyby to an orbiting trajectory about the planet 
Mars, and subsequent orbit trim maneuvers. Empty 
weight of the propulsion subsystem was 87 kg; weight at 
launch was 577 kg including 476 kg of propellant and 
14 kg of pressurant gas. 
This storable hypergolic bi-propellant propulsion sub- 
system was an integrated, pressure-fed, multi-start, fixed- 
thrust subsystem that used nitrogen tetroxide (NzO,) 
oxidizer and monomethylhydrazine (MMH) fuel as pro- 
pellants. Early in the propulsion subsystem design, four 
propellant tanks were considered and discarded in favor 
of two tanks (Ref. 27). The primary subassemblies of this 
design were a dual-tank nitrogen reservoir, a pressurant 
control assembly that provided pressurant isolation and 
regulation, two check and relief valve assemblies, two 
propellant isolation assemblies, a gimballed 1334-newton 
(300-lbf) thrust rocket engine assembly with an elec- 
trically operated bi-propellant valve, and the propulsion 
module structure. The rocket engine contained a thick 
beryllium combustion chamber which conducted heat 
rapidly and was cooled by fuel sprayed on the inside 
walls. The nozzle was made of high-temperature steel 
and was radiantly cooled during firings. 
The subsystem was pressurized by gaseous nitrogen 
from high-pressure storage tanks. Welded or brazed 
tubing and component connections were used. Metal 
seals were used to minimize the effects of irradiation, 
hard vacuum, temperature, and long-term storage on 
critical subsystem joints. Multiple pyrotechnic valves, 
arranged in three groups with normally open and nor- 
mally closed valve branches, provided the capability to 
isolate propellant and pressurant for the long periods of 
space storage. The subsystem was capable of being fueled, 
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pressurized, and monitored before installation on the 
spacecraft. 
At launch, the propellants and high-pressure gas supply 
were isolated by the pyrotechnic valve assemblies. Before 
the trajectory correction maneuver, the engine valve was 
opened momentarily to bleed the air trapped between the 
normally closed propellant pyro valves and the engine 
valve. Actuation of the first set of propulsion valves 
allowed the propellant tanks to build up to operating 
pressure and allowed propellant flows to the engine 
valve. Commanding the main engine valve open caused 
the propellants to flow into the thrust chamber and mix, 
undergo hypergolic ignition, and continue to burn until 
the engine valve was closed when the desired velocity 
increment was obtained. The propellant and pressurant 
lines were then closed to guard against leakage when 
tracking data confirmed that no more propulsion maneu- 
vers would be required before the nominal time of another 
trajectory correction or for Mars orbit insertion (MOI). 
After tracking data confirmed correct orbital character- 
istics, the propdsion fluids would be isolated by the 
operation of pyro valves for the rest of the cruise mission. 
Commands for event sequencing originated from the 
CC&S and/or the flight command subsystem. Actuation 
of pyro valves and management of solenoid power was 
accomplished by power switching in the pyrotechnics sub- 
system. Thrust vector control was provided by the A/C 
subsystenl through the use of gimbal actuators for pitch 
and yaw control and cold-gas jets for roll control. 
11. Temperature control. The temperature of the space- 
craft was controlled by the temperature control subsystem 
(13 kg) so that all equipment would function correctly in 
the potentially damaging flight thermal environment. The 
four major variables that affected the temperature of 
spacecraft elements were incident solar radiation, elec- 
trical power dissipation, thermal transfer between com- 
ponents, and thermal radiation of the spacecraft into 
space. Various passive (shields, thermal blankets, paint, 
polished surfaces) and active devices (variable-emittance 
louver assemblies) were used to achieve temperature 
control. 
Multi-layer thermal blankets were employed on the 
sunlit and anti-solar (top and bottom) sides of the space- 
craft. Both blankets were lightweight thermal boundaries. 
The purpose of the top blanket was to isolate the propul- 
sion module and bus from the Sun; the bottom blanket 
minimized thermal gradients within the bus and forced 
the internally dissipated power to be rejected to space 
through the louvered bay faces. A third blanket controlled 
heat losses from science instruments on the planetary 
scan platform. 
Thermostatically actuated louvers were installed on all 
spacecraft bays except Bays IV and VI. Bay IV was 
covered with a polished, low-emittance aluminum shield, 
and Bay VI was covered with high-emittance white paint. 
12. Data storage srrbsystem. Many times during the 
mission, the spacecraft would acquire data faster than the 
data could be transmitted to Earth. The data storage 
subsystem (DSS) (11 kg) stored the data on a digital tape 
recorder until it could be transmitted to Earth at  a slower 
rate. This "all digital" tape recorder was added to the 
MM'71 design because of its greater compatibility with 
the science instruments and on-board data handling 
equipment. 
The DSS recorded data supplied by the data automa- 
tion subsystem in the form of a serial stream of pulses. 
The data, recorded at a rate of 132.2 kbps, consisted pri- 
marily of digitized video from the television subsystem 
formatted with data from the other science instruments. 
About 32 TV pictures could be stored on the 1.8 X los-bit 
capacity tape. Recording was automatically stopped (1) 
when the tape recorder was filled, (2) by command from 
the CC&S, or (3) by ground command. When the ground 
antennas of the DSN were ready to accept the data, the 
data were played back through the flight telemetry sub- 
system to the radio-frequency subsystem at a slower rate 
than recorded. Five playback data rates (16.2, 8.1, 4.05, 
2.025, and 1.0125 kbps) were available and selectable by 
commands from the flight command subsystem or the 
CC&S. 
13. Data azltomation subsystem. The data automation 
subsystem (DAS) (6 kg) acted as the signal interface 
between the science instruments and all other subsystems 
of the spacecraft. This subsystem: 
(1) Controlled and synchronized the science instru- 
ments within a fixed timing and format structure 
and sent commands to the instruments as required 
so that the instrument internal sequencing was 
known. 
(2) Provided the necessary sampling rates, both simul- 
taneous and sequential, to ensure meaningful 
science data. 
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(3) Performed the necessary conversions and encoding 
of the several forms of science data, and placed 
them in a suitable format. 
(4) Buffered the science data and sent it either to the 
flight telemetry subsystem at 50 bps, 8.1 kbps, or 
16.2 kbps, or to the data storage subsystem at 
132.2 kbps for later playback as appropriate. 
(5)  Issued and received commands that pertain to the 
operation of the science instruments to and from 
other spacecraft subsystems. 
(6) Issued timing "cues" to CC&S for orbital opera- 
tions sequencing. 
14. Scan control subsystem. The scan control subsys- 
tem (8 kg) provided precise angular pointing control of 
the two-degree-of-freedom (clock and cone axes) gim- 
balled support structure or platform, upon which the 
science instruments were mounted. 
At launch, the scan platform was secured in the stowed 
position. One day after launch, a direct ground command 
or CC&S event signalled the pyrotechnics subsystem to 
unlatch the scan platform. 
The scan platform would be used in the following 
modes: pre-orbital television, orbital science, and orbital 
cruise. In the pre-orbital television mode, the platform 
would be moved so that a series of television pictures 
could be taken of the planet. In the orbital science mode, 
the platform would be stepped sequentially through a 
series of pointing directions. The scan pointing positions 
would be directed in flight, and during the orbital 
sequence, by CC&S commands or ground quantitative 
commands. 
Reference potentiometers would control the clock and 
cone angles for the start of the pre-orbital and orbital 
science sequences. The reference potentiometers were 
coupled through a gear train to step motors. Identical 
clock and cone sequencing circuits supplied pulses to turn 
the step and reference potentiometer motors. In a typical 
scan operation, the sequencing circuits received either 
clockwise or counterclockwise pulses, spaced one second 
apart, from either the flight command subsystem or 
CC&S. Each pulse resulted in a Y4-deg platform motion. 
The scan platform could be pointed to within Yz deg 
of a desired direction (all error sources considered includ- 
ing the A/C limit cycle uncertainty); after moving the 
platform to the desired position, the actual direction could 
be ascertained to within Y4 deg on both cone and clock 
angles. Achievement of these accuracies was the result of 
a combination of prelaunch ground calibrations and in- 
flight calibrations (Ref. 28). 
15. Science instruments and experiments. The Mariner 
Mars 1971 experiments included television (TV), u'itra- 
violet spectroscopy (UVS), infrared radiometry (IRR), 
infrared interferometer spectroscopy (IRIS), S-band occul- 
tation, and celestial mechanics. Data for the latter two 
experiments would be obtained by using the radio sub- 
system. Instruments for each of the other experiments 
were mounted on the scan platform and, along with the 
wide-angle camera (A), boresighted with the television 
narrow-angle camera (B). 
a. Television. The television subsystem (26 kg) used in 
this experiment consisted of two television cameras (wide- 
and narrow-angle) mounted on the spacecraft's planetary 
scan platform. The camera optics and some parts of the 
supporting electronics were identical to the equipment 
used on Mariners 6 and 7. The wide-angle camera (Fig. 3) 
MECHANISM 
MECHANISM 
HOUSING SUPPORT PLATE 
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Fig. 3. Wide-angle television camera 
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Fig. 4. Narrow-angle television camera 
has a rectangular nominal field of view of 11 X 14 deg 
and a nominal focal length of 50 mm. The narrow-angle 
camera (Fig. 4) has a rectangular nominal field of view 
of 1.1 X 1.4 deg and a nominal focal length of about 
500 mm. The resolution of objects in the field of view of 
each camera is dependent on the line-of-sight range to 
the object. With the cameras looking vertically downward 
at the surface and the spacecraft at an altitude of 1250 km, 
the wide- and narrow-angle cameras can detect objects 
under about 1 and 0.1 km, respectively. The television 
camera parameters are summarized in Table 5. 
b. Ultraviolet spectrometer. The UVS subsystem (16 kg) 
used an Ebert-Fastie type of spectrometer. The optical 
view is a front surface (mirror) telescope through which 
ultraviolet light enters and is split into its component 
wavelengths by a reflection diffraction grating. Two exit 
slits allow two measurement channels. The detectors are 
photomultiplier tubes with specific photocathode and 
Table 5. Camera performance 
Wide-angle Narrow-angle 
Characteristic camera camera 
Focal length, mma 50 500 
Focal ratio f14.0 f12.35 
Shutter speed range, msa 3 to 6144 3 to 6144 
Automatic shutter speeds, msa 48, 96, 192 6, 12, 24 
Angular field of view, dega 11 x 14 1.1 X 1.4 
Active vidicon target raster, mma 9.6 X 12.5 9.6 X 12.5 
Scan lines per frame 700 700 
Picture elements per line 832 832 
Bitslpicture element 9 9 
Frame time, s 42 42 
aNominal values. 
window materials that provide additional wavelength 
discrimination. 
The ultraviolet~spectrometer on Mariner 9 (Fig. 5)  was 
basically the same as that on Mariners 6 and 7, with 
some modifications. The channel 1 photomultiplier is an 
F tube instead of an N tube and has a spectral range of 
145 to 350 nanometers (1450 to 3500 angstroms). A step 
gain amplifier incorporated with this channel provides 
control over the expected range of surface brightness. The 
spacial resolution was maximized by reducing the field of 
view to 0.17 X 0.48 deg from 0.25 by 2.5 deg used by 
Mariners 6 and 7. The channel 2 photomultiplier tube (G)  
has a spectral range from 110 to 190 nanometers (.1100 to 
1900 angstroms) and a field of view of 0.17 X 1.20 deg. 
One spectral sweep of each channel would be recorded 
each 3 s. 
c. Infrared radiometer. The infrared radiometer sub- 
system (3 kg) used an instrument (Fig. 6) to provide 
brightness temperatures of the Martian surface by 
measuring the energy radiated in the 8- to 12-p,m and 
18- to 25-p,m wavelength bands. By using refractive optics, 
infrared radiation is focused on detectors, which use 
13-junction bismuth-antimony thermopiles, in two inde- 
pendent channels. The channels have fields of view of 
0.5 and 0.7 deg, respectively, and provide resolutions of 
about 11 and 15 km at a range of 1250 km. Although 
the Mariner 9 radiometer was basically the same as that 
flown on Mariners 6 and 7, it had been modified to pro- 
vide clearer definition of the fields of view. 
Infrared radiometric measurements of the Martian sur- 
face temperature would be made in each wavelength 
band at 1.2-s intervals. 
Inflight calibration would be performed once each 
42 s by pointing the 3-position scan mirror alternately at 
an internal thermal reference surface (whose temperature 
is independently monitored) and at deep space (which 
serves as a zero-energy reference). 
d.  Infrared interferometer spectrometer. The instru- 
ment used by the IRIS subsystem (23 kg) was a Michelson 
interferometer spectrometer similar to that used for the 
Nimbus I11 and IV meteorological Earth satellites, with 
modifications made in the mechanical, optical and elec- 
trical components (Fig. 7). An essential part of the instru- 
ment is the cesium iodide beamsplitter, which divides the 
incoming radiation into two approximately equal com- 
ponents. After reflection from the fixed and moving 
mirrors, respectively, the two beams are recombined and 
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Fig. 5. Ultraviolet spectrometer 
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Fig. 6. Infrared radiometer 
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Fig. 7. Infrared interferometer spectrometer 
form an interference pattern with a phase difference pro- 
portional to the optical path difference between both 
beams. The interference pattern is focused on the de- 
tector, where the intensity is recorded as a function of 
path difference. Radiometrically accurate spectra are 
recovered by means of extensive computer processing on 
the ground. 
The spectral range covered by the Mariner 9 instru- 
ment is 6 to 50 pm (1600 cm-I to 200 cm-I), with 2.4-cm-I- 
wide (apodized) spectral resolution elements. The spatial 
(geometric) resolution is about 100 km for an altitude of 
1250 knl with the 4.5-deg conical field of view. One 
spectrum (interferogram) would be recorded each 21 s. 
16. Spacecraft/lnz4nch vehicle interface. Peculiar re- 
quirements placed on the Launch Vehicle System were 
classified in two categories: 
(1) Interface (hardware) design. 
a. IiTardzoare Interface Paizel. Members of the Hard- 
ware Interface Panel, appointed from JPL and LeRC, 
were under two co-chairmen, one from each organization. 
Efforts of the Panel were directed ~rimari ly at the inter- 
faces between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle, and 
between the spacecraft and its operational support equip- 
ment at the launch complex. Panel areas of responsibility 
included environmental requirements and design criteria, 
electrical and mechanical design requirements, electro- 
magnetic interference, and ground support equipment 
requirements. 
The Hardware Interface Panel held 11 meetings during 
the period from December 11, 1968 to February 12, 1971 
at approximately 6-wk intervals at JPL in Pasadena, at 
LeRC in Cleveland, or GD/CA in San Diego. The Panel 
was superseded during launch preparations at Cape 
Kennedy by the activities of the Launch Operations 
Working Group, which had similar functions and strut- 
- - 
(2) Mission requirements. ture, and more frequent meetings. 
Hardware requirements were documented and both 
document and drawings were subject to negotiation and 
sign-off by JPL and LeRC. A panel known as the 
Mariner Mars 1971 Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Hardware 
Interface Panel was established to have responsibility 
over the technical contents of the Interface Control 
Documents, and to ensure the timely execution of these 
requirements. A working group, the Atlas/Centaur/ 
Mariner Mars 1971 Performance, Trajectory, and Guid- 
ance Working Group, was established to have responsi- 
bility over the mission requirements interface. 
b. Performance, Traiectory, and Guidance ( P T b G )  
Working Group. The members of the PT&G Working 
Group were comprised of personnel appointed from JPL, 
LeRC, GD/CA, and TRW; the Chairman was from 
LeRC. The purpose of this working group was to con- 
tinually review, compile, evaluate, interchange data, and 
assess the performance of the trajectory launch period 
and the guidance and control requirements of the Atlas/ 
Centaur for the Mariner Mars 1971 Project. In addition, 
the working group was to pinpoint problems in these 
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areas, determine possible courses of action, and recom- 
mend solutions. 
6. Spacecraft Sequence implementation 
The design of spacecraft flight sequences, in response 
to the Mission Design Team's identification of orbital 
science sequences for the two complementary missions, 
suggested early in the project the desirability for a set of 
spacecraft functional sequences that could be used as 
basic building "blocks" with which each science sequence 
could be implemented. These sequences were identified 
and broadened to cover the prelorbital phase of the 
mission, and to include all spacecraft operations which re- 
quired more than a single event to implement a given 
function. The spacecraft blocks were documented in the 
Spacecraft Block Dictionary (Ref. 29). In addition, an 
1108 computer program, called SEQGEN, was designed 
on the basis of blocks to facilitate the production of 
orbital sequences using required science data (TV pic- 
tures, times, clock and cone angles of the scan platform, 
etc.) as inputs. These tools were transferred to the MOS 
organization during operations, and used extensively 
throughout the mission. 
I. Spacecraft blocks. The set of spacecraft blocks was 
identified through combined efforts of the Mission De- 
sign and the Spacecraft Design Teams, and established as 
the basis for all spacecraft operations in flight. Since all 
operational sequences were required to be compatible 
with blocks, the latter became the standard for establish- 
ing the feasibility of all required spacecraft operations. 
As such, they were used as the criterion for satisfying the 
requirement that the system test program verified the 
spacecraft's capability to perform the mission. When flight . 
operations began, the blocks were transferred to the 
control of the MOS, with the stipulation that any new 
block identified during this period had to be tested on 
the proof test model (PTM) before being used in the 
flight spacecraft. 
2. SEQGEN. The 1108 program SEQGEN included all 
of the blocks necessary for the acquisition and return to 
Earth of science data. The prelaunch program was used 
to produce the baseline sequences generated by the Mis- 
sion Sequence Working Group, and the spacecraft base- 
line sequences for the Spacecraft Flight Sequence (Ref. 
30). After orbit insertion, SEQGEN became the primary 
planning and documentation tool for the spacecraft team 
in generating daily operational sequences, and, as such, 
was updated whenever new blocks were incorporated or 
changes were required to existing blocks. 
D. Spacecraft Design Verification 
1. Environnzental tests 
a. Introduction. The Mariner Mass 1971 Environmental 
Test Program was established within the project require- 
ment that MM'69 basic technology and procedures be 
adopted to the extent possible without compromising the 
environmental test objectives. A successful program was 
conducted in compliance with this requirement. 
b. Program objective and plzilosophy. Environmental 
testing of MM'71 spacecraft demonstrated that the space- 
craft design was capable of performing satisfactorily 
throughout exposure to mission-type environments while 
retaining its functional integrity. 
In pursuit of this objective, the environmental require- 
ments philosophy embodied type approval (TA) of a 
design model and flight acceptance (FA) testing of flight 
equipment on both the spacecraft subsystem/assembly 
and system levels. Type approval tests provided equip- 
ment design verification under environmental conditions 
exceeding those expected during the actual mission. 
Flight acceptance testing demonstrated the flight equip- 
ment to be representative of the equipment design and 
quality verified in the TA tests. 
c. Origin of test requiremlents, Dynamic launch envi- 
ronments consist of the internal nose fairing acoustic field, 
random vibration, and booster-induced transients. Esti- 
mates of these environments were derived from Surveyor 
and MM'69 flight data. The vibration test series con- 
sisted of a swept sinusoidal and randonz vibration com- 
bination and an acoustic noise test at assembly levels. In 
addition, swept sinusoidal vibration, acoustic noise, and 
pyrotechnic shocks were imposed at the spacecraft system 
level. 
Thermal vacuum estimates were derived for the most 
critical environments anticipated for the spacecraft. These 
estimates were based on data obtained during past pro- 
grams, on the thermal characteristics of the spacecraft, 
mission trajectory, and various ground operations. 
Thermal vacuum, thermal shock, and temperature tests 
were developed from these estimates for assembly-level 
qualification. System-level environmental testing con- 
sisted of exposure to thermal vacuum. 
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) test requirements 
originated from environmental estimates of Cape Ken- 
nedy RFI sources, umbilical and separation connector elec- 
trical transient measurements, launch support equipment 
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long line electrical transients, and internal spacecraft noise. 
The tests consisted of R F  simulation, spacecraft sequenc- 
ing, and umbilical and separation connector transient 
tests. These tests were conducted at the spacecraft system 
IeveI. 
d. Comparison with MM'69 Environmental Test Pro- 
gram. A significant portion of the MM'71 spacecraft sys- 
tem design and hardware was carried over from the 
MM'69 program. Where possible, the design verification 
status from MM'69 TA tests was maintained for MM'71. 
As a result of this commonality and program resource 
constraints, fewer TA tests were conducted for thk MM'71 
Project than for MM'69. Limited spacecraft hardware 
availability also dictated that MM'71 PTM equipment 
serve the dual role of TA test article and flight spares. 
Table 6 presents a comparison of the number of TA 
and FA assembly-level tests performed on the Mariner 
projects. 
Another departure from past programs was the substi- 
tution of acoustic testing for random vibration testing for 
both PTM and flight system-level tests. The MM'71 
system-level acoustic testing provided a well-controlled, 
more realistic set of simulations of the liftoff environment. 
PTM and flight system-level sinusoidal vibration was 
performed in the spacecraft Z-axis only. In the past, 
sinusoidal vibration testing was required in three axes. 
DTM data revealed that cross coupling was present, pro- 
ducing a multi-axial response of the spacecraft. The con- 
servation of schedule time and avoidance of test control 
problems were also influencing factors in the decision to 
test in a single axis. 
During the derivation of the MM771 system-level tem- 
perature test requirements, additional consideration was 
devoted to those subsystems that required the system- 
level environment for an adequate temperature vacuum 
test. This approach resulted in a clearly established set 
of test requirements that fulfilled the objectives of space- 
craft thermal vacuum testing in a minimal time duration. 
A final basic difference between the MM'71 program 
and past programs was the conduct of formal Project 
reviews of the MM'71 subsystem required tests. All 
segments of the Project were invited to participate. This 
resulted in a wider understanding throughout the Project 
of the background relating to the establishment of the 
subsystem environmental test matrix. The investigation 
and closure of the action items from the Review Board 
provided additional confidence that the proposed test 
program was effective and complete. 
Table 6- Mariner Mars 1991 assembly tests/spacecrafi 
Number of Total number Tests per 
Project spacecraft 
of tests spacecraft 
e. Progranz results (assenzbly tests). The subsystem/ 
assembly-level environmental test program adequately 
met the guidelines set forth in the test philosophy and 
objectives. Maximum utilization of available subsystem 
schedule time and Project resources was strived for 
throughout the program. The assembly-level tests identi- 
fied the need for some design improvements that were 
incorporated prior to system-level testing. Additionally, 
a data base on subsystem response under environmental 
exposure was generated. This data enhanced the under- 
standing of subsystem in-flight behavior. 
f .  Progranz results (systenz tests). The environmental 
dynamic test program demonstrated the environmental 
integrity of the MM'71 design and the flight worthiness of 
each flight spacecraft. Each system-level dynamic test 
adequately achieved its objectives. Deviations from the 
specified requirements did occur in some instances, but 
were thoroughly evaluated and determined to be accept- 
able. 
The system-level space simulator testing had adequately 
met the MM'71 Project objectives within the guidelines set 
forth by the test philosophy. The space simulator system 
test demonstrated the capability of the total system in the 
thermal vacuum environment. The assembly equipment 
which was not tested in a thermal vacuum environment at 
the assembly level received this exposure on the space- 
craft. The system test further demonstrated the perfor- 
mance of those assemblies whose assembly-level test re- 
quirements were reduced. 
The Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) RFI Simu- 
lation Test generally met the desired objectives. Test- 
level deviations occurred on two radiation sources during 
PTM testing, but were sufficient to evaIuate the space- 
craft functional performance within this environment. 
The Umbilical and Separation Connector Transient 
Test was accomplished with some adjustments to speci- 
fied requirements. The test avoided any danger of 
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damaging circuits that could have been susceptible to the 
test implementation approach, but were not considered 
to be of concern in the expected real environment. The 
test met its intended objectives. 
The Umbilical and Separation Connector Removal Test 
successfully accomplished its objective of verifying that 
the connector removal would not induce transients on the 
interrupted circuits, 
The spacecraft tests, repeated frequently, provided the 
test for electromagnetic sensitivity and sources within the 
spacecraft itself, and results were very satisfactory in pro- 
viding acceptance of the design. 
2. Ftinctionnl tests 
a.  General. Functional testing of the Mariner Mars 
1971 spacecraft was accomplished by the spacecraft sys- 
tem test program, the purpose of which was to: 
(1) Plan the process of electrical and mechanical as- 
sembly. 
(2) Demonstrate subsystem specified performance and 
subsystem interface. 
(3) Verify the design of the spacecraft in simulated 
mission exercises. 
(4) Confirm interfaces with launch vehicle, MOS, TDS. 
(5)  Define normal performance for mission reference. 
(6) Perform problem diagnosis and reverification of im- 
paired hardware. 
(7) Provide two spacecraft systems, tested, prepared, 
qualified, and ready to launch at the prescribed 
dates for the 1971 launch opportunity. 
(8) Provide a third spacecraft system (PTM) tested to 
qualify spares to support the flight systems, to 
demonstrate design acceptance, and to serve as a 
pathfinder for the entire test program. 
The ideal system test program would verify all param- 
eters on the spacecraft in all operating modes and with 
all expected environments. However, the ability to accom- 
plish this ideal was constrained by Earth environments, 
facility and support equipment limitations, simulation 
limitations, and inability to perform hazardous or 
destructive-type operations. Therefore, compromises in- 
duced by constraints were compensated by subsystem- 
level tests, analytical verification, or demonstration by 
similar units. 
System test operations began with the inspection, certi- 
fication, and assembly of subsystems into a complete 
spacecraft system; included the performance of subsystem 
integration tests, system tests, environmental tests, inter- 
face tests, and special tests; and concluded with launch 
operations at the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR). 
The spacecraft systems test, the major test element, was 
designed as a comprehensive exercise and verification of 
the system performance of the complete spacecraft through 
all mission phases and modes including backups. This 
test, together with the spacecraft readiness test and space 
environment simulation test, exercised all ground com- 
mands (direct, quantitative, and coded) and all 
commands generated on board the spacecraft. All space- 
craft blocks were tested during the operational sequences 
included in these tests. 
The controlling docun~ent for all spacecraft systems 
tests and operations was the Mariner Mars 1971 Space- 
craft System Test and Operations Plan (Ref. 31). A series 
of Test Phase Directives (Ref. 32) based on this plan 
was written which formed the basis for detailed test 
procedures and other test material. 
b .  Proof test model (PTM) objectives and requirements. 
The PTM spacecraft (MM71-3) was used for spacecraft 
design verification. I t  was subjected to a variety of tests, 
some of which were conducted under more severe condi- 
tions than would normally be expected in flight (e.g., 
type approval tests) in order to verify design and operat- 
ing margins. In general, when PTM testing revealed the 
need for a design change, the change was incorporated 
and tested on the PTM before incorporation on the flight 
spacecraft. 
The primary objective of PTM testing was to verify 
spacecraft design and thereby determine the degree to 
which the assembled spacecraft met its design criteria. 
Supplementary objectives that needed to be fulfilled in 
order to attain the primary objective are shown in Table 7. 
The test plan for the h4ariner Mars 1971 PTM space- 
craft was developed to assure efficient use of the sched- 
uled test time providing the maximum knowledge of 
spacecraft performance. As a result, approximately 8 mo 
were allocated for PTM testing at Pasadena. The test 
schedule gave precedence to the following types of tests: 
(1) Those tests that were likely to reveal design defi- 
ciencies requiring lead-time for investigation, re- 
work, and retest. 
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Table 9. Proof test model spacecraft supplementary 
test objectives 
Type of objective Detailed objective 
Interface 
con~patibility and 
system performance 
Parameter variation 
and failure mode 
Environmental 
perfor~nance 
Miscellaneous 
Verify that each subsystem, while operating 
on the spacecraft, meets the requirements 
of its functional requirement and design 
requirement. 
Verify that all analog, digital, and power 
signals from subsystem to subsystenl are 
within tolerance and remain so throughout 
the test program. 
Demonstrate that the spacecraft will 
perform all "logic functions" in all 
appropriate operational modes. 
Verify that the interface circuits meet 
the requirements for grounding and 
isolation. 
Demonstrate the operational capability 
of all spacecraft-to-Earth data links and 
Earth-to-spacecraft comn~and links. 
Demonstrate the ability of backup circuits 
to correct for failures in primary functions. 
Verify that backup circuitry or redundant 
paths, when in their quiescent modes, 
do not interfere with the proper operation 
of the primary circuitry. 
Determine the effect on the spacecraft 
system of certain selected failure modes 
and develop possible corrective 
procedures. 
Evaluate system performance characteristics 
during a planned series of parameter 
variations of extremes of tolerance. 
Demonstrate that the spacecraft system 
will perfom1 to specification during and 
after having been subjected to 
environments in excess of those expected 
during test, launch, and mission. 
Demonstrate spacecraft system operability 
when subjected to a simulated space 
environment where temperature levels 
exceed those expected during a nominal 
mission. 
Verify spacecraft failure protection logic. 
Determine failure rates within the time 
available. 
Develop and verify system test procedures. 
Develop and train personnel. 
(2) Those tests that provided data that allowed for an 
evaluation of the overall spacecraft design. 
(3) Those tests upon which other tests were dependent. 
(4) Repeat testing for development of data for statis- 
tical use. 
Secondary considerations used to determine test pri- 
orities were: 
(1) A greater portion of the allotted test time would be 
given to those spacecraft elements which were new 
in concept and had no previous flight experience. 
(2) Emphasis would be given those tests which re- 
quired a spacecraft environment, as opposed to 
those which could be performed off the spacecraft. 
The Pasadena operations schedule was based on the 
considerations outlined above. When conflicts regarding 
the use of the Mariner Mars 1971 PTM arose, priorities 
were used to resolve the conflict. This schedule was de- 
veloped in November 1969, but revisions were necessary 
during the course of test operations due to a variety of 
causes, such as late equipment deliveries, equipment re- 
turn for repair and rework, equipment failures, problem 
investigations, etc. 
c. Flight spacecraft objectives and requirements. The 
primary objective of the flight spacecraft test plan was 
to provide two fully qualified, flight-accepted spacecraft 
for the first day of the available launch period of the 
1971 Mars launch opportunity. 
To meet the primary objective, the total Pasadena 
assembly and test time (about 5 mo) was scheduled based 
on the following considerations: 
(1) The testing was not for design verification as it 
was for the PTM spacecraft, but rather to verify 
that the equipment operated normally to design 
specifications. The testing was primarily concerned 
with acceptance and used the test data obtained 
from the PTM spacecraft as a standard against 
which to check flight spacecraft performance. 
(2) The spacecraft had to operate through a complete 
mission sequence in a simulated space environment 
without major failure. A major failure was defined 
as one that would prohibit the successful comple- 
tion of the mission; e.g., a power failure would be 
considered major, whereas a temperature trans- 
ducer failure would be considered minor. 
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(3) The spacecraft would be shipped to AFETR only 
upon successful completion of the preshipment sys- 
tem test at JPL. A successful system test was de- 
fined as one in which no major failure occurred. 
(4) The same procedures and careful initial power 
application and subsystem interface tests were to 
be performed on all three spacecraft (PTM and two 
flight spacecraft). 
(5) Verification tests were required on all subsystems to 
ensure that their performance was within specifica- 
tions and compared closely to those of the PTM 
spacecraft. 
(6) The environmental tests, both vibration and space 
simulation, were scheduled to be performed as close 
to the shipping time as possible. The object was to 
give maximum assurance that the equipment which 
would be committed to the mission was used to 
meet the qualifications stated in (1) above. 
(7) The testing had to ensure compatibility of the space- 
craft and all other elements utilized in the Mariner 
Mars 1971 mission. Spacecraft data were made 
available to the Mission Operations System and 
Deep Space Network, and, in addition, formal 
compatibility tests were run. Compatibility tests 
between the spacecraft, Mission Operations System, 
Deep Space Network, launch complex equipment, 
Centaur shroud and adapter, Centaur RF systems, 
and supporting personnel were performed at 
various times during the overall test program. 
The test plan recognized the importance of the PTM 
spacecraft in establishing the standards and procedures 
that were used to qualify the flight spacecraft. Therefore, 
the amount of time that was spent on various phases of 
the flight spacecraft test plan was, in general, less than 
that used for the PTM spacecraft. As in the case of the 
PTM, the flight spacecraft test schedule also underwent 
revision to accommodate various problems. 
In general, the flight spacecraft test sequence followed 
the same pattern as the PTM spacecraft program. How- 
ever, unlike the PTM spacecraft, where one objective was 
to become acquainted with the overall system behavior as 
early as possible, the flight spacecraft were required to 
successfully pass each test in the sequence before advanc- 
ing to the next test in the sequence. The flight spacecraft 
ordinarily were not used for detailed troubleshooting as 
was the PTM spacecraft, but, rather, the problems were 
transferred to the PTM spacecraft when possible. Ex- 
ploratory testing that required test setups ordinarily was 
not permitted on the flight spacecraft. 
If the problem was peculiar to the flight spacecraft 
and could not be esanlined on the PTM or flight spare 
spacecraft or at the subsystem level, the problem was 
necessarily investigated in its OWXI spacecraft environment. 
When this was the case, the cognizant engineer and 
quality assurance personnel gave special attention to the 
test to preclude equipment damage. 
d. Test team orgafzization. The spacecraft test and 
operations program was carried out under the direction 
of the Test and Operations Manager who utilized two 
Test Direction Teams for performance of test operations. 
One team was responsible for the PTM (MM71-3) and 
Flight 1 (MM71-1) activities and the other team handled 
Flight 2 (MM71-2) activities. 
The test teams were supported by a documentation 
group, a data system group, and an operations support 
group. The functional organization for test activities is 
depicted in Fig. 8. 
e. Test and operations. The Mariner Mars 1971 test 
and operations program began on March 10, 1970. The 
initiating event was the receipt of the octagon structure, 
scan platform, and the upper ring, lower ring, and power 
wiring harness for the PTM. Receipt of subsystem equip- 
ment and buildup for electrical testing continued through 
March 17, concurrent with buildup of the system test 
complex in preparation for test of the power subsystem 
followed by initial power application to the spacecraft 
which occurred on March 25,1970. As equipment became 
available, it was integrated into the spacecraft system, 
concurrent with test operations which continued through 
the remaining test phases at Pasadena. The space simula- 
tion test for the PTM spacecraft was conducted in two 
phases. Phase I was conducted to demonstrate spacecraft 
functional performance while operating in a simulated 
space environment. Phase I1 was conducted to verify the 
temperature control design of the spacecraft. The space 
simulation test for the flight spacecraft was conducted in 
one continuous test. 
Vibration testing of the PTM spacecraft was performed 
in the Z-axis at flight acceptance (FA) and type approval 
(TA) test levels. The flight spacecraft vibration tests were 
conducted at flight acceptance test levels only. 
Flight spacecraft testing proceeded generally in the 
same order as the PTM operations. Simultaneous testing 
of two spacecraft required full participation of each test 
team and a two-shift operation during much of the test 
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SPACECRAFT SYSTEM MANAGER 
I I 
TEST AND OPERATIONS MANAGER 
GROUP 
TEST AND OPERATIONS SECTION 293 
1 
TEST DIRECTION 
TEAM 1 
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SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS 
DOCUMENTATION GROUP 
DATA AND OPERATIONS 
ANALYSIS GROUP 
OPERATIONS SUPPORT 
e SCIENCE PAYLOAD INTEGRATION e LAUNCH VEHICLE INTEGRATION 
0 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS e TRACKING AND DATA SYSTEMS 
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0 MISSION ANALYSIS AND 0 MISSION AND TEST COMPUTER SYSTEM 
ENGINEERING 
PROJECT SCIENCE/EXPERIMENT 
0 MISSION OPERATIONS SYSTEM REPRESENTATIVES 
Fig. 8. Functional organization for test activities 
period, The number of problems or failures was consider- 
ably less than those on the PTM and thus proved the 
value of a good PTM test program. Details on the prob- 
lems and failures may be found in Ref. 33. 
f .  Mission and test computer system operations. The 
Mariner Mars 1971 Project selected the mission and test 
computer (MTC) to process the spacecraft data during 
system testing launch operations and mission operations. 
The MTC is an outgrowth of the spacecraft computer 
checkout facility (SCCF) used in the Mariner Mars 1964 
Project, the Surveyor Project, and the latter part of the 
Mariner Mars 1969 Project. The SCCF was expanded by 
the addition of one dual processor computer and renamed 
the MTC prior to the start of system test operations. The 
SCCF included two UNIVAC 1219 computers and one 
UNIVAC 1218. A UNIVAC 9300 input/output terminal 
was added during the MM'69 Project. The MTC retained 
all of those computers and added a UNIVAC 1230 mobile 
tactical computer for the MM'71 Project. The 1230 is a 
dual processor used primarily as a preprocessor for high- 
rate data. 
The MTC included the mission and test video subsys- 
tem (MTVS) for both system test and mission operations. 
The MTVS consisted of two media conversion film re- 
corders (MCFR), scan converters, a data disk, a high- 
resolrrtion (1000-line) monitor system, and film processing 
capability. The system test operations used only the two 
film recorders and the associated film processing. The 
film recorders were basically the two recorders from the 
Surveyor video data processing subsystem (TV-1 and 
TV-11). The two recorders were extensively modified and 
rebuilt to improve the quality of the product. One of the 
film recorders (formerly TV-11) was mounted in an air- 
ride trailer van, \vhich also included a film processing 
capability. This stand-alone van was used at the Air 
Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) during the MM'71 
prelaunch test operations. 
The MTC processed a wide variety of raw data which 
included five telemetry streams, two ground command 
streams, one on-board command stream, many discrete 
status and event signals, one multiplexer and analog-to- 
digital converter output, two frequencies requiring count- 
ing, and several parallel shifted'signals. With the raw 
data, much subsequent data processing was required. 
This special processing included the data from the science 
spectral instruments and the television subsystem. 
The MM'71 Project instituted the concept of a cen- 
tralized source of system test data processing require- 
ments. The concept was implemented by the origin of a 
Data Processing Review Board (DPRB). The DPRB 
chairman worked directly for the Mission Operations 
System (MOS) Manager. The MOS Manager was respon- 
sible for the development of all project data processing 
including the MTC system test activities. The DPRB 
included permanent members from the Data Systems 
Division, Science Ground Data Handling Sections, the 
spacecraft design area, and the mission operations area. 
In addition, ad hoc membership was used for special 
purposes. 
The functions of the DPRB were to generate a cohesive, 
integrated set of data processing requirements and to 
accept the subsequent processing capabilities for use in 
the system test operations. The data processing require- 
ments consisted of both the spacecraft system-level re- 
quirements and the special processing requirements of 
the spacecraft subsystems and science instruments. The 
DPRB contributed to the design of the MTC software 
system where the handling of the spacecraft data was 
concerned. 
The MTC was capable of supporting two spacecraft 
simultaneously throughout the system test operations. 
Each UNIVAC 1219 could support one spacecraft. The 
1219 concurrently processed the two low-rate telemetry 
channels as telemetry or as direct access, the ground and 
on-board command streams, the myriad of diverse direct- 
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access data, and the data from the analog-to-digital 
converter/multiplexer (ADC/MUX). In addition, at any 
one time, the MTC could process one of (1) the science 
132.3-kbps umbilical data stream, (2) the autopilot data, 
(3) the data storage subsystem playback, or (4) the central 
conlputer and sequencer (CC&S) load and verify data. 
These four processors were programmed to be overlays 
because of 1219 magnetic core storage limitations. The 
CC&S load and verify processor was deleted during the 
system test operations because of known hardware inter- 
face and possible software problems. When the UNIVAC 
1230 mobile tactical computer became operational near 
the end of calendar year 1970, it could process the high- 
rate telemetry channel from one spacecraft. The dual 
spacecraft support capability in the 1230, though avail- 
able, was never made operational because the spacecraft 
system test schedule never required it. The UNIVAC 1218 
was used only for nonreal-time processing throughout the 
system test operations. 
The MTC and MTVS were shipped in stages to AFETR 
for launch operations beginning in early February 1971 
with the hilTVS van. One 1219 and associated peripherals 
were sent with the PTM spacecraft and the STC. The 
second 1219, the 1230, and the 9300 were shipped with 
the second flight spacecraft. 
A 50-kbps wideband full-duplex telephone line for data 
transn~ission was provided by the DSN for intra-MTC use. 
The wideband data line was used for two purposes: to 
transmit data from computer to computer or to drive the 
character printers and low-speed line printers at JPL. 
One of the two 1219s was used at AFETR and the 1218 at 
JPL for the inter-computer link. The printers at JPL used 
to display AFETR data were those in the mission support 
area in the Space Flight Operations Facility (SFOF). 
The MTC experienced considerable difficulty at 
AFETR in establishing acceptable hardware operations 
for spacecraft support. This was believed to be caused 
by the poor electrical grounding system which was avail- 
able for MTC use and a high-temperature problem which 
affected the interface electronic equipment. Much effort 
was put into establishing temperature stabilization at 
acceptable levels and in electrical grounding. The effects 
of the problems were reduced significantly but never 
totally resolved. 
midcourse maneuver. The remainder of the MTC and the 
h/lTVS van were returned to JPL with the PTM spacecraft. 
3. Reliability and quality assurance 
a. In,trodziction. The Mariner Mars 1971 Project Plan 
(Ref. 34) was the governing document for the Project and 
contained, among others, the requirements for the relia- 
bility and quality assurance programs. Reference was 
made in this plan to the NASA Project Approval Docu- 
ment (PAD) which required Project surveillance over 
quality assurance and reliability assurance programs. 
b. Quality Assurance Program. The Mariner Mars 1971 
Quality Assurance Program was based on a series of re- 
quirements and implemented activities which took place 
during all program phases, and were designed toward 
ensuring maximum mission success. The provisions of 
NPC 200-2 were implemented by JPL and JPL's sub- 
contractors, with Ref. 35 as a basis for the MM'71 quality 
assurance system. These provisions were reflected in 
individual subsystem Quality Assurance Plans which were 
contractor-generated and JPL-approved. 
One of the major tasks accomplished by quality assur- 
ance was the surveillance of parts screening vendors and a 
rigorous control of parts from the screening vendor to the 
subsysten~ builder. Since the major part of the flight 
subsystem hardware was built by subcontractors, a 
rigorous quality assurance inspection task was under- 
taken. This task included the inspection of all hardware 
at mandatory control points by JPL quality assurance 
personnel, and a final review of all as-built documentation 
prior to shipment. These disciplines were also imposed on 
science instruments. 
Once at JPL, the hardware was independently in- 
spected by quality assurance engineers to assure flight 
worthiness. The hardware was subsequently maintained 
in flight status by constant quality assurance surveillance. 
This surveillance was imposed until launch. 
In summary, the MM'71 Quality Assurance Program 
was a hardware-oriented, closed-loop inspection system. 
This type effort continues to be the most appropriate for 
low hardware volume planetary programs. 
One 1219 and the associated peripherals and interface c. Reliability Assurance Program. The MM'71 Relia- 
electronics were shipped back to JPL immediately after bility Assurance Program (Ref. 36) consisted of the fol- 
the second launch. This 1219 was used to support the lowing tasks: 
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(1) Developing system-level reliability plans. 
(2) Participating in design reviews. 
Number of Average board Average Reviews 
reviews members attendance 
(3) Monitoring reliability plans. Subsystem: 
(4) Problem failure report (PFR) activity. Functional 12 9 35 
(5) Monitoring system PFR activities. Detail 20 8 35 
(6) FMECA (failure mode, effects, and criticality Hardware 63 5 12 
analysis). 
System: (7) Parts and materials activity. 
Functional 1 9 70 (8) Engineering support to FMECA, problem/failure 
analyses, etc. Detail 1 9 70 
(9) Appraising the MM'71 Project Office of risk con- 
cerns. 
(10) Reporting significant deviations. 
Of these many tasks, three were felt to have had signi- 
ficant impact on the Project. These were design review, 
electronic parts reliability, and problem/failure reporting. 
In addition, the FMECA activity had special emphasis. 
d.  Reliability activities 
(1) Design reviews. The three basic formal design re- 
views utilized on the MM'71 Project (Ref. 37) were func- 
tional, detail, and hardware reviews. Reliability considera- 
tions were an important facet of each of these reviews, 
including: 
(1) Review of MM'69 PFRs as applicable. 
(2) Failure mode analysis. 
(3) Parts reliability. 
(4) Review of MM'71 PFRs (hardware reviews only). 
The functional design reviews for the spacecraft sub- 
systems were relatively unchanged from MM'69 require- 
ments. The ~e l i ab i l i ' t ~  Assurance Office took an early 
lead in discussing and describing the functional design 
reviews to be held, and performed an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the functional design reviews by use of an 
evaluation criteria work sheet. This work sheet provided a 
shopping list of potential deficiencies, and early corrective 
action was achieved to strengthen the agenda and topics 
to be covered at the remaining design reviews. 
Participation in the three series of reviews gives an 
indication of importance and intensity of effort brought 
about by the reviews. Participation was as follows: 
(2) FA4ECA. To effect some standardization in failure 
mode, effect, and criticality analyses (FMECA) perfor- 
mance, a guideline document (Ref. 38) was developed 
early and utilized as a source of 'low" to conduct an 
FMECA. Several design changes and test planning 
changes resulted from MM'71 FMECAs. 
The effectiveness of the FMECA task was not SO much 
in its documentation but in doing the analysis, wherein the 
documentation showed the results. To summarize the 
known studies, a report (Ref. 39) of subsystem FMECAS 
was issued in October 1969. This report, along with logic 
and state diagrams, was used as a tool by systems per- 
sonnel to understand and identify operating modes and 
failure modes of the spacecraft. 
(3 )  PFR Center management. The JPL PFR Center 
maintained responsibility for PFR distribution, filing, ap- 
proval coordination, and status reporting. The quality and 
efficiency of all of these functions were significantly 
improved over previous projects. A total of 2423 PFRs 
was processed within about two years (through launch) 
and distributed to 25 different combinations of cognizant 
personnel. Readability was greatly improved over pre- 
vious projects due to the use of offset printing rather 
than "ditto." The most significant advance, however, was 
the implementation of the Mark IV System, a new file 
management software program which was used for re- 
cording PFR data and for generating periodic standard 
reports and special reports. 
The Mark IV System has been an extremely valuable 
tool for the MM'71 Project. All data from the PFR form 
were recorded, except the text. A three-line summary was 
recorded for the "Description," "Verification and Analy- 
sis," and "Corrective Action." These data were then 
sorted in many logical combinations and printed out as 
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status, management, or analytical reports. About 7'5 
special types of report format were generated. 
(4) Electronic parts ~eliability. Electronic parts reliabil- 
ity activities were a major effort throughout the MM'71 
Project. These activities included the Component Parts 
Investigation Committee (CPIC), special parts, and elec- 
tronic part reliability analyses and special tests. The 
CPIC meetings and special parts review were conducted 
primarily during 1969, whereas electronic part evaluation 
was conducted throughout the MM'71 Project. 
(a) Component Parts Ittvestigation Committee. The 
purpose of the CPIC was to review inadequate compo- 
nent parts in subsystems which were planning to use 
existing hardware (with or without modifications) and/or 
build copies of existing MM'69 designs for MM'71. The 
subsystems reviewed contained 17,213 component parts, 
70% of the total number of MM'69 baseline component 
parts. Discussions and action items were concerned 
primarily with component parts which had an MM'69 
Parts Control Program rating of Class 4, or a high ground 
test failure rate on the MM'69 Project. Of these parts, 
185 were upgraded and 21 parts were left unchanged. 
(b) Special parts. Special (proprietary) parts were the 
subject of many of the most significant MM'69 PFRs 
throughout this Project. These parts are not subjected to 
the same extensive part specialist review and testing 
(qualification, life, and screening tests) as experienced by 
electronic parts. The MM'71 Reliability Office was there- 
fore assigned responsibility for developing a complete list 
of MM'71 special parts. Design, development, and testing 
were monitored for 72 part types, including approxi- 
mately 32,000 individual parts. Each part was classified 
periodically, with the same Class 1 through 4 system used 
for electronic part classification (Ref. 40). Project and 
Division Management attention was focused on special 
parts which were a risk to the MM'71 mission. Nearly all 
serious problems on MM'71 special parts (such as IRIS 
pyroelectric detector, TV vidicon, RFS TWTs, and pro- 
pulsion bladder) were identified and solved at an early 
phase of the Project. 
(c) Electronic part reliability analyses and special tests. 
Throughout the MM'71 Project, JPL reliability engineers 
maintained a careful observance of part failures, NASA 
alerts, and reports from other NASA Centers. The pur- 
pose of this effort was to eliminate unreliable parts from 
the MM'71 spacecraft design at the earliest possible phase 
of the Project. Particular emphasis was placed on identify- 
ing generic parts deficiencies associated with a particular 
manufacturer or a specific lot. The use of Mark IV EDP 
printouts of all MM'69 part failure data and periodically 
updated MM'71 data was extremely valuable in this 
effort. The following analyses and special tests are ex- 
amples of the activities related to eliminating unreliable 
parts: 
(1) Motorola transistors with one-mil aluminum wedge- 
bonded leads were identified by a NASA alert as a 
potentially unreliable part in some circuit applica- 
tions. An extensive study of testing at several NASA 
Centers and NASA contractors, MM'71 circuit ap- 
plications, MM'69 and MM'71 part failure data, 
etc., resulted in replacement of several of these 
transistors. 
(2) Concern over poor bonding and metallization de- 
fects in National Lh4 709, 710, and 711 integrated 
circuits (ICs) resulted in analysis of samples from 
several subsystems, replacement of LM 710s in the 
infrared interferometer spectrometer, and procure- 
ment of spare ICs from another manufacturer. 
(3) Other extensive analyses and testing were con- 
ducted for UVS Vitramon ceramic capacitor capaci- 
tance drift, TV and IRU CRC polycarbonate capa- 
citor shorting, TV T I  2N2905A transistor "chan- 
neling," IRIS 2N5093 solid-state device transistors 
with bad bonds, CC&S Teledyne relay failures, 
Signetics IC failures due to chlorine contamination, 
IRIS reverse bias on Sprague "wet slug" tantalum 
capacitors, TV Custom capacitors, FTS T I  FET 
failures due to electrostatic discharge, and trans- 
former redesigns for IRR, UVS, power, and TV. 
Each of these parts problems was resolved through co- 
operative efforts of part specialists, cognizant engineers, 
reliability engineers, quality assurance engineers, and the 
MM'71 Project Office Product Engineer. 
(5) Problem/failure reporting. This task was the prime 
task and involved the greatest level of effort. The PFR 
effort received considerable interest and continued sup- 
port from the Project Manager. PFRs became the singular 
means of logging and identifying problems and inciting 
action to correct the problems. Details of how the me- 
chanics of the system were organized and conducted are 
described in Ref. 33. 
The Problem/Failure Reporting Program implemented 
by the Mariner Mars 1971 Project provided a closed-loop 
procedure for reporting, analyzing, defining corrective 
action, and verifying the accomplishment of correction. 
Project requirements provided for the initiation of a 
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report to document all incidents of failure, ~roblem,  mal- 
function, anomalies, and nonstandard or unexpected 
results. Reports were initiated by the person who ob- 
served the problen~/failure of all deliverable hardware 
items, starting from the first functional checkout of de- 
vices or subassemblies subsequent to part screening. Elec- 
trical check of two or more parts was defined as the start 
point for problem/failure reporting for electrical/elec- 
tronic equipment. Many subsystems began reporting for 
developmental or prototype hardware, with a total of 
161 PFRs for 17 different subsystems. PFRs for support 
equipment (SE) were required from at  least the start of 
equipment element functional checkout, prior to use with 
spacecraft system equipment, and through all operations 
in conjunction with or associated with its use on deliver- 
able spacecraft equipment. 
PFRs were automatically flagged in bi-weekly status 
reports as "delinquent" or "red flag" if they were not 
closed out within the 30-, 60-, and 90-day time limits speci- 
fied by Ref. 41. The "red flag" classification was also 
assigned for problem/failures considered critical in re- 
spect to achievement of spacecraft performance require- 
ments. This system provided an excellent source of Project 
and division management visibility, to ensure that prob- 
lems were being resolved in a timely manner. 
(a) PFR form changes. Three significant changes were 
incorporated in MM'71 PFR forms, which have greatly 
enhanced PFR solution, trend analysis, and risk evalua- 
tion. These three changes from the MM'69 PFR form 
were as follows: 
(1) System test and flight PFRs have a blank for 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), to record the time 
the anomaly occurred. 
(2) Cause of faiIure categories, including subcategories, 
was specifically defined. 
(3) Four classes (Ref. 41) were established for rating 
combined subsystem and spacecraft system "cause 
status and residual risk." 
(b) Subsystem PFR summary. Table 8 provides a sub- 
system summary of all MM'71 prelaunch PFRs. 
(c) MM'69 versus MM'71 PFR comparison. Nearly all 
MM'71 subsystems exhibited a significant decrease in the 
total number of flight hardware PFRs compared to 
MM'69. This is probably due to the fact that many 
MM'71 subsystems utilized MM'69 spare flight hardware 
and produced new subsystems from MM'69 drawings, 
with few design changes. The completely new propulsion 
subsystem was the only subsystem that experienced a large 
increase in quantity of PFRs (from 51 on MM'69 to 213 on 
MM'71). 
The total number of prelaunch PFRs was about the 
same for the MM'69 and MM'71 SE, but about 900 less 
for MM'71 flight hardware PFRs. Only three flight con- 
figuration units were built for MM'71 subsystems, com- 
pared to four for MM'69. A review of Fig. 9 clearly indi- 
cates a more rapid increase in total PFRs during the early 
subsystem test phase of the MM'71 Project. This is attrib- 
uted to the fact that MM'71 subsystem testing began 
earlier due to "carryover" of MM'69 hardware. As a result, 
a much greater percentage of design and manufacturing 
deficiencies was discovered and corrected prior to start of 
spacecraft assembly. 
(d) Cause of prelaunclz flight hardzuare PFRs. Of the 
1844 prelaunch flight PFRs, analysis determined that the 
failure causes were: design = 550 or 29.8%; workmanship 
= 268 or 14.5%; parts = 224 or 12.1%; manufacturing 
= 143 or 7.8%; operator error = 128 or 6.9%; support 
equipment = 136 or 7.4%; damage = 49 or 2.7%; adjust- 
numt = 32 or 1.7%; and other (inclusive of unknown) = 
314 or 17%. Within the design category, 210 or 38.2% 
were functional or application-induced and 164 or 29.8% 
were associated with specification or tolerance callout 
inadequacies. 
The number of EM1 (electromagnetic interference) 
PFRs was significantly reduced from a total of 351 on 
MM'69 to 168 on MM'71. The most significant reason for 
this reduction was the formation of an EMC Panel which 
accomplished the following: 
(1) Upgraded EMC requirements (design and test) 
based on MM'69 problems. 
(2) Gave special attention to MM'71 hardware similar 
to MM'69 hardware which had EMC problems. 
(3) Carefully examined new hardware for potential 
EMC problems and assessed the need for design 
changes or special tests to evaluate for EMC. 
The specific cause was not determined for 59 part 
problems and 170 subsystem/spacecraft problems. In all 
cases, the failure was analyzed and determined to be no 
risk or constituted an acceptable risk to the mission. 
(e) Science instrument PFRs. Several interesting obser- 
vations can be made in reviewing the curves on Fig. 10 
for cumulative PFRs for the MM'71 data automation sub- 
system (DAS) versus the four science subsystems. The 
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Table 8. Prelaunch PFR summary reporl: 
Develop- Spacecraft riskg 
Reference Action ment System Flight System SE Safetyb 
designator responsibility PFRsa totalb flightc total* SEe total1 2 3 4 
2000 Systems 68 1 48 48 19 19 50 18 2 
20011 Structure 48 13 16 31 1 4 46 2 
2101 
20021 RFS 440 20 44 289 40 131 321 108 4 5 1 
2102 
20031 FCS 124 1 7 71 16 52 98 13 13 1 
2103 
20041 Power 71 6 14 41 14 24 65 5 1 2 
2104 
20051 CC&S 165 2 24 144 14 19 126 21 2 16 
2105 
20061 FTS 116 3 4 62 40 51 96 17 2 1 
2106 
20071 A/C 357 15 16 286 19 56 324 30 2 1 4 
2107 
20081 Pyro 46 4 8 23 7 19 41 5 2 
2108 
20091 Cabling 39 17 26 13 13 32 6 1 2 
2109 
20101 Prop 213 31 3 163 1 19 183 11 4 15 
2110 
2011 1 Temp conh.01 17 5 8 12 15 2 
2111 
20121 Devices 27 2 8 23 2 2 24 3 
2112 
20161 DSS 120 14 11 88 7 18 91 20 3 6 
2116 
2017 S-band antenna 15 5 3 10 13 2 
2020 DAS 66 13 1 51 2 60 3 1 2 1 
2031 Scan 23 1 23 23 
2034 UVS 44 2 9 42 37 4 3 
2036 TV 111 22 30 81 1 8 87 11 8 5 
2038 IRR 38 2 6 29 7 33 5 
2039 IRIS 146 46 143 1 3 113 19 5 9 
21XX STCE- SE 33 31 33 32 1 
2120 Science-SE 38 38 38 23 15 
2500 ETE 58 58 55 3 1 
----------- 
2,423 161 324 1,686 264 576 1,988 324 35 74 16 
BTotal PFRs = development + flight + SE PFRs. 
bDevelopment total = total PFRs for developnlent or prototype hardware. 
CSystem flight = total PFRs which occurred during spacecraft system testing on the PTM and two flight subsysten~s. A low number 
in this column indicates early design maturity. 
dFlight total = total PFRs on above 3 units which occurred in subsystem and system testing. 
'System SE = all SE PFRs which occurred during or in support of spacecraft testing. 
fSE total = total SE PFRs in subsysten~ and system testing. 
gspacecraft risk 1 through 4 = total PFRs classified in spacecraft risk categories 1 through 4. 
hSafety = PFRs with a real or potential safety hazard to personnel. 
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Fig. 9. Mariner Mars 1969 and Mariner Mars 1971 total problem1 
failure reports vs date, spacecraft system flight hardware, and 
OSE 
1970 1971 
CALENDAR DATE 
Fig. 10. Cumulative PFRs: DAS vs science subsystems 
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DAS and the scan control subsystenis were extremely 
reliable during all prelaunch spacecraft system testing, 
with only one flight system hardware PFR written 
against each subsystem. The DAS cumulative PFR curve, 
therefore, represents the "ideal" situation, wherein nearly 
all deficiencies are discovered and corrected during sub- 
system testing. Note that the infrared radiometer (IRR) 
and ultraviolet spectrometer (UVS), with carryover 
MM'69 hardware and only slight design changes, experi- 
enced a PFR history similar to the DAS. Both subsystems 
experienced only a few significant PFRs during system 
testing. 
The MM'71 television subsysten~ (TVS) incorporated 
several significant design changes from the MM'69 con- 
figuration and had almost twice the number of electronic 
parts (2633) as the UVS (872) and IRR (532) combined. 
The rate of TV PFR initiation decreased gradually dur- 
ing system testing. Most of the seven TV PFRs that re- 
quired individual design changes occurred early in sub- 
system and system testing. 
The infrared interferometer spectrometer (IRIS) was 
flying for the first time on a Mariner spacecraft. The IRIS 
has several complex, critically aligned optical and electro- 
mechanical subassemblies and almost as many electronic 
parts (2347) as the TVS. The critical alignment, extreme 
sensitivity to EMI, and parts problems contributed to 
many of the 30 IRIS PFRs, which resulted in separate 
design changes. These were also major causes for the IRIS 
total of 46 PFRs during spacecraft system testing, the 
largest number for any MM'71 subsystem. 
The IRIS was also the only MM'71 subsystem for which 
problem/failure reporting did not start from the first 
functional checkout of devices or subassemblies subse- 
quent to parts screening. IRIS problem/failure reporting 
covered only n1alfunctions (except those attributed to 
workmanship or operator error), starting with subsystem 
integration testing, the first time that all units of a com- 
plete instrument were operated together, both electrically 
and mechanically. This late start (about 3 mo) in problem/ 
failure reporting was a significant factor in limiting 
Project visibility of early IRIS design and development 
problems. 
E. Planetary Quarantine 
The objective of the NASA planetary quarantine poli- 
cies as applied to Mars is to prevent the transfer of 
terrestrial life to Mars, a planet of biological interest, SO 
that life detection experiments will not be invalidated and 
the planet's environment will not be irreversibly altered. 
The Mariner Mars 1941 Project in accordance with its 
Planetary Quarantine Plan (Ref. 42) analyzed the proba- 
bility of contaminating Mars with viable terrestrial micro- 
organisms carried on or ejected from the spacecraft. A 
mathematical model was constructed to allocate and to 
estimate probability of contamination associated with 
identified contaminating sources or events. Mission stra- 
tegy, including aiming point biasing and orbit periapsis 
altitude selection, was developed to satisfy the proba- 
bility allocations for accidental spacecraft impact. The 
results of the prelaunch analysis were published in 
Ref. 43. 
Based on the planetary quarantine analysis, large sur- 
face areas of the spacecraft were determined to be prin- 
cipal sources of microbiological ejecta which could result 
in Mars biological contamination. Four zones of the 
spacecraft (high-gain antenna, solar panels, structural 
elements, and thermal blankets) were designated as 
critical areas. The microbiological monitoring and clean- 
ing activities were concentrated on these surfaces. 
To assure that the upper permissible microbial level at 
the time of encapsulation would not be exceeded, the 
spacecraft were assembled, tested, and encapsulated in 
Class 100 laminar downflow tents (Fig. 11). Also, clothing 
and access restrictions for personnel were established, and 
an extensive cleaning program using isopropyl alcohol 
on critical spacecraft surfaces was implemented. These 
measures were part of the spacecraft contamination con- 
trol effort as delineated in the Contamination Control 
Plan (Ref. 44). Microbiological assays (Fig. 12) were taken 
using the swab-rinse method in accordance with Mariner 
Mars 1971 Microbiological Assay and Monitoring Plan. 
The United States Public Health Service verified the 
assays. The final encapsulation estimate for Mariner H 
was 1.3 X lo5 estimated spacecraft microbial burden on 
exposed surfaces, which did not exceed the permissible 
Mission A upper limit of 3.1 X lo6. The estimated 
microbial burden on the exposed surfaces at encapsulation 
of the Mariner I spacecraft was 3.1 X lo4, which was well 
within the permissible limit of h4ission B, or of any pro- 
posed mission plail. 
The analysis and microbiological assay results indicated 
that the planetary quarantine constraints for the orbiter 
mission were satisfied. 
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Fig. 11. Spacecraft laminar downflow tent 
Fig. 12. Microbiological sampling of the Mariner Mars 1971 spacecraft 
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PI. Mission Operations System 
A. MOS Requirements 
The MOS design was most significantly affected by a 
basic philosophy of the Mariner mission design. Rather 
than develop a mission design directed toward guaran- 
teeing a specified level of performance or science return, 
the Mariner Mars 1971 mission design activities were 
directed toward providing a broad framework within 
which the mission could respond to actual performance 
and to the character of the science data as received and 
analyzed. Thus, the mission operations design had to be 
sufficiently flexible to allow modification of the mission 
plans to take full advantage of flight and ground equip- 
ment capabilities and to accommodate to the maximum 
extent possible any shifts in science emphasis. It was also 
a primary mission objective to: 
(I)  Develop necessary hardware, software, strategies, 
and procedures for, and to demonstrate the capa- 
bility of, conducting orbital operations at planetary 
distance with two spacecraft simultaneously. Orbital 
operations were defined to include insertion into 
Mars orbit, orbital trim maneuver(s), science data 
acquisition, engineering and science data trans- 
mission to Earth, orbital metric data acquisition, 
ground data handling, processing and analysis, and 
spacecraft command and control in orbit. 
(2) Develop and demonstrate the capability of con- 
ducting orbital operations in an adaptive mode 
whereby the data from one spacecraft revolution is 
used to influence the operation of the spacecraft on 
subsequent revolutions. The adaptive mode was 
intended to provide for the enhancement of science 
data value and to permit full exploitation of targets 
of opportunity. 
(3) Develop a mission design which provided the maxi- 
mum degree of achievement of mission objectives, 
given a degraded spacecraft performance, and also 
allowed enhancement of objectives, given better 
than nominal performance. 
These requirements implied the development of navi- 
gation capabilities of sufficient accuracy to deliver the 
spacecraft into the proper orbit and to determine the 
location and viewing characteristics of the science instru- 
ment data. The single accuracy requirement most im- 
portant to the navigation effort was the requirement to 
control instrument pointing to 0.5 deg relative to inertial 
space. 
The mission requirements also implied the generation of 
new types of mission control programs. These programs 
were required for the daily conversion of scientists' desires 
of targeting into the required CC&S program to execute 
those desires on the spacecraft. These programs started 
with the scientific desire to target the instruments on a 
certain location on the planet and with certain viewing 
conditions at that location. The navigation programs, 
knowing the location of the spacecraft and planet, gen- 
erated the spacecraft instrument pointing requirements 
and passed these requirements onto engineering pro- 
grams. The engineering programs converted the pointing 
requirements to the scan platform stepping requirements, 
shuttering requirements, filter setting requirements, etc. 
These spacecraft activities were then passed to a program 
that generated the CC&S program, which caused those 
spacecraft activities to be executed. This same program 
then generated the set of commands which must be sent 
to the spacecraft to properly load the on-board computer. 
The requirement to use data during the orbital mission 
to affect future activities implied: a requirement to dis- 
play the data as it was obtained and to provide analysis 
capabilities with the data in a short time scale relative to 
the 90-day orbital missions. The quantity of data obtained 
also implied a requirement for complete records, not only 
of the telemetry data returned, but of all the supporting 
data which accompanied each telemetry measurement. 
B. Organizational Plan 
The length of MM'71 orbital operations made it neces- 
sary to organize for mission operations in such a way as to 
minimize the demand for specialists in technical disci- 
plines (such as navigation, and spacecraft and instrument 
design) to support ongoing operations. 
The organizational plan, therefore, was to employ a 
two-tier concept in which one tier was occupied by those 
organizational elements principally involved in mission 
operations analysis and planning and the other tier by 
those elements involved in continuous, real-time monitor- 
ing and operation of the spacecraft and the ground sys- 
tem. The responsibilities of the former normally were 
satisfied by scheduled daily participation; the latter re- 
quired continuous support of varying levels through the 
missions. Support requirements were geared to mission 
phase and status, with minimum staffing during the cruise 
phase, normal staffing for orbital operations, and extra 
staffing for maneuvers. 
The mission operations organization, as shown in 
Fig. 13, was headed by the Chief of Mission Operations 
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Fig. 13. Mariner Mars 1971 mission operations organization 
(CMO), who was responsible to the Mission Manager and 
MOS Manager for the conduct of the missions. Mission 
conduct was construed to mean mission operations plan 
development, approval, and execution. 
SEQUENCE GROUP ASSISTANT CMO 
During orbital operations, the Chief of Mission Opera- 
tions prepared daily an updated and revised mission 
operations plan. This was based on planning teams' 
analyses and recommendations, and on Science Recom- 
mendation Team inputs concerning desired science opera- 
tions and priorities for the ensuing period; The science 
plan was reviewed by the CMO and the other planning 
and analysis team chiefs for compatibility with space- 
craft and ground operations limitations and Project 
guidelines. That review resulted in an updated operations 
plan which the CMO delivered to the Assistant Chief of 
Mission Operations (ACMO) to be translated into specific 
spacecraft command sequences and directions for ground 
activities to be carried out by the mission operations team. 
I 
- 
The mission operations organization consisted of two 
major groupings of elements: the planning and analysis 
teams and the mission operations teams. 
1. Planningand analysis teanzs. The planning and 
analysis teams consisted of: 
(1) A Navigation Team, whose principal functions were 
spacecraft navigation and scan geometry analysis. 
(2) A Science Recotnmendations Teanz, whose princi- 
pal functions were to analyze science data and 
recommend science operations' plans and priorities. 
(3) A Spacecraft Team, whose principal functions were 
spacecraft performance evaluation and prediction, 
and spacecraft sequence design and validation. The 
Spacecraft Team was responsible for maintaining, 
and updating as required authoritative compila- 
tions of spacecraft commands, spacecraft blocks, 
spacecraft sequences, telemetry calibrations and 
conversion coefficients, and operating margins. 
(4) A DSN Project Engineering Team, whose principal 
functions were DSN resources allocation, opera- 
tions planning, and configuration control. 
2. Mission operations teams. The mission operations 
execution functions were embodied in four teams and a 
group under the direction of an Assistant Chief of Mission 
Operations (ACMO): 
(1) A Command Team, whose primary function was to 
operate the spacecraft in accordance with the 
mission operations plans specified by the ACMO. 
This team issued commands to the spacecraft and 
provided real-time evaluation and control of space- 
craft performance. 
(2) A Science Data Team, whose primary function was 
to determine and specify science data processing 
requirements, and to collect, catalogue, and dissem- 
inate science data products and maintain a science 
data library. 
(3) A Data Processing Teanz, whose primary functions 
were planning, scheduling, coordinating, and 
trouble-shooting all data processing for the Project. 
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In addition, this team furnished and scheduled per- 
sonnel to operate Project-supplied hardware and 
computer programs. 
(4) A DSN Adission Operations Team, whose primary 
function was the operation of the DSN and coordi- 
nation of near-Earth phase tracking (MSFN, 
AFETR) and NASCOM support in accordance 
with Project direction and DSN operating policies 
and procedures. 
(5) A Sequence Group, whose primary function was to 
prepare mission and spacecraft sequences, CC&S 
program updates, and files of commands for sub- 
sequent transmission to the spacecraft in accord- 
ance with instructions from the ACMO. 
C. Operational Readiness/Simulation 
MOS readiness, simulation, and training discussed per- 
tain solely to readiness for launch and the first trajectory 
correction maneuver (TCM). Training and demonstration 
of readiness for orbital operations had always been 
planned for and were conducted during the cruise phase 
following the first TCM and will be documented in 
Volume I11 of the Mariner Mars 1971 Project Final Re- 
port (to be published). 
The MOS readiness preparations were divided into 
several phases. The first phase of these preparations con- 
sisted of nine lectures covering organizational, software, 
communications, tracking, telemetry, and command sys- 
tems. Following these lectures a series of 17 interteam 
training exercises were conducted. Ninety-five hours of 
training went into this individual team training. The next 
series of training tests combined the entire MOS organi- 
zation with the SFOF portion of the DSN. Two of these 
tests were conducted. The next series of tests combined 
the MOS with the entire TDS, especially to work out the 
handling of the telemetry and command systems. One of 
these tests was run with each prime deep space station 
and one with MSFN Ascension. Four more training tests 
were conducted between the MOS and TDS to work out 
all the procedures for launch, cruise, and first maneuver. 
All of the tests and training to this point were dedicated 
to working out a final set of procedures which could 
accomplish the mission design. The next set of five tests 
called Operational Demonstration Tests was especially 
designed to incorporate anomalies into the training and 
thereby stress the operations organization. These tests 
included long-duration training. A total of 148 h was 
devoted to these tests. 
Several compatibility tests were also conducted be- 
tween the MOS/TDS and the spacecraft. Fifty hours of 
testing with the spacecraft were especially dedicated to 
compatibility testing. In addition, the MOS/TDS sup- 
ported the terminal countdown demonstration at AFETR 
with the PTM spacecraft and supported the J-FACT 
testing with both Mariners H and I. The compatibility 
testing, in addition to its value for compatibility, pro- 
vided excellent training in the recognition of the real 
signature of the spacecraft. 
All of the training exercises were severely hampered by 
two major problems. The first of these problems was the 
late availability of the 360/75 capabilities. The final 
launch version of the 360/75 was not available until April 
8, 1971. The continual change of the 360/75 software 
configuration during the tests preceding this date re- 
quired training, retraining, and test work for the whole 
period. The second difficulty was with the simulation 
system. A simulation math model of the MM'71 spacecraft 
was generated which was adequate for proper training, 
but unfortunately the 6050 computer and the 6050/1108 
interface, within which the math model had to work, 
proved to be highly unreliable. In fact, it seemed to 
always fail in the most crucial part of the test. 
As a final part of the launch readiness verification, two 
operational readiness tests were conducted before the 
launch of Mariner H. These tests demonstrated readiness 
of the MOS/TDS to support launch. A third operational 
readiness test was conducted prior to the Mariner I 
launch to demonstrate the launch readiness. 
VI. Intersystem Compatibility 
In addition to testing the individual MM'71 systems 
and demonstrating their design and capabilities separately, 
it was necessary to test and verify the interface between 
systems. This section describes the program to validate 
intersystem compatibility needed between (1) the space- 
craft and the Tracking and Data System, (2) the Mission 
Operations System and the Tracking and Data System, 
(3) the spacecraft and launch vehicle, and (4) the space- 
craft and Mission Operations System (Ref. 45). 
A. Spacecraft/Tracking and Data System1 
1. Approach. The approach to spacecraft/TDS com- 
patibility testing on the Mariner Mars 1971 Project was to 
'See Ref. 46 for details of TDS support for the Mariner Mars 1971 
mission. 
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demonstrate first a compatible R F  interface between the 
spacecraft and a deep space station (DSS) telecommuni- 
cations system. Next, the compatibility of the spacecraft 
and the DSN Telemetry and Command Data Systems was 
demonstrated by the proper processing of data. The oper- 
ational interface was then verified by conducting typical 
flight sequences with representative operational proce- 
dures. These tests constituted the design compatibility 
test (Fig. 14) and were conducted at JPL between the 
spacecraft, located in the Spacecraft Assembly Facility 
(SAF) or Environmental Test Laboratory (ETL), and 
Compatibility Test Area (CTA 21). Further compatibility 
testing verified the design compatibility established at 
JPL by RF verification tests conducted at Cape Kennedy 
between the spacecraft (in Building A 0  at the AFETR) 
and DSS 71. 
2. Test program. Spacecraft/TDS compatibility testing 
was divided into three phases: 
(1)  Phase I ,  Design Compatibility. Phase I tests were 
conducted with the fully assembled PTM space- 
craft. The purpose of these tests was to verify that 
the spacecraft design and the TDS were mutually 
compatible. Tests were conducted with the space- 
craft located in the SAF or ETL with a communi- 
cations link to CTA 21. 
tests was to verify data from the Phase I design 
compatibility tests of the PTM, confirming that 
each flight spacecraft performance was acceptable 
as referenced to the PTM and specified require- 
ments. 
(3) Phase 111, Mzltual I~zterference Compatibility. For 
the first time, two spacecraft were to have been 
tracked simultaneously by one DSS. Phase I11 tests 
were conducted to determine if there was any 
interference when commanding either spacecraft 
or processing two telemetry data streams. 
These compatibility tests included RF System, Telem- 
etry System, Command System, and Ranging System tests. 
The PTM/CTA 21 compatibility tests were conducted 
from July 1 to September 14, 1970. The MM71-1 flight 
spacecraft/CTA 21 compatibility tests were performed in 
two phases: (1) from December 14 through 17, 1970, and 
(2) from February 8 through 10, 1971. The MM71-2 flight 
spacecraft/CTA 21 compatibility tests were run from 
February 24 to 26, 1971. The MM71-1 flight spacecraft/ 
DSS 71 compatibility tests were performed at AFETR on 
March 24 and 25, 1971; MM71-2 flight spacecraft/DSS 71 
compatibility tests were performed from March 26 to 
30,1971. 
(2) Phase 11, Design Conzpatibility Verification. Phase Significant problems experienced during flight space- 
I1 tests involved each flight spacecraft in conjunc- craft/TDS compatibility tests and the solutions to the 
tion with CTA 21 and DSS 71. The purpose of the problems are listed in Table 9. 
[I 1 GROUND SYSTEM 
I RF VERIFICATION TESTS I i 
I I SPACECRAFT - CODED COMMAND DATA TEST I 
t OPERATIONAL COMPATIBILITY TEST I 
'BACKUP ONLY TDS/SPACECRAFT DESIGN 
Fig. 14. Spacecraft/TDS design compatibility tests 
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Table 9. Flight spaeecraR/TDS telecommunications compatibilie --- significant problems and solutions 
Test Problem Solution 
R F  System Spacecraft "best lock" frequency tests at CTA 21 and Uplink "sweep" procedures were developed, 
DSS 71 revealed that procedures were inadequate for documented, and utilized successfully in tests. 
determining uplink acquisition frequency. 
Telemetry System During dual carrier-multiple subcarrier tests at 
CTA 21, using the MM71-2 spacecraft and a 
breadboard model at TDL, the signal-to-noise ratio 
of the 8 '/3 bps was 3.36 dB lower than predicted. 
Command System During preparation for MM71-1 compatibility tests 
at CTA 21, it was noted that commands would always 
abort if command modulation and ranging nlodulation 
were on simultaneously. 
This problem was due to an incorrect setting of 
modulation index on the engineering subcarrier. The 
dual carrier-multiple subcarrier operation was not 
required until planet operation. 
Investigation revealed that confirmation detection 
was not compatible with having the command and 
ranging nlodulation on simultaneously. The 
operational program was modified to disable the 
confirmation detector. 
During MM71-2 spacecraft tests at CTA 21, two Investigation concluded that this problem was 
command aborts occurred. In each case, the abort caused by a noisy channel in the F,/2F, comparison 
reason was a "bit-by-bit" verification failure. circuitry. The command nlodulator assembly (CMA) 
tolerance on this measurement was modified from 
1 to 5 ps. 
Several command "bit-verify" aborts occurred Intensive troubleshooting revealed that the problem 
during MM71-1 and -2 spacecraft tests. was an inherent CMA design fault, which was 
isolated to noisy CMA input lines. Incorporation of 
noise suppression diodes and capacitors in each of 
the 48 lines rectified the problem. 10,000 commands 
were transmitted from the modified CMAs at 
CTA 21 during a "proof soak" test without any 
alarms or aborts, and 7000 commands were sent 
successfully from DSS 14. 
The spacecraft command system apparently dropped This was not a DSN problem. The spacecraft had 
phase lock for 51 s during the MM71-2/DSS 71 experienced the same phenomenon using ground 
compatibility test on March 29, 1971. support equipment. I t  was established that the 
performance was normal for the conditions of test. 
No further action was necessary. 
Ranging System Compatibility tests at CTA 21 and DSS 71 with the No solution was required since the tolerance for 
MM71-2 spacecraft revealed that the ranging this measurement was + 2 dB. 
acquisition threshold was degraded by 1 to 1.5 dB 
from the predicted threshold. The MM71-1 spacecraft 
was at the predicted ranging threshold. 
Operational Program During colnpatibility tests with the MM71-2 For all applicable operational procedures, "Command 
spacecraft at CT.4 21, the telemetry and command Modulation" was removed from the exciter prior to 
processor was reloaded in the investigation of a reloading the telemetry and command processor 
telemetry problem. This operation caused the operational program. 
spacecraft command detector to drop lock. This was 
an operational constraint. 
B. Mission Operations System/Tracking and Data compatibility tests and no special, additional compati- 
Acquisition System bility tests were required by the MOS and TDS. 
The compatibility testing between the MOS organiza- C m  Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle 
tion and the TDS facilities was a necessary part of the 
MOS/SFOF and MOS/TDS testing and training. The Intersystem compatibility between the MM'71 space- 
basic purpose of these tests was for the operations per- craft and the launch vehicle was demonstrated through 
sonnel in the MOS to learn to use the TDS equipment development, design verification, and prelaunch opera- 
and facilities. Consequently, all of these tests were in fact tions tests. These tests were necessary to show that the 
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established functional, electrical, mechanical and environ- 
mental interface design requirements and constraints had 
been met with the fabricated hardware. 
1. Test program 
a. Development tests. Chief in this category of develop- 
ment tests were tests performed at JPL to determine the 
dynamic compatibility between the Centaur adapter and 
the payload assembly (spacecraft adapter and spacecraft) 
for purposes of determining modal shapes and response 
characteristics of the spacecraft and adapter assembly. 
Modal surveys and vibration testing were conducted 
utilizing a full-scale spacecraft model, a prototype space- 
craft adapter, and a prototype Centaur adapter which 
had been furnished by Lewis Research Center. 
b. Design verification tests 
(1) Match-mate. First under this category was the 
match-mate conducted at GD/CA, San Diego, with a full- 
scale spacecraft model. The purpose of this test was to 
verify that the clearances and fit between spacecraft, 
adapter, and nose fairing were satisfactory; to validate 
the encapsulation proced~~res; to validate ground handling 
equipment; and to gather data on the R F  environment 
generated by the spacecraft and Centaur radios. 
(2) Pyrotechnic design verification. Testing was con- 
ducted at  GD/CA to verify that the launch vehicle firing 
unit was con~patible with the requirements of the space- 
craft release device squibs. 
(3) Flight adapter contpatibility test. This test was 
conducted at GD/CA to demonstrate the electrical and 
mechanical compatibility and interchangeability of the 
flight forward payload adapters with the launch vehicles. 
(4) Telemetry systenz. compatibility tests. Testing was 
conducted at GD/CA to verify that the spacecraft flight 
telemetry system (FTS) was compatible with the Centaur 
telemetry system. 
(5) RF compatibility tests. Testing was conducted at 
GD/CA to determine the effects produced by the space- 
craft radio on Centaur systems. 
c. Prelazinclz operations tests 
(1) Launch Complex Checkout 
(a) Electrical checkout. Following installation of 
launch complex equipment (LCE) in the block- 
house, spacecraft functions were verified 
through all interface cabling to the field joint. 
(b) R F  system checkout and calibration. End-to- 
end checkouts consisting of calibration of the 
R F  systems were performed to verify both air 
and landline links. 
(c) Air conditioning and cleanliness. Prior to each 
spacecraft/launch vehicle mate, the conditioned 
air was sampled for particulate cleanliness. 
(2) Terminal countdown denionstration (TCD). A 
spacecraft participated in a TCD with each launch 
vehicle to verify systems operational compatibility under 
cryogenic tanking and actual launch environmental con- 
ditions. The TCD test objectives were to: 
(a) Demonstrate the capability of the ground and 
airborne propellant systems and associated sup- 
port systems to support a launch. 
(b) Demonstrate operational autopilot and guid- 
ance systems during simulated flight under 
cryogenic conditions. 
(c) Demonstrate the performance of the instrumen- 
tation systems with the Service Tower removed. 
(d) Demonstrate the ability to de-tank propellants. 
(e) Verify that no RFI is caused by the interaction 
of the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, and the 
range radars. 
(3) Joint flight acceptance composite test (]-FACT). 
Each flight spacecraft participated in the J-FACT with its 
launch vehicle to verify systems operational compatibility 
under simulated flight conditions from initiation of count- 
down through completion of Centaur retromaneuver. 
Further, the test demonstrated on an integrated basis the 
operation of all airborne electrical systems during a simu- 
lated flight, with launch vehicle guidance in flight mode 
using telemetry and the gantry test rack for event moni- 
toring. 
(4) Con~posite readiness test (CRT). Each flight space- 
craft participated with its launch vehicle in system-level 
simulated flight to demonstrate launch readiness of all 
electrical and RF systems with a minimum of system vio- 
lation, utilizing launch control GSE, landline instrumen- 
tation and telemetry for event monitoring. This test was 
the final composite systems test prior to launch. 
(5)  Electronzagnetic interference/radio frequency inter- 
ference (EA4I/RFI) test. Each flight spacecraft partici- 
pated with its launch vehicle in system-level tests to en- 
sure interference-free operations and to develop the 
characteristic RF signature of that particular spacecraft/ 
launch vehicle combination, Each spacecraft was counted 
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down to a predetermined state and monitored for EMI/ 
RFI while launch vehicle, launch complex, and range sys- 
tems were activated. 
2. Schedules. Accomplishment of schedules for testing 
intersystem compatibility between spacecraft and launch 
vehicle as described above is shown in Table 10. 
D. Spacecraft/Mission Operations System 
The MMJ71 spacecraft/MOS compatibility plan was 
documented in Ref. 47. The spacecraft and DSN had 
performed design compatibility tests, and the MOS 
approach was to validate the MOS software and com- 
puter interfaces that were new for this mission. 
It was recognized early in the program that it would 
be difficult to arrange spacecraft time for MOS com- 
patibility tests, because of the tight spacecraft schedule; 
however, it was also recognized that it was necessary that 
such compatibility tests be performed. Other difficulties 
associated with developing the test schedule were: (1) the 
360/75 implementation plan was behind schedule, and 
(2) it was the MOS's desire to use the closest 360/75 flight 
version that was possible. These two facts presented a 
profound conflict. 
The compatibility test program was designed so that 
there would be a minimal duplication of tests performed 
on Flight 1 (MM71-1) and Flight 2 (MM71-2) spacecraft 
(see Table 11). It'should be noted that the only test 
duplication was the composite test, which exercised the 
spacecraft in as many RF states as possible that could be 
anticipated during flight operations. 
The spacecraft was in SAF, and CTA 21 was configured 
as nearly as possible to an operational tracking station. 
Only the telecommunication signal levels on the uplink 
and the downlink were not realistic; this was because the 
CTA 21 antenna gain and noise temperature were dif- 
ferent from the operational tracking stations. 
The composite test 1 sequence stepped through the 
various telecommunication data modes (RTS-1, RTS-2, 
playback, and engineering) and the data rates twice, 
requiring nearly six hours. I t  started out in the RTS-1 
mode, with 50-bps science and 33%-bps engineering 
telemetry. The RTS-2 mode, both 16.2 and ending at 
1.0125 kbps, was exercised. Interspersed in the sequence 
were engineering channel data rate switches from 33% 
bps to 8% bps, and back again, and also CC&S memory 
readouts. This portion of the test concluded with a second 
Table 10. SpacecraR/Iaunch vehicle intersystem 
compatibility test accomplishment 
Test Date accomplished 
Pyro design verification 
Telemetry system compatibility 
RF compatibility 
Flight adapter compatibility 
Launch complex 36B checkout 
Launch complex 36A checkout 
PTM/AC-23 TCD 
PTM/AC-23 J-FACT 
PTM/AC-24 TCD 
PTM/AC-24 J-FACT 
MM71-1/AC-24 J-FACT 
MM71-1/AC-24 CRT 
MM71-2/AC-23 J-FACT 
MM71-2/AC-23 CRT 
MM71-2/AC-23 TCD 
10/6/70 
10/6/70 
10/6/70 
10/7/70 
1/25/71 
2/25/71 
3/11/71 
3/18/71 
4/8/71 
4/13/71 
5/4/71 
5/5/71 
5/17 and 23/71 
5/24/71 
5/25/71 
Table 11. Spacecraft/MOS compatibility tests 
Priority MM71-1 MM71-2 
1 Coinposite test 1 Composite test 2 
( 6-10 hours ) ( 6-10 hours ) 
2 Science sequence by Science sequence by 
CC&S (4-5 hours) ground commands 
( 4-5 hours ) 
3 Tandem maneuver Insertion maneuver 
sequence (4-5 hours) sequence (4-5 hours) 
sequence of RTS-1, RTS-2, playback, and engineering 
data modes. 
Due to continuing 360/75 development problems, the 
CC&S readout could not be performed at JPL, and this 
was recognized as a lien on the spacecraft during the 
JPL preshipping review. However, a CC&S readout was 
accomplished by using the PTM spacecraft at hanger A 0  
and by utilizing DSS 71 at Cape Kennedy, with support by 
the SFOF. The readout was performed successfully and 
was judged a demonstration of compatibility of all ele- 
ments required for flight support. 
As a result of the compatibility test program, the sys- 
tems were declared to be compatible prior to launch of 
the spacecraft. 
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Vli. Science Planning and implementation 
The science instruments and experiments were selected 
as a result of an Announcement of Flight Opportunity for 
MM'71. Three of the instruments were eliminated when 
the scope of the mission had to be narrowed due to bud- 
getary considerations (April 1969). The eliminated instru- 
ments were the following: 
(1) Charged-particle telescope (principal investigator: 
J. Simpson, University of Chicago). 
(2) Multiple-frequency receiver (principal investigator: 
Von R. Eshelman, Stanford University). 
(3) X-ray particle detector (principal investigator: J. 
Van Allen, University of Iowa). 
The final set of science experiments and the investigators 
for these experiments are shown in Table 12. A brief 
description of the instruments is given in Section IV-B-15. 
References 48 and 49 established MM'71 Project science 
requirements. Reference 48 lists basic science require- 
ments by defining experiment objectives and listing re- 
quirements that impact spacecraft design and signifi- 
cantly guide the choice of mission and Mission Operations 
System designs. Reference 49 lists the specific require- 
ments necessary for payload integration, spacecraft sys- 
tem testing, calibration, and detailed design of mission 
operations. The experimenters and project science pre- 
pared a definitive set of papers (Ref. 50) that described 
the experiments, scientific objectives, and capabilities of 
the MM'71 mission. 
The principal science philosophy was one that not only 
considered the instruments an integral part of the space- 
craft design from the beginning but also considered the 
investigators an integral part of the project team. Each 
experiment had a principal investigator; if there were 
more than one principal investigator, a team leader was 
named. All of the instrument teams depended on JPL 
experiment representatives who served as the day-to-day 
interface between the experiment and the project. Some 
of the representatives were co-experimenters while others 
later became co-experimenters. 
Due to the size of the television team, it was possible 
and necessary to organize the team in terms of disci- 
pline groups and task groups (Table 13) so that they might 
effectively contribute to their project responsibilities. All 
of the teams participated in the instrument design, testing, 
and calibration. They also helped in the preparation for 
flight data processing. 
Table 12. Experimenter teams 
Experiment Investigator Affiliation 
Television H. Masurskya U.S. Geological Survey 
D. Arthur U.S. Geological Survey 
R. Batson U.S. Geological Survey 
W. Borgeson U.S. Geological Survey 
M. Carr U.S. Geological Survey 
J. McCauley U.S. Geological Survey 
D. Milton U.S. Geological Survey 
L. Soderbloin U.S. Geological Survey 
R. Wildey U.S. Geological Survey 
D. Wilhelins U.S. Geological Survey 
J. Lederbergb Stanford University 
E. Levinthal Stanford University 
J. Pollack Ames Research Center 
C. Sagan Cornell University 
J. Veverka Cornell University 
G. de Vaucouleursb Texas University 
A. Young Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
G. Briggsb Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
E. Shipley Bell Telephone 
Laboratories 
B. Smithb New Mexico State 
University 
J. Cutts California Institute of 
Technology 
M. Davies Rand Corporation 
W. Hartmann Planetary Science 
Institute 
R. Leighton California Institute of 
Technology 
C. Leovy University of Washington 
B. Murray California Institute of 
Technology 
R. Sharp California Institute of 
Technology 
Infrared R. Hanelb Goddard Space Flight 
interferometer Center 
'Pectrometer B. conrat. Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
W. Hovis Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
V. Kunde Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
"Team leader, principal investigator. 
bPrincipa1 investigator. 
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Table 12 (contd) 
Experiment Investigator Affiliation 
Infrared 
interferometer 
spectrometer 
( contd ) 
Infrared 
radiometer 
Ultraviolet 
spectrometer 
Celestial 
mechanics 
S-band 
occultation 
G. Levin 
P. Lowman 
C. Prabhakara 
B. Schlachillan 
J. Pearl 
T. Burke 
G. Neugebauerb 
S. Chase 
H. Kieffer 
E. Miner 
G. Munch 
C. Barthb 
C. Hord 
A. Lane 
I. Stewart 
J. Lorella 
J. Anderson 
W. Martin 
W. Sjogren 
I. Shapiroh 
R. Reasenberg 
A. Klioreb 
D. Cain 
G. Fjeldbo 
S. Rasool 
B. Seidel 
Biospherics, Inc. 
Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
Goddard Space Flight 
Center 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
California Institute of 
Technology 
Santa Barbara Research 
Center 
University of California 
at Los Angeles 
Jet Propulsio~ Laboratory 
California Institute of 
Technology 
University of Colorado 
University of Colorado 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
University of Colorado 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
NASA I-Ieadquarters 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
The project science support was divided into two 
groups. A Science Evaluation Team (SET) was established 
to perform the long-range data analysis which would be 
incorporated into science recommendations for mission 
operations. The SET was chaired by an assistant project 
scientist and consisted of all the experimenters. For the 
real-time mission operations interface, the Science Recom- 
mendation Team (SRT) was created under another assis- 
tant project scientist. 
The organization of the teams for the adaptive mode 
mission operations was paramount in the prelaunch 
period. The SRT, which served as the interface between 
the scientists and mission operations, was organized and 
had a representative from each experiment team as a 
member of the SRT. Initially, the experiment representa- 
tives served this SRT function. The scientists participated 
on the mission design team whose function was to defini- 
tize and optimize orbital parameters and integrate science 
inputs into sequences. 
The two-launch mission design resulted in one space- 
craft which was to be primarily utilized for mapping, 
geodesy, and polar coverage and the other for variable 
surface features, atmospheric studies, and global cover- 
age. The missions were a 12-h orbit period at an 80-deg 
inclination and a 20-h orbit period at a 50-deg inclina- 
tion, respectively. After the launch failure of Mariner 8, a 
new plan was developed by the project and experiment- 
ers. The compromise orbit, described in Section X, was a 
12-h orbit period with a 65-deg inclination. 
This was a building, organizing, and planning period 
for experiments and experimenters. Primary functions 
were preparation of instruments, hardware, and software, 
and preparing the experimenters for adaptive mode or- 
bital operations. 
VIII. AFETR Prelaunch and Launch Operations 
A. Plan 
The MM'7l basic Launch Operations Plan provided for 
the launch of two Mariner Mars 1971 spacecraft (MM71-1 
and MM71-2) and Atladcentaur vehicles (AC-23 and -24) 
from Launch Pads 36A and B at the Cape Kennedy Air 
Force Station, Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR). 
The first launch was scheduled for May 7,1971, to be fol- 
lowed by the second launch no later than 10 days. Arrival 
dates at  Mars were November 14 and 21, 1971. The 
nominal launch period available was May 7, 1971 through 
June 4, 1971. Launch windows varied from 30 to 90 min. 
The dominant constraint to the launch window and period 
was the launch vehicle performance. 
The proof test model (PTM) spacecraft was shipped to 
the AFETR for utilization as a pathfinder and a source 
of spares. 
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Table 13. MM'Sl television team organization chart? 
Discipline Groups 
Atmospheric Geodesy/ Satellite Variable Physics of G~ology phenonlena cartography astrononly surface features polar phenomena 
C. Leovy" G. de Vaucouleursh J. McCauleyl) J. Pollackb C. Sagan" B. Murrayb 
G. Briggs D. Arthur M. Carr D. Milton J. Cutts R. Leighton 
E. Shipley R. Batson W. Hartnlann M. Davies J. Lederberg J. Lederberg 
B. Smith W. Borgeson R. Sharp W. Hartmann E. Levinthal C. Leovy 
R. Wildey M. Davies L. Soderblom C. Sagan J. Veverka R. Sharp 
J. Pollack R. Leighton D. Wilhelms J. Veverka R. TVildey L. Soderblonl 
A. Young A. Young J. Cutts B. Smith A. Young D. Milton 
R. Wildey D. Milton A. Young G. Briggs 
B. Murray hl. Carr 
C. Sagan G. de Vaucouleurs 
J. Pollack 
B. Smith 
Task Groups 
Hardware Mission Analysis 
Data Processing 
and Process Control Mission Operations 
B. Murray') 
W. Borgeson 
J. Cutts 
R. Leighton 
B. Smith 
R. Wildey 
A. Young 
G. Briggsb 
W. Borgeson 
M. Davies 
D. Milton 
J. Pollack 
C. Sagan 
B. Smith 
E. Levinthalb 
D. Arthur 
R. Batson 
G. Briggs 
J. Cutts 
M. Davies 
E. Shipley 
B. Smith 
L. Soderblom 
J. Veverka 
R. Wildey 
A. Young 
B. Smithb 
R. Batson 
G. Briggs 
M. Carr 
W. Hartmann 
C. Leovy 
J. McCauley 
B. Murray 
C. Sagan 
aH. Masursky (Team Leader) and B. Smith (Deputy) are ex-officio members of all groups. 
bGroup leaders. 
B. Organization 
The MM'71 organization at AFETR is described in 
detail in the Launch Operations Plan (Ref. 51). In gen- 
eral, a satellite Project Office was set up at AFETR, with 
the Assistant Project Manager (Near Earth) acting as 
Launch Manager and Mission Director for the launch. 
The Spacecraft System Manager and his organization 
moved to AFETR with the spacecraft for the entire 
launch operations period. Elements of the Tracking and 
Data System (TDS), i.e., Near-Earth TDS, were in resi- 
dence at the AFETR; these consisted of AFETR, MSFN, 
and DSN stations. The Mission Test Computer and Video 
System elements of the Mission Operations System (MOS) 
were in residence to support spacecraft testing and launch 
preparations. 
The Launch Vehicle Manager was in residence at 
AFETR during launch preparations and launch. However, 
the actual launch vehicle preparations were delegated to 
the Kennedy Space Center Unmanned Launch Opera- 
tions (KSC/ULO), under whose direction General 
Dynamics, Convair Aerospace (GD/CA) performed the 
actual operations on the Atlas and Centaur vehicles. 
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Project meetings at AFETR were held weekly on 
Wednesday, and results were transmitted immediately 
after the meetings by telecon to the JPL Pasadena MM'71 
Project Meetings. Minutes were also distributed. 
Other organizational elements that contributed greatly 
to the launch operations were the Launch Operations 
Working Group (LOWG) and the Near-Earth Tracking 
and Data System (NETDS) Working Group. 
During the prelaunch phase of AFETR operations, the 
LOWG acted as the prime mechanism for coordinating 
space vehicle launch preparations, including launch com- 
plex preparations. The LOWG was chaired by KSC/ULO 
acting in behalf of LeRC and met weekly at AFETR. 
Membership in LOWG consisted of representatives of 
LeRC, ULO, JPL, and associated contractors, major sub- 
contractors, and AFETR program management personnel. 
Actions of the LOWG that affected the Mariner Mars 
1971 Project were reported to the Launch Manager and 
were subject to his review and approval. Group responsi- 
bilities included: 
(1) Review of the day-to-day schedule status. 
(2) Review of day-to-day problems. 
(3) Launch operation test records and schedules. 
The NETDS Working Group, chaired by the JPL/ETR 
Assistant Field Station Manager (NETDS Manager), was 
responsible for the planning of operations required to pro- 
vide near-Earth tracking and data support of the Mariner 
Mars 1971 Project. The support requirements were de- 
fined in Refs. 52 and 53. The NETDS Working Group 
coordinated the efforts of the AFETR, Manned Space 
Flight Network, Goddard Space Flight Center, and those 
elements of the DSN needed for near-Earth support. The 
group carried out all necessary interfaces with the DSN 
Project Engineer with regard to the flow of voice and data 
between the near-Earth and the deep space facilities. 
The MM'71 Launch Readiness Review was originally 
scheduled to cover all systems for both launches. How- 
ever, following the failure of the first launch (MM71-l), 
a second Launch Readiness Review was conducted prior 
to the second launch. 
Two days prior to each launch, a Launch Readiness 
Verification Meeting was held at the AFETR, and a con- 
ference call was made to JPL Pasadena. 
The countdown operations organization is shown in 
Fig. 15. Project operations were controlled from Building 
A 0  at the AFETR. 
C. Prelaunch Preparations and PTM/LV Tests 
The MM'71 Launch Operations at Cape Kennedy, 
AFETR, actually commenced with the delivery of the 
Atlas for the Atladcentaur 23 (AC-23) to AFETR on 
December 5, 1970; and the Atlas for AC-24 was delivered 
on February 10, 1971 (see Fig. 16). The launch vehicles 
were erected on Launch Pads 36B and A, respectively, 
and were prepared for launch: Spacecraft activities com- 
menced with the delivery of the propulsion subsystem 
"pathfinder" on January 15, 1971. The first MM771 space- 
craft, the PTM (MM71-3), was delivered to AFETR on 
~ e b r u a r ~ ' l 7 ,  1971, followed by the two flight spacecraft, 
the MM71-1 on February 28, 1971 and the MM71-2 on 
March 14,1971. 
The basic philosophy followed during launch opera- 
tions was to check out each system (Launch Vehicle, 
Spacecraft, Near-Earth Tracking and Data System, Mis- 
sion Operations System) independently and then conduct 
intersystem compatibility tests. The PTM spacecraft 
(MM71-3) was utilized as a "pathfinder" for the flight 
spacecraft to proof equipment, facilities, and test proce- 
dures. The PTM was also mated to each of the launch 
vehicles on Launch Pads 36A and B as early as possible 
(beginning on March 9, 1971) to participate in interface 
tests, such as Terminal Countdown Demonstration (TCD), 
Joint Flight Acceptance Test (J-FACT), Radio Frequency 
Interference Test (RFI), Electromagnetic Interference 
Test (EMI), and Composite Readiness Test (CRT). 
In addition, these interface tests provided the environ- 
ment to test the spacecraft compatibility with the actual 
launch complex equipment and provided "practice" 
countdowns for personnel. The original intent was to mate 
the PTM and AC-23 on Pad 36B and then move to AC-24 
on Pad 36A and complete all tests without returning to 
the Explosive Safe Area (ESA). However, due to the 
UVS problem, the PTM was demated from AC-23, Pad 
36B, on March 24, 1971 and then remated to AC-24, 
Pad 36A, on April 5, 1971. The complete set of interface 
tests was successfully completed on April 14 without any 
major problems and provided high confidence that the two 
flight spacecraft would encounter no unforeseen difficul- 
ties when mated to their respective launch vehicles. 
The two flight spacecraft (MM71-1 and MM71-2) were 
system-tested in Building A 0  and prepared for launch in 
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the ESA. During the period March 24 through 30, com- 
patibility testing between both spacecraft and DSS 71 
was conducted. These compatibility tests uncovered a 
problem in the ground command system which was sub- 
seqr~ently rectified; the ground command system was 
retested prior to launch. In addition, DSS 71 participated 
in testing at the ESA and on the launch pads, and during 
prelaunch and launch countdowns. 
The NETDS, in preparation for launch, conducted sub- 
system testing and then participated in the Operational 
Readiness Test (ORT) with the MOS and TDS on April 
29, 1971 in the final demonstration of readiness for launch. 
The MOS participated in interface tests through DSS 71 
to the spacecraft during this preparation period. 
By April 23, 1971, all system and intersystem tests had 
been completed at AFETR except the ORT, and only the 
operations necessary to prepare for launch were required. 
On April 23, the MM'71 Cape Launch Readiness Re- 
view was conducted at AFETR by a review board chaired 
by R. J. Parks, Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight 
Projects, with board members from both JPL and NASA. 
This same board had participated in the "Spacecraft 
Preshipment Review" at JPL. A major item of concern 
was the IRIS failure that had occurred the previous day. 
Major action items were to (1) establish a contingency 
plan to use the spacecraft propulsion subsystem to extend 
the launch period, (2) transmit listings of spacecraft signa- 
tures to the MOS, and (3) establish a contingency plan to 
consider the actions to be taken in the event the planetary 
quarantine restraints were not met. The recommendation 
of the Board was to proceed with launch. 
At the Cape Launch Readiness Review, emphasis was 
placed on the launch vehicle and spacecraft systems, near 
Earth TDS readiness, and intersystem interface compati- 
bility. Subsequently, an MOS and DSN Launch Readiness 
Review was conducted on April 27 at JPL, Pasadena, by 
R. J. Park's review board. 
D. Testing (Pathfinder, System Tests, Launch 
Preparations) 
Facility (ESF), where it was pressurized and encapsul- 
ated. The spacecraft then proceeded through a series of 
combined spacecraft and launch vehicle integrated sys- 
tems tests at each launch pad. This use of the PTM for 
compatibility testing enabled compression of flight space- 
craft test time and proved to be a valuable scheme as 
evidenced by the absence of any spacecraft, or spacecraft- 
induced, problems during combined operations with the 
flight spacecraft. 
Flight spacecraft test operations at AFETR were de- 
signed to reduce activities to those required to complete 
launch preparations and demonstrate launch environment 
compatibility including the DSIF. Functional system tests 
and calibration activities were normally restricted to those 
which could be performed without removal of flight hard- 
ware from the spacecraft or the demating of flight con- 
nectors. Equipment shipped to AFETR on the spacecraft 
was removed only to complete hazardous flight prepara- 
tions (e.g., propulsion subsystem fueling) and, when 
necessary, to replace hardware with flight-qualified pro- 
visioned spares. 
Although the flight spacecraft was not intended to be 
demated from the launch vehicle after the first mate, 
spacecraft MM71-2 was demated on May 19, 1971 to 
enable investigation of a Centaur propellant utilization 
problem. 
While the majority of the problems or failures that 
occurred during AFETR test operations was quickly un- 
derstood and corrected, three problems proved to be very 
troublesome, and a great deal of time was consumed in 
troubleshooting, repair and rework, reinstallation, and 
retest: 
(1) The engineering pedestal data on Channel F of 
UVS SN 003 (MM71-2) was 20 data number (DN) 
higher than normal. The unit performed normally 
during bench tests after removal but would not 
operate properly after reinstallation. After many 
hours of troubleshooting and analysis and a decision 
to use the PTM unit on MM71-2, the trouble was 
found to be a cracked epoxy lead-in resistor ter- 
mination. The unit was repaired, replaced on 
MM71-2, and operated satisfactorily. 
The PTM spacecraft was utilized as a pathfinder system (2) The IRIS failed to activate when spacecraft power 
to precede the flight spacecraft in order to evaluate pro- was applied on April 22, 1971 during a precount- 
cedures, train personnel, and demonstrate spacecraft com- down test of MM71-1. The cause was determined 
patibility with the launch complex environment and inter- to be a design fault, wherein reverse bias circuitry 
facing system hardware. Following initial preparation at resulted in capacitor failure. The instruments were 
Building AO, it was transported to the Explosive Safe removed from all three spacecraft and returned to 
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the nlanufacturer for rework and test. Several days Surface wind: 1.03 m/s (2 knots) from 140 deg 
of test time were lost, resulting in schedule com- Clouds: scattered at 4267 m (14,000 ft); altocumulus at promises and round-the-clock operations in order 
to meet the desired launch date. 3048 m (10,000 ft) 
Sea level atmospheric pressure: 762.254 mm (30.010 in.) (3) The third problem was the in-flight failure of 
of nlercury AC-24 and the loss of MM71-1, which resulted in a 
delay of the second launch to enable investigation 
of the cause. 
The total test time, with spacecraft power on, from 
start of system testing at Pasadena through AFETR oper- 
ations was 1111.9 h for the PTM, 812.9 h for MM71-1, and 
898.2 h for MM71-2. 
Complete details of test activities at AFETR may be 
found in the Mariner Mars 1971 Spacecraft Test and 
Operations Report (Ref. 54). 
E. Mariner H Launch Preparations and Launch 
On April 22, the IRIS on MM71-1 failed. The IRIS 
capacitor problem affected all units, and launch schedules 
were now dictated by the IRIS repair and retest schedules. 
On May 3, a repaired and tested IRIS was received at 
AFETR and installed on MM71-1. The launch prepara- 
tion schedule for MM71-1 and AC-24 was conducted as 
follows: 
May 3 - Mate MM71-1 to AC-24 on Pad 36A 
The Mariner H flight was nominal until shortly after 
Centaur main engine start. At this time, Centaur vehicle 
pitch stabilization was lost, followed by complete loss of 
pitch control, which subsequently resulted in vehicle 
tumbling and engine shutdown. The vehicle and the 
MM71-1 spacecraft impacted in the Atlantic Ocean ap- 
proximately 600 s after launch, 1665 km (900 nmi) down- 
range, approximately 560 km (350 mi) northwest of Puerto 
Rico, resulting in the loss of Mariner H.2 
F. Recovery From Mariner H Failure 
1. Failure 
a. Flight ezjents. At about 270 s into the Mariner H 
flight, it became evident from radar tracking data that 
the space vehicle was no longer following the predicted 
altitude track. Post-flight data analysis revealed that at 
Centaur main engine start (MES), when the flight control 
system starts to actively control the vehicle, the pitch 
rate channel gain was 20 to 40% of nominal. Shortly 
thereafter, at MES + 4 s, when guidance steering was 
initiated and increased the control requirements of the 
flight control system, the vehicle pitch movements started 
to become divergent. At MES + 28 s, the engines went 
May 4 - J-FACT and EM1 test to fixed-pitch positions and the vehicle started to tumble. 
May 5 - Composite readiness test (CRT) and RFI test 
May 8 - Launch (May 8, EDT; May 9 GMT) 
The prelaunch tests were completed satisfactorily and 
the countdown for launch of Mariner H (MM71-1) was 
normal without any significant anomalies. 
The AC-24 (Atlas SLV-3C S/N 5405 and Centaur S/N 
22D) and Mariner H (MM71-1) were launched from 
AFETR Launch Complex 36A, May 9, 1971, at 
01:11:02.294 GMT on a flight azimuth of 101:95 deg at 
the opening of the launch window. The weather was as 
follows: 
Temperature: 21.1°C (70°F) 
Relative humidity: 89% 
Visibility: 14.5 km (9 mi) 
Dew point: 18.3"C (65°F) 
- - 
The roll and yaw channels were normal during this 
period. The payload data channel, Channel 13, was lost at 
MES. + 86 s, reflecting separation of the payload due to 
the tumbling motion of the vehicle, and 2 s later an initial 
Centaur engine shutdown occurred due to propellant 
starvation. With the exception of the flight control failure, 
all other Centaur systems operated as expected under the 
existing conditions. A failure investigation conducted after 
the flight revealed that an integrated circuit failure from 
the pitch rate gyro preamplifier of the rate gyro package 
was the most consistent explanation for the flight failure 
and the data indications. As a result of this failure, cor- 
rective action was implemented to partially redesign the 
rate gyro package and to modify the test methods and 
procedures for flight control system. As an aid to under- 
standing the system within which the failure occurred, a 
brief description follows. 
2Mariner H has also been referred to as Mariner 8 even though the 
Centaur failed to inject it into the trajectory to Mars. 
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b. Centaur Fliglzt ConfroE Systenz. The flight control 
system maintained vehicle stability by conditioning the 
appropriate rate/position data to provide command sig- 
nals for positioning the main thrust chambers. The system 
also provided a pre-set switching sequence for maintain- 
ing the desired order of flight events. A simplified block 
diagram is shown in Fig. 17, separating the system into 
three major functional components, the rate gyro package, 
the servo amplifier package, and the programmer. The 
steering reference is supplied by the Centaur Guidance 
System. 
The rate gyro package contained three rate gyros 
(pitch, yaw, and roll), which provided the signals for 
damping necessary to maintain control system stability. 
The outputs of the pitch and yaw rate gyros were ampli- 
fied and summed with the appropriate guidance-generated 
pitch and yaw steering signals, producing proportional 
rate/position error signals for use by the servo amplifier 
package. The steering signals were electrically limited to 
prevent excessive turning rates, and might also be in- 
hibited during select flight periods. 
The servo amplifier canister conditioned the pitch/yaw/ 
roll error signals via appropriate filter/integrator circuitry 
to provide comnland signals to four actuators. The com- 
mand signals were summed with the individual actuator 
feedback transducer outputs in the servo amplifiers. The 
command to the actuator was the difference between the 
actual and desired engine position. The integrators pro- 
vided engine trimming signals to ensure that the steady- 
state error signals were zero, negating the effect of system 
offset, engine thrust unbalances, rigging errors, and 
center-of-gravity offsets. 
The programmer consisted of an electromechanical 
timer for sequential control and an auxiliary electronics 
unit which contained the required relays and logic for 
distributing the programmer commands. External dis- 
cretes were received from the guidance and Atlas flight 
control systems. The switching outputs controlled various 
vehicle and system internal commands. The timer was 
driven by a 3-phase 400-Hz synchronous motor and was 
started at Atlas sustainer engine cutoff (SECO) by a 
discrete from the Atlas programmer. 
Fig. 17. Signal flow diagram 
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2. Investigation The LeRC-GD/CA general analytical approach was as 
follows: 
a. Delay of second laz~nch. Prior to the AC-24 flight 
failure, a nominal 10-day separation between the two (1) Review flight data for significant parameters, such 
launches had been planned. After the failure, a Project as frequencies, amplitudes, and nonlinearities. 
decision was made to delay the second launch as long as (2) Compare with previously predicted values. feasible to allow time for problem solution and corrective 
action, and design of a single spacecraft mission (see 
Section X). As a result, the second launch occurred 22 
days later on May 30, 1971. 
b. Investigation plans, A first-look failure review was 
conducted during the night of the launch. Participants 
were LeRC, JPL, KSC, GD/CA, Minneapolis-Honeywell, 
and Pratt & Whitney. The conclusion reached at this 
review was that failure had taken place in the pitch 
channel of the Centaur flight control system. The next 
day, a T+12-h status review of all systems was held by 
JPL. At the conclusion of this status review, LeRC 
announced that the launch vehicle project office and 
technical personnel were returning to the Lewis Research 
Center, to bring into play more of their technical per- 
sonnel there and the facilities available at LeRC. The 
GD/CA personnel returned to San Diego to continue the 
investigation, specifically to set up  a computer simulation 
of the Centaur flight control system. At the same time, 
JPL continued data analysis at AFETR and in Pasadena. 
The JPL investigation was twofold: (1) an analysis of 
those areas wherein the spacecraft potentially was the 
generator of the causes of the ultimate failure (in particu- 
lar, mass shifts, propellant slosh, and radio signal radia- 
tion), and (2) furnishing technical assistance through our 
personnel who had gone to LeRC and later to GD/CA in 
the detailed investigation of the flight control system. 
(3) Perform root-loci analysis to determine possible 
causes. 
(4) Use analog simulation to verify root-loci and further 
pinpoint possible causes. 
(5) Install the hardware in computer simulation loop to 
confirm cause of failure. 
Analysis of sinlulation reduced the potential failure 
cause candidates to a single one: the pitch rate gyro pre- 
amplifier. The schematic is shown in Fig. 18. Further 
analytical effort pinpointed the single cause, or a potential 
single cause, of failure to the pA709 integrated circuit 
used in the preamplifier. The details of this integrated 
circuit are shown in Fig. 19. The GD/CA simulation, 
using a prototype gyro canister with a failed integrated 
circuit, was able to reproduce the flight conditions. JPL 
investigation confirmed the analysis. 
3. Corrective action. In order to ensure that the gyro 
canisters for future Centaur flights were good, GD/CA 
suggested a twofold corrective action: (1) enlarged accep- 
tance testing of the gyro canisters, and (2) countdown 
procedural changes. The expanded acceptance testing 
proposed by GD/CA consisted of the following: 
(1) Temperature cycling tests for dc offset. 
(2) Elevated temperature and vibration tests. 
Detailed investigation of flight data and the result of (3) High-rate tests for dc latch-up. 
the analysis revolved around the following significant 
flight data: (4) High-guidance input for dc latch-up, 
(1) Pitch channel instability. (5) Check amplifier input diodes. 
(2) Rate only mode was stable. Rate gain was initially 
~h~ countdown procedural changes were: 
only 20 to 40% of the nominal. (1) Increase accuracy and rate gain tests. 
(3) Instability began when position data was admitted. (2) Perform rate gain tests later in countdown (at T- 
(4) Frequency of oscillation was approximately 20% 10 min). 
low. (3) High-guidance input tests at T- 110 min. 
(5) Engine did not go to stops, but finally remained at 
1.2 deg. These proposed changes were implemented and the rate package which subsequently flew on AC-23 went through 
(6) Peculiar signature on engine feedback traces at ~ e a k  the series of testing. The countdown procedural changes 
levels. were incorporated and used during the countdown. 
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of funds, Consequently, the third launch preparations 
were cancelled. 
I:" 
Fig. 18. Pitch rate gyro preamplifier schematic 
4. NASA Headquarters review. A Failure Revtew Board 
was convened by Dr. Low of NASA Headquarters at 
General Dynamics, Convair Aerospace. LeRC, KSC, JPL, 
and GD/CA made presentations to the Review Board. 
The consensus of the Review Board was that the analyti- 
cal approach was sound, that the results and conclusions 
were meaningful, and that the proposed remedial action 
was acceptable. The same Review Board then planned to 
sit in on the second Launch Readiness Review to be held 
at AFETR prior to the launch of the second vehicle. 
5. Third spacecraft/launch vehicle. At the same time 
the failure investigation was going on, an additional 
investigation was being performed by spacecraft and 
launch vehicle personnel. This was an attempt to see if 
a third launch were possible to replace the failed one. 
In the spacecraft area, this would require the procure- 
ment of additional solar panels in order to bring the PTM 
spacecraft up to flight configuration. The launch vehicle 
area had several things to contend with. One was the nose 
fairing, of which there was not one of the right configura- 
tion available anywhere. This problem was not insoluble 
since there was a nose fairing available which could be 
modified. There was a Centaur available at GD/CA which 
6. Second hunch readiness reuiew. On May 26,1971, a 
second Launch Readiness Review was conducted jointly 
by Mr. Parks' Launch Readiness Review Board and 
Dr. Low's Failure Review Board. The major items of con- 
cern were the failure of the Centaur after the first launch, 
the analysis of the failure, and the action, repair, and re- 
test undertaken to qualify the Centaur for the second 
launch. However, the new single spacecraft mission and 
all of the other systems (spacecraft, TDS, and MOS) were 
also reviewed. The consensus of the two boards was that 
reasonable action had been taken on the Centaur problem 
and that all systems were go for launch. 
G. Mariner I Launch 
1. AFETR operations. Pending investigation of the AC- 
24 pitch rate gyro and to save time, MM71-2 was mated to 
AC-23 on Pad 36B on May 11 to conduct interface tests. 
On May 13, a special RFI test was conducted to verify 
that the spacecraft did not specifically contribute to the 
AC-24 failure. Results indicated no effect on AC-23. A 
J-FACT was conducted on May 17 with a retested rate 
gyro package (later replaced for launch with a more 
extensively tested unit) installed on the Centaur. During 
J-FACT, the Propellant Utilization (PU) System failed to 
return to the null parameters. At this time, the anomaly 
was attributed to lack of warm-up time. The next day 
during testing, the PU System was determined to have an 
intermittency in the electrical system. I t  was determined 
that the spacecraft would have to be demated to allow 
removal of a hatch and access to the inside of the hydro- 
gen tank of the Centaur. Work continued on the PU Sys- 
tem anomaly through May 23 when final button-up was 
performed. The anomaly was attributed to contamination 
in the PU plug at the Centaur hydrogen tank bulkhead. 
Concurrently, another rate gyro was being tested at 
GD/CA under more stringent specifications and pro- 
cedures. On May 22, the retested rate gyro package was 
received from GD/CA and was installed on the Centaur. 
At this time, preparations for the second launch were 
scheduled as follows: 
could be modified, and an Atlas could be made available, May 23 - Mate MM71-2 to AC-23 on Pad 36B 
all of these in time to support a launch by the end of the 
contingency launch period. Spacecraft analysis deter- May 23 - J-FACT 
mined that the PTM spacecraft could be readied within May 24 - CRT 
the same time frame. In the final analysis, everyone 
agreed that it was possible; all it would take was money. May 25 - TCD and RFI test 
However, the NASA decision was negative due to lack May 29 - Launch 
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Fig. 19. Pitch rate gyro preamplifier integrated circuit 
The J-FACT was required due to replacement of the 
rate gyro package and modifications (replacement of 
tantalum capacitors with four ceramic capacitors which 
are not degraded by back-bias voltage) in the Centaur 
guidance package. Another TCD was required to check 
the rework done on the Centaur hydrogen tank and also 
to demonstrate the special rate gyro torquing test, special 
vent valve lockup test, and careful examination of the 
PU System..All tests yielded satisfactory results. 
(auxiliary programmer) when operated in the mode used 
for this special test. The launch was rescheduled for h e  
next day. 
The second countdown for launch on May 30, 1971 
proceeded normally except for two launch vehicle anom- 
alies: 
(1) At T-5 min, landline instrumentation of the Atlas 
PU error demodulator voltage shifted off scale. 
Telemetry verified that the problem was associated 
with the landline and that the voltage was in toler- The first countdown for launch on May 29, 1971 pro- 
ance. 
ceeded normally to T-110 min, at which time special 
checks were performed to verify proper operation of (2) Throughout the countdown the Centaur PU System 
integrated circuits in the control loop. Data indicated a experienced erratic propellant quantity readout 
problem in the pitch channel which could not be re- with the landline instrumentation system. Telem- 
solved prior to the close of the launch window. The etry verified that this was a landline problem so 
countdown proceeded to T-72 min and holding so as telemetry was used as prime instrumentation. 
not to commit propellants to the vehicle. The launch was 
scrubbed at 22:Ol GMT. Later in the evening, the These problems caused a hold, and launch occurred 6 min 
problem was resolved to be a characteristic of the GSE into the launch window. 
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The AC-23 (Atlas SLV-3 S/N 5404 and Centaur S/N 
21D) and the MM71-2 were launched from AFETR 
Complex 36B, hilay 30, 1971, at 22:23:04 GMT (day 150) 
on a flight azimuth of 92.742 deg. The weather was as 
follows: 
Temperature: 23.8" C (74.9" F) 
Relative humidity: 60% 
Visibility: 16 km (10 mi) 
Dew point: 15.5"C (60°F) 
Surface wind: 3.6 m/s (7 knots) from 090 deg 
Clouds: sky obscured by smoke to 3048 m (10,000 ft) 
Sea level atmospheric pressure: 757.301 mm (29.815 in.) 
of mercury 
Performances of launch vehicle and spacecraft were 
nominal in all aspects. The spacecraft was injected into an 
approximate one-sigma trajectory to Mars. 
2. MOS launch operations 
a. Spacecraft. Separation in the Earth's shadow was ob- 
served on the spacecraft 13 min and 18 s after launch, by 
the counter 3 "pyro arm" event indication, and switching 
of telemetry Channel 113 from B-axis gimbal measure- 
ments to Sun sensor measurements. This was followed by 
subsequent confirmation that the attitude control switch: 
ing amplifiers for the cold gas reaction control system 
were enabled, that the 30-Vdc regulator was turned off, 
and that power changes associated with the removal of 
the CC&S relay-hold function had occurred. 
After a nominal time for the pyro capacitor banks to 
achieve full charge, the first spacecraft squib firing oc- 
curred, releasing the four solar panel tip latches at 
22:40:55.962. The four panels did not unfold at the same 
rate, but all were deployed within 8.4 s of one another by 
22:42:02.9. 
The spacecraft was now in a state to acquire the Sun 
upon emergence from the Earth's shadow. The penumbra 
was first seen at 23:08:46. After 2 min and 34 s, there was 
a sufficient amount of sunlight so that the spacecraft 
started a Sun search, as evidenced by pitch rate changes. 
Sun acquisition was achieved at 23:15:59. 
Command modulation was applied at 23:30:00, with 
command lock occurring at 23:36:11.804. The first com- 
mand, a DC-9 to turn on the ranging channel, was sent 
at 23:40:00, and ranging modulation was applied shortly 
thereafter. Problems with the ground equipment pre- 
vented acquiring good ranging data until DSS 62 acquired 
good correlation at 01:23:00 on day 151, May 31, 1971. 
The second "hours" scan of the CC&S at  00:09:59 pro- 
duced a 16J command to put the DSS into slew mode, 
advancing to the left end of tape, Pass 1. Simultaneously, 
the data rate logic was changed from the launch con- 
figuration of 4 kbps to the orbital operations configura- 
tion of 16 kbps by CC&S command 16A. Upon comple- 
tion of the slew, at 00:15:13, the DSS logic went into 
ready mode, indicating that it was now "parked for the 
cruise phase. 
The fourth "hours" scan produced a 7B command, turn- 
ing on the Canopus sensor. Since Sun acquisition, while 
the spacecraft was fully stabilized in pitch and yaw, it 
was drifting without a reference for the roll axis. Applica- 
tion of power to the Canopus sensor caused it to imme- 
diately search for Canopus, the roll reference star. On the 
first roll, Achernar was acquired instead of Canopus, as 
expected. The second ground command sent to the space- 
craft since the flight began, a DS-21, was transmitted to 
disacquire Achernar and continue the search for Canopus. 
The next star acquired was Canopus, and the spacecraft 
was fully stabilized in 3 axes at 02:25:10. Three min and 
36 s later, the 3-min timer turned the gyros off. 
At 03:04:57, the automatic switchover circuit was activ- 
ated, and the high-rate battery charger was turned off, 
and the low-rate charger turned on. 
The day after launch, two major activities took place: 
unlatching of the scan platform, followed by venting the 
engine supply lines to exhaust entrapped air. 
The first activity consisted of putting the spaceraft into 
roll-inertial control by CC&S command 7F (CC&S stray- 
light signal) to prevent potential loss of Canopus during 
the squib firing required to unlatch the platform. 
In previous missions, such squib firings have caused 
bright particles to come into view of the Canopus tracker, 
causing loss of lock of Canopus for a period of time. By 
maintaining inertial control, the loss of Canopus due to 
bright particles is avoided. 
The unlatch was accomplished by ground command 
DC-45 at 22:31:01, so timed that Channel 421, scan latch 
pressure, would be sampled 30 s into the pressure decay. 
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The second part of the day's activity began with a load desired Mars orbit with minimum expenditure of propul- 
of 10 coded command 1/2 pairs to the CC&S starting at sion fuel. 
00:30. The purpose of CC&S update No. 1 was to remove 
some launch program diagnostic routines, insert a new 2A Final preparations for the first trajectory correction 
time and to enable DC-32 for the engine vent routine. maneuver began shortly after the successful Mariner 9 
launch on May 30, 1971. Successive orbit determination 
A DC-84 was sent following the load to initiate a 
checksum routine. The counter 2 event indicated that 
CC&S update 1 was properly received. 
A DC-32 was then sent to initiate the engine vent se- 
quence. This sequence was very much like a computer-only 
maneuver except that there were no turns programmed, 
and the fuel and oxidizer were not available to the engine. 
Engine venting allows air at dne atmosphere to escape 
from the propellant lines, thereby providing a hard 
vacuum for liquid filling. 
b. Nauigatiotz. Orbit determination at launch plus 28 h 
indicated a good trajectory with a miss distance at Mars 
of about 30,000 km (OD uncertainty about 300 km) at 
about noon on November 14. This represented slightly 
greater than a one-sigma injection inaccuracy. 
The trajectory correction maneuver required to correct 
for miss distance and time of flight was predicted to be 
about 8 m/s at launch plus 5 or 6 days. 
c. Ground systems. Ground systems conditions were 
generally acceptable, but less than perfect. Outstanding 
problems were: 
(1) Hardware failure in 360/75B core memory array- 
machine unavailable major part of the day. 
(2) DSS 51 ranging subsystem down. 
(3) DSS 12 ranging subsystem down for a short period. 
DSS 14 tracked for the first three days of the mission, 
while the spacecraft was within range of the Mark IA 
ranging equipment, in order to obtain a comparison of 
the lunar and planetary ranging systems. 
IX. First Trajectory Correction Maneuver 
Two trajectory correction maneuvers (TCM) were 
planned for Mariner 9 during its cruise to Mars. These 
maneuvers would eliminate an intentional target bias 
(required by planetary quarantine considerations) and 
correct for any launch vehicle-induced trajectory errors. 
Establishment of an accurate trajectory, time of arrival at 
Mars and target point, would allow insertion into the 
calculations were run, and a maneuver strategy was de- 
veloped. As additional tracking data were obtained from 
the Earth-based antennas, knowledge of Mariner 9's tra- 
jectory became increasingly accurate. Maneuver strategy 
studies led to the best procedure for turning the space- 
craft to the desired orientation for firing the engine. From 
the Sun- and Canopus-stabilized orientation, it was de- 
cided to first roll the spacecraft 141 deg (counterclock- 
wise as viewed from the Sun) about an axis through the 
rocket nozzle and then turn the spacecraft about its yaw 
axis -45 deg (counterclockwise as viewed from above, 
looking down on the spacecraft toward the star Canopus). 
These turns would orient Mariner 9 with its rocket point- 
ing almost toward Earth. After engine firing, the space- 
craft would be returned to its previous three-axis stabili- 
zation by reversing the order and direction of the turns. 
On June 3, 1971, operations planned for the Mariner 9 
first trajectory correction maneuver were checked on the 
proof test model at the JPL Air Force Eastern Test Range 
facility. Beginning at  19:30:00 GMT on the same day, a 
series of six coded commands (CC-4) were transmitted to 
Mariner 9, followed by thirteen CC-1 and CC-2 pairs on 
one-minute centers starting at 19:36:00, to load the 
maneuver parameters into the fixed central computer 
and sequencer (CC&S). Next, the maneuver-enabled 
direct command (DC-14) was sent, followed by a DC-33 
to put the CC&S in the tandem standby mode and a 
DC-29 to disable the divide-by-32 network in the accel- 
erometer circuitry. The tandem standby mode was a 
necessary condition for executing a "tandem" maneuver. 
The spacecraft was then placed in the roll inertial mode 
prior to propulsion subsystem pressurization to avoid the 
possibility of loss of Canopus due to bright particles re- 
leased by the pressurization impulse. DC-65 was trans- 
mitted at 21:17:25 to fire pyrotechnic valves in the propul- 
sion subsystem. With these valves open, both oxidizer and 
fuel storage tanks were pressurized, forcing propellants 
through the lines to the main engine valve. The impulse 
about the yaw axis was quickly damped out; no bright 
particles were observed. Canopus reference was restored 
by DC-19 at 21:48:00. 
The first trajectory correction maneuver was executed 
on June 4, 1971. The spacecraft CC&S loads were further 
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refined by two CC-4's and twelve CC-1 and CC-2 pairs, 
respectively. A time-critical DC-52 transmitted at 22:19:04 
started the on-board maneuver routine; then gyros were 
turned on. The following table indicates the programmed 
and actual values of the maneuver: 
Parameter Programmed Actual value 
value 
Roll turn magnitude, deg - 140.806 - 140.717 
Yaw turn magnitude, deg - 44.725 - 44.828 
Roll turn time, s 777 777 
Yaw turn time, s 247 247 
AV imparted to 
spacecraft, m/s 
Accelerometer pulse count 223 223 
Nominal performance occurred during the spacecraft 
roll and yaw turns. At 00:22:00 GMT, June 5, 1971, the 
main engine valve was opened, and the hypergolic pro- 
pellants, nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) and monomethyl 
hydrazine (fuel), burned for 5.1 s until the main engine 
valve was automatically closed. Spacecraft yaw and roll 
unwind was accomplished. At 00:48:44, after a short roll 
search, Mariner 9 reacquired the Sun and Canopus celes- 
tial references. The gyros were turned off 3 min and 36 s 
later. 
Tracking data indicated that the first trajectory cor- 
rection maneuver was extremely accurate and the orbit 
determination computations on June 14, 1972 showed: 
Parameter Targeted Achieved Error 
ATCA (time of 19 h 06 min 19 h 04 min 02 min 08 s 
closest approach) 36 s 28 s 
AB (B-plane 24,948 24,869 140 (vector 
target point error) 
correction), km 
X. Single Mission Plan 
A. Single Spacecraft Impact 
Immediately following the failure to successfully launch 
Mariner H (MM71-1 spacecraft aka Mariner 8), intensive 
mission design activities were initiated. With only one 
spacecraft remaining to be launched, neither the plan for 
Mission A nor Mission B alone was adequate to meet all 
of the mission objectives. Consequently, a new hybrid 
mission had to be designed which would accomplish the 
mission objectives within the capabilities of the existing 
systems. During the time between the first and second 
launch, a single mission plan was developed sufficiently 
to provide the necessary confidence to proceed with the 
launch of Mariner I. All of the basic elements of the single 
mission plan were known and understood prior to the 
second launch although certain details and documentation 
were lacking. 
This mission plan reflected a concerted effort to maxi- 
mize the science value for the single mission so as to 
minimize the impact on the experiments by the reduction 
of two missions to one. 
B. Orbit Design 
Characteristics of the orbit (Ref. 55) are summarized in 
Table 14. 
Table 14. Orbit characteristics 
Period 11.98 h 
Periapsis altitude 1200 to 1500 km 
Inclination 65 deg 
Apsidal orientation 136 to 142 deg 
Arrival date November 14,1971 ( GMT) 
The 11.98-h orbital period would allow variable feature 
studies of Mars to be made. Mars revolves about the Sun 
at the rate of 0.538 deg of celestial longitude per Mars 
mean solar day (24.660 h). The 11.98-h period is 
17/35 of the Martian mean solar day. Thus, after 17 
Martian mean solar days (and 35 spacecraft revolutions), 
the orbit ground track on the surface of Mars would 
begin to repeat itself. The 11.98-h orbit period would be 
synchronized with the 0.538-deg/day motion of Mars 
about the Sun. After every 17 Martian mean solar days, 
the solar illumination conditions of any specific point on 
the planet as viewed from orbit would be nearly constant. 
This is important for studies of variable features. 
The minimum periapsis altitude of 1200 km or higher 
was chosen to ensure that, when vertical wide-angle 
camera pictures are taken at periapsis, there would be 
front-lap (contiguity) between adjacent pictures taken 
every 84 s; side-lap gaps would occur between sequences 
of pictures taken near periapsis on adjacent orbits. How- 
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ever, these gaps would be filled in on subsequent 14- to 
18-day longitude circuits. 
The orbit inclination (65 deg) was a compromise be- 
tween a higher inclination, which would provide excellent 
coverage of the south poiar region, and a lower inclina- 
tion, which would provide better viewing of variable- 
feature phenomena near the sub-solar point. Planetary 
quarantine did not affect the choice of inclination. 
The apsidal orientation angle, $, is measured from the 
incoming hyperbolic direction in which the spacecraft 
approaches Mars (the approach asymptote) to the orbit 
ellipse line of apsides (Fig. 20). As + is increased, the 
latitude of periapsis would move north on the surface of 
Mars, and the opportunities for global TV coverage would 
be enhanced. Global TV coverage would consist of sev- 
eral low-resolution pictures, which would map the lighted 
disk of the planet about 2 h before periapsis. The time 
would be dictated by the scan platform viewing limita- 
tions. If $ is increased, pictures could be taken at  higher 
altitudes, which would reduce the total number of pic- 
tures needed for a mosaic of the lighted disk. 
ORBITAL ELEMENTS 
i - INCLINATION 
.I. - APSIDAL ORIENTATION 
hp - PERIAPSIS ALTITUDE 
ho - APOAPSIS ALTITUDE 
UNBRAKED DEPARTURE 
B - MISS DISTANCE 
OTOR BURNOUT 
PLANET EQUATOR 
PERIAPSIS 
MOTOR 
I G N I T I O N  
Fig. 20. Approach trajectory and elliptical orbit 
If a periapsis-to-periapsis (minimum impulsive) orbit 
insertion is attempted, the resulting apsidal orientation 
angle would be equal to about 118 deg. However, by 
consuming more spacecraft retro fuel at orbit insertion, 
the value of $ could be increased to a maximum of 136 
to 142 deg depending on the delivery accuracy of the 
spacecraft at the planet. 
Figure 21 illustrates the characteristics of the proposed 
orbit. The times at which the center (or the limb) of Mars 
comes into or goes out of view is determined by the 
spacecraft scan platform mechanical limits. The cone 
angle is limited to the range of 96 to 165 deg; the clock 
angle range is 90 to 305 deg. As long as the scan platform 
cone and clock angles remain within these limits, the 
spacecraft instruments could view the planet vertically 
at the sub-spacecraft point on the planet. When the scan 
platform hits one of its limits, off-vertical viewing of some 
points of the planet might still be possible until the planet 
limb is reached. Figure 21 shows the time when the 
spacecraft would pass through the 60-deg solar incidence 
angle contour on its way to the evening terminator (90- 
deg incidence angle). Because of the orbit inclination 
I SPACECRAFT CROSSES 65-deg SOUTH LATITUDE AND IS HEADING NORTH 
1 -203 1 I I 1 
30 60 W 
DAYS I N  ORBIT AFlER INSERTION O N  N O V  14, 1971 
Fig. 21. Orbit characteristics 
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selected, the spacecraft ground track would be confined 
between 65 deg north and 65 deg south latitude on Mars. 
About 29 min before periapsis, the spacecraft would cross 
65 deg south Iatitrtde and start to head north along its 
ground track toward periapsis. 
Shortly after passing through orbit periapsis, the space- 
craft would enter Earth occultation. During occultation, 
the planet limb would pass out of view of the scan plat- 
form, as shown by the dashed line in Fig. 21. After 
approximately 38 days from insertion, Earth occultations 
would cease for the balance of the 90-day nominal mission. 
There would be no solar occultations during the 90-day 
nominal mission. Solar occultations would commence 
about 135 days after orbit insertion (during the proposed 
extended mission). The occultation period would not 
exceed 1 h and 40 min on any orbit. The solar occultations 
would end about 190 days after insertion. To conserve 
spacecraft power during the period of solar occultations 
when the solar panels are periodically shaded, the science 
instruments would be turned off. 
An additional period of Earth occultations would com- 
mence about 170 days after insertion and last for about 
40 days. 
GMT). The purpose of this maneuver was to decrease the 
spacecraft speed so that the Mars gravity field would 
capture the spacecraft in an orbit whose parameters were: 
Period 12.5 h 
Periapsis 1300 km 
Inclination (to Mars equator) 65 deg 
The orbit insertion maneuver also would take place 
over Goldstone because the high-gain antenna would be 
pointing off the Earth and the engineering telemetry would 
have to be played back over the medium-gain antenna and 
received over the 64-m antenna at Goldstone. The motor 
burn would begin about 28 min prior to closest elliptic 
approach. Total burn time would be approximately 16 min 
and the time to reacquire Canopus and initial doppler 
data would be approximately 2 h. 
The orbit insertion maneuver would be a planar trans- 
fer from the hyperbolic orbit to the elIiptic orbit. This 
meant that there would be no change made in the inclina- 
tion at orbit insertion. Due to the required rotation of the 
periapsis of the elliptic orbit, the orbit insertion would 
not be a minimum energy transfer. 
Reflected stray sunlight from the surface of Mars might An trim Illaneuver (Ref. j6) Occur between 
enter the field of view of the Canopus sensor for several November 16 and 18,1971. The purpose of this maneuver 
minutes during each orbit starting some 40 days after was to modify the orbit produced by the MOI maneuver 
orbit insertion. The spacecraft would have to turn on its from the 12.5-h period to the desired 11.98-h period and 
gyros to maintain its roll reference during these periods. to synchronize the time of periapsis passage with the 
Goldstone zenith. 
C. Maneuvers 
If required, the second trajectory correction maneuver 
(TCM) would occur on October 26, 1971. The purpose of 
this maneuver would be to refine the spacecraft trajectory 
so that the Mars orbit insertion maneuver and the trim 
maneuver(s) would produce desired orbit parameters 
with lowest propellant expenditures. Motor bum time 
would be approximately three seconds, and the time to 
reacquire Canopus would be one hour. (Tracking data 
and orbit determination computations performed in Sep- 
tember and October 1971 showed that the first TCM was 
sufficiently accurate to justify cancellation of the second 
TCM .) 
The Mars orbit insertion (MOI) maneuver (Ref. 56) 
would occur on November 13, 1971 (November 14, 1971 
The orbit trim strategy was designed to place the time 
of periapsis of the orbit within an envelope that would 
provide for a low probability of overlap of playbacks with 
Earth occultations and portions of the planet-in-view 
period for the duration of the 90-day mission (Fig. 22). 
The size of this envelope would be constrained by the 
rk0.3-min post-trim period tolerance (30) and by the 
planned asynchronism with Goldstone of the desired and 
nominal period of 11.98 h. 
In the event of large insertion dispersions, two trim 
maneuvers would be executed to achieve synchronism. 
The second trim maneuver would be performed at periap- 
sis 8 days after insertion. In Fig. 22, a typical single trim 
case is shown as a solid line. The two trim cases are indi- 
cated by dashed lines. 
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Fig. 22. Time of periapsis envelope 
D. Science Sequences 
1. Pre-orbit insertion. When the spacecraft is close 
enough to obtain scientific measurements, primarily visual 
imaging, the first of three pre-orbit science sequences 
(POS-1) would be conducted (Ref. 57). POS-1 would 
begin on November 10, 1971, and continue for approxi- 
mately 24 h. A 3-h playback of the data over the 64-m 
Goldstone antenna would be conducted on November 11, 
1971. Twenty-five narrow-angle TV pictures of Mars 
would be taken at 62-min intervals along with six narrow- 
angle TV pictures of the natural satellite Deimos. The 
Mars pictures would provide global coverage of all 
longitudes. 
Pre-orbit science sequence 2 (POS-2) would begin on 
November 11, 1971 and continue for 24 h. A 3-h playback 
of the data over the 64-m Goldstone antenna would be 
conducted on November 12, 1971. Essentially the same 
coverage as POS-1 was planned, except that 24 narrow- 
angle pictures of Mars and 7 pictures of Deimos would 
be taken. 
Pre-orbit science sequence 3 (POS-3) would begin on 
November 12, 1971 and continue for approximately 10 h. 
A 3-h playback of the data over the 64-m Goldstone 
antenna would be conducted, after orbit insertion, on 
November 13, 1971 (PST). Twenty-three wide- and 
narrow-angle TV pictures of Mars would be taken at 2-h 
intervals, producing a mosaic of most of the planet. (By 
this time, the spacecraft would be very close to Mars and 
the TV cameras could not see the entire planet.) Satellite 
coverage would be two pictures of Phobos and five pic- 
tures of Deimos. 
2. Orbit operations. Figures 23 and 24 show typical 
Goldstone zenith and nadir science sequences as they 
might appear in the mission. As Mars rises to an elevation 
angle of approximately 15 deg above the local horizon at 
Goldstone, playback of the tape load of data taken during 
the preceding nadir pass would begin. Nearly 3 h would 
be required to play back the data at a rate of 16.2 kbps. 
After playback, there might be an opportunity to take 
global coverage pictures. 
Three geodesy pictures from the wide-angle camera 
would be taken at 84-s intervals beginning about 1 h and 
30 min before periapsis. These wide-angle camera pictures 
would be targeted at latitudes of about 15 deg south, 
30 deg south, and 45 deg south. On one pair of orbits, the 
TV pictures would be taken at the sub-spacecraft longi- 
tude; on the succeeding pair of orbits, the pictures would 
be taken ahead (east) of the sub-spacecraft longitude to 
provide a stereo effect. Figures 25 and 26 show typical 
geodesy pictures. 
Scan platform cone and clock angles would be selected 
so that, as the ultraviolet spectrometer slit sweeps down 
through the atmosphere above the brightest portion of 
the Mars surface, the slit would be as close to perpendic- 
ular to the local vertical as possible when it passes through 
an altitude of 100 krn above the surface (Fig. 27). The 
ultraviolet spectrometer data would be transmitted in 
real time at 8.1 kbps. During the conduct of this bright 
limb experiment, three TV pictures of the atmosphere 
immediately above the planet limb might be recorded. 
On succeeding orbits, wide-angle camera pictures using 
different colored filters might be taken to provide spectral 
studies of stratified atmospheric haze. 
Approximately four wide- or narrow-angle pictures 
might be taken when the spacecraft is orbiting near 
65 deg south latitude. These pictures might be aimed 
toward the south polar region or, to study variable fea- 
tures on the surface, north (on alternate orbits) toward 
the latitudes where the solar illumination is highest. 
Ultraviolet pressure mapping would be conducted by 
pointing the ultraviolet spectrometer at the lighted side 
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Fig. 23. Typical Goldstone zenith science sequence Fig. 25. Typical geodesy sequence, view near vertical 
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Fig. 24. Typical Goldstone nadir science sequence 
Fig. 26. Typical geodesy sequence, looking eastward 
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Fig. 27. View of the ultraviolet spectroscopy experiment 
of the planet surface during a portion of the orbit up to 
within about 20 deg of the terminator. The data again 
would be transmitted in real time at 8.1 kbps. 
The mapping sequence was the heart of the mission. 
This sequence would consist largely of TV wide-angle 
camera pictures of selected points on the Mars surface 
supplemented by TV narrow-angle camera pictures at 
10 times better resolution. Figures 28 and 29 can be 
used to visualize the mapping of Mars. In Fig. 29, the 
bands of latitudes to be mapped are shown in 20-day 
intervals beginning after the final orbit trim and continu- 
ing throughout the nominal mission. In each of the four 
mapping sequences shown, 360 deg of Mars longitude 
are covered between two parallels of latitude. As the 
mission progresses, these bands of Iatitude wouId shift 
northward to follow the evening terminator and to fill in 
side-lap gaps between sequences of pictures taken on 
adjacent orbits. For an orbit inclination of 65 deg and 
with an apsidal orientation angle of 136 to 142 deg, the 
latitude of periapsis would be initially at about 20 deg 
south latitude. As the mission progresses, the latitude of 
periapsis would decrease slightly because of a slight 
negative precession of the orbit line of apsides. When 
vertical wide-angle camera pictures are taken north or 
south of periapsis, the spacecraft altitude would be 
greater; the TV wide-angle pict~rres would have positive 
front-lap; and the resolution would be reduced. Most of 
the wide-angle pictures would be taken vertically. The 
last vertical picture could be taken at a cone angle of 
96 deg. Late in the mission, the fourth mapping sequence 
could be extended northward to perhaps 45 degrees north 
latitude by fixing the scan platform at a cone angle of 
96 deg and at a clock angle of 305 deg and then taking 
off-vertical wide-angle camera pictures up to the termin- 
ator. Thus, the planet could be mapped completely from 
65 deg south latitude to 45 deg north latitude during the 
standard mission. 
When the spacecraft is in view of Goldstone, the planet 
is in view of the spacecraft scan platform, and the tape 
recorder is not being played back, the spectral data from 
the infrared radiometer, the infrared interferometer spec- 
trometer, and the ultraviolet spectrometer would be trans- 
mitted to the 64-m Goldstone station. Also, during the 
mapping sequence when the tape recorder is on, comple- 
mentary multi-spectral data from the ultraviolet, visual, 
and infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum 
would be obtained. 
Early in the mission, shortly after the mapping se- 
quence ends near periapsis, the spacecraft would enter 
Earth occultation and communication with the Earth 
would be temporarily lost. However, as the spacecraft 
enters and exits occultation, the S-band radio doppler data 
obtained would ultimately be used to determine the 
pressure profile of the Mars atmosphere. After Earth 
occultations cease, communication with the spacecraft 
during the 40 min following periapsis passage would be 
maintained on Goldstone zenith passes. Between the 
time the mapping sequence ends and the limb of Mars 
passes out of view of the spacecraft scan platform, spectral 
data from the ultraviolet spectrometer, infrared interfer- 
ometer spectrometer, and infrared radiometer could be 
obtained from the night side of the planet beyond the 
evening terminator. 
After the limb of the planet passes out of view of the 
scan platform, the ultraviolet spectrometer could be 
pointed to various regions of space surrounding Mars in 
search of Lyman alpha particles. The data would be 
transmitted in real time at 50 bps. At this low data rate, 
continuous coverage could be provided independently 
from Goldstone by the world-wide network of 26-m (85-ft) 
diameter antennas. 
The celestial mechanics experiment would continue 
throughout the mission. However, the most useful data 
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Fig. 28. Typical wide-angle camera footprints for surface mapping 
60 I I would be obtained near each periapsis passage. One- and 
two-way doppler data would be obtained on Goldstone 
50 - 
zenith and nadir passes at 33% bps, except for periods of 
Earth occultation. However, ranging data could be ob- 
40 - tained only on Goldstone zenith passes. 
30 - 
After the spacecraft exits Earth occultation, playback 
20 - of the tape load of data obtained on the previous Gold- 
0, 
u 
stone zenith pass would be completed in about 3 h. After 
D playback, Goldstone would set. When Goldstone is not 
in view, no tape recorder playbacks would occur, and no 
high-rate spectral data would be returned in real time. 
During the period from 3 to 1.5 h before periapsis, 
opportunities would exist to take TV wide-angle pictures 
of the lighted portion of the planet disk and of the atmo- 
sphere above it. This global TV coverage would be con- 
- structed from a mosaic of the wide-angle camera pictures 
taken on each nadir orbit. If three pictures are taken per 
- orbit, a single wide-angle camera color filter might be 
used (Fig. 30). If six pictures are taken per orbit, two 
- TV wide-angle camera pictures of selected portions of 
the lighted limb and of the atmosphere above it could be 
-60 I I taken. The best opportunities for global coverage would 
0 30 60 90 
DAYS I N  ORBIT AFTER INSERTION O N  NOVEMBER 14, 1971 
occur early in the mission after the limb of Mars first 
comes into view of the scan platform (cone angle = 96 deg 
Fig. 29. Mars mapping sequence and clock angle = 90 deg). As the mission progresses, the 
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Fig. 30. Typical global coverage pictures 
limb and the center of Mars would come into view when 
the spacecraft is closer to periapsis, the angular diameter 
of Mars would be larger, and the number of TV wide- 
angle pictures required to mosaic the lighted portion of 
the planet would escalate rapidly. Global coverage would 
probably end 25 to 30 days after insertion. The apsidal 
orientation angle, +, would be made as large as possible 
at orbit insertion to permit global coverage for the maxi- 
mum practical period after arri~~al. 
On the nadir pass, geodesy TV pictures would be taken 
about 1 h and 30 min prior to periapsis, but they could not 
be played back at that time because Goldstone would not 
be in view. South polar region TV or high-Sun TV pic- 
tures would be taken on alternate nadir orbits. TV map- 
ping, including recorded spectral data, would be ob- 
tained on each nadir pass. 
The only real-time data that could be obtained on 
nadir orbits would be infrared radiometer data and ultra- 
violet spectrometer Lyman alpha data at 50 bps or celes- 
tial mechanics one- and two-way doppler data at 33% 
bps. This data would be received by the 26-m (85-ft) 
diameter antenna network. 
After the spacecraft is in orbit from 90 to 120 days, the 
north polar cap could be seen'in the light by the scan 
platform of the spacecraft. This viewing period would 
occur from 0.5 to 1.5 h after periapsis. 
Photography of the Martian Moons, Phobos and Deimos, 
would be obtained many times throughout the mission. 
The spacecraft would pass to within 5000 to 10,000 km 
of the satellites at the optimum opportunities. 
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Project and System Milestones 
Date co~npleted Milestone Date completed Milestone 
4/30/68 Announcement of Flight Opportunity 9/5/69 Mission analysis and engineering inputs to 
( AFO ) issued Program Requirements Document completed 
Project Approval Document (PAD) signed Quality Assurance Plan ( P D  610-15) issued 
9/30 Payload selection completed 
10/17 Taslc Order issued 
9/12 Preflight PEGASIS program completed 
9/16 Spacecraft Subsystem Detail Design and 
Detail Design Review completed 
10/25 Project Policy and Requireinents (PP&R) 
( PD 610-4) issued 9/19 Contract plans and negotiations completed 
9/22 Spacecraft Environmental Test Review 
conlpleted 11/1 Start Mission Operations Systein (MOS) 
Functional Design Book 
10/1 Preliminary Planetary Quarantine Estimate 
completed 12/2 Start spacecraft subsystem rework and 
fabrication 
10/1 Maneuver Programs-Interplanetary Program 
MOS and Tracking and Data System 
(TDS) Management Plan (PD 610-14) issued Command, Telemetry Metric Constraints 
Definition completed 
Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Design Review 
completed 
Near-Earth nominal trajectory data delivered 
by Lewis Research Center to Air Force 
Eastern Test Range (AFETR) 
Mission Design Review conlpleted 
Launch vehicle Centaur contract issued 
Spacecraft System Functional Design and 
Design Review completed 
Mission Design and Mission Specification 
(PD 610-16, Part 1 ) issued Flight Plan Approval Letter delivered to 
AFETR Spacecraft Subsystem Functional Review 
completed Deep Space Network (DSN)  Operations 
Plan-DSN/Spacecraft Telecommunications 
Interface ( P D  610-74, Volume IIA) issued 
Cruise science experiments removed 
Telecon~n~unications Requirements Definition 
completed Statement of Flight Approval received from AFETR 
Mariner Mars 1969 proof test model 
transferred to MM'71 Interface Coll~patibility Management Plan ( P D  610-93) issued 
Preliminary Support Instrumentation 
Requirements Document ( SIRD ) 
(PD 610-41) issued 
Program Requirements Document issued 
MOS and TDS Functional Design Review 
completed Near-Earth Requirements Definition completed 
Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Interface Schedule 
( P D  610-61) issued 
Project Plan (PD 610-8) issued 
Maneuver Operation Functional Requirements 
completed 
Spacecraft Systeill Detail Design Review 
completed Initial Mission Plan (PD 610-16, Part 11, 
Draft 1 ) coillpleted Spacecraft Operational Support Equipment 
Review completed 
8/18 Mission Specification (PD 610-16, Part 1, 
12/1 Spacecraft/Centaur Launch Vehicle Hardware 
Interface Control Document ( P D  610-17) 
Revision A )  issued issued 
8/29 Mariner Mars 1969 flight spare transferred to 12/2 Preliminary NASA Support Plan issued 
MM'71 
12/15 Spacecraft System Test and Operations 
9/2 h4OS Functional Design and Design Book Preliminary Plan (TOP ) ( PD 610-50) 
completed available 
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Date conlpleted Milestone Date completed Milestone 
Spacecraft System Test and Operations 
Preliminary Plan (TOP)  ( PD 610-50) Review 
completed 
Overall Planetary Quarantine completed 
Maneuver Programs-Trim Program completed 
Interplanetary Orbit Determination Accuracy 
completed 
Mission Plans for Proof Test Model (PTM) 
Tests completed 
Program Support Plan issued 
DSN Operations Plan-DSN System Description 
( P D  610-76, Volume 111) issued 
Final Support Instrumentation Requirements 
Document ( SIRD) ( PD 610-41 ) issued 
(signed by JPL) 
Maneuver Operations Program Request for 
Program issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Centaur 
Guidance Systein delivered to General 
Dynamics, San Diego 
Interplanetary Trajectory Characteristics 
Design and Document (PD 610-92) completed 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Centaur 
RL 10 engine delivered to General Dynamics, 
San Diego 
Maneuver Programs-Insertion Program 
completed 
Maneuver Programs-Statistical Linking 
Program completed 
Planetary Quarantine Plan (PD 610-18, 
Part 1 ) issued 
Orbit Design and Characteristics Handbook 
( P D  610-113) issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Centaur 
major weld completed 
Structure test model delivered to General 
Dynamics, San Diego 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Centaur 
and Structure Test Model Matchmate Test 
completed 
DSN Operations Plan-DSN Operations 
Support ( P D  610-70, Volume I )  issued 
MOS Implen~entation Plan issued (transit) 
MOS Implementation Plan issued (orbit ) 
Spacecraft Assembly Facility ( SAF ) Test 
Directives issued 
Spacecraft System Test and Operations Plan 
(TOP) ( P D  610-50) issued 
MM71-3 spacecraft subsystem rework and 
fabrication completed 
Spacecraft System Test Procedures completed 
Spacecraft-MOS Interface Control Document 
( P D  610-13) issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Centaur 
major weld completed 
Start MM71-3 Spacecraft-MOS Compatibility 
Test 
MM71-3 spacecraft available for Spacecraft- 
MOS-TDS Compatibility Test 
Space Flight Operations Plan-Policy and 
Requirements ( P D  610-29, Volume I )  issued 
MM71-3 Spacecraft Subsystem Type Approval 
(TA) and Flight Acceptance (FA) Test 
completed 
MM71-3 spacecraft subsystenl delivered to 
SAF 
DSN Test Plan ( P D  610-77, Volume I, Part B )  
issued 
DSN Test Plan-DSN Test Procedures (PD 
610-78, Volume 11) issued 
MM71-3 Spacecraft System Test Analysis 
and Review completed 
Microbiological Assay and Monitoring Plan 
(PD 610-18, Part 111) issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Guidance 
System delivered to General Dynamics, San 
Diego 
TDS Operations Plan-Near-Earth Expected 
Coverage Capabilities (PD 610-133, Volume 
IV) issued 
Launch Constraints Document ( P D  610-40) 
issued 
DSN Operations Plan-DSN/MOS Interface 
Control Document ( PD 610-75, Volunle IIB ) 
issued 
Preliminary Orbit Determination Strategy and 
Accuracy Document (PD 610-33) issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Centaur 
final assembly completed 
Final NASA Support Plan (NSP) issued 
(signed by JPL) 
Spacecraft Contamination Control Plan (PD 
610-123) issued 
TDS Operations Plan-Near-Earth Phase (PD 
610-137, Volunle 111) issued 
Telecommunications Link Performance 
Document ( P D  610-57) issued 
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Milestone Date completed Milestone Date completed 
11/16/70 Spacecraft-Mission Operations Complex 
Compatibility Test Plan ( P D  610-48) issued 
DSN Test Plan-Space Flight Operations 
Facility ( SFOF) Test Procedures ( PD 610-86, 
Volume V ) issued 
DSN Sinlulation System Readiness completed 
(transit) 
hIM71-3 Spacecraft Functional and 
Environmental Tests completed 
MM71-3 Spacecraft-MOS-TDS Compatibility 
Test completed 
Post AIM71-3 Spacecraft Test and Design 
Verification Review completed 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, R L  10 
engine delivered to  General Dynamics, 
San Diego 
DSN Test Plan-Ground Comn~unications 
Facility Test Procedures ( P D  610-85, 
Volume I V )  issued 
PAD Safety Report ( P D  610-136) issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23 Combined 
System Test completed and prepared to ship 
t o  AFETR 
MM71-2 spacecraft system test and analysis 
con~pleted MM71-1 spacecraft subsysten~s rework and 
fabrication completed Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23 delivered 
to AFETR MOS Test Plan ( P D  610-46) issued 
MM71-1 spacecraft available for Spacecraft- 
MOS-TDS Compatibility Test Targeting Specification ( P D  610-49) issued 
Mission Profile Studies Through Orbit 
Inspection completed (transit ) MM71-2 spacecraft available for Spacecraft- MOS-TDS Compatibility Test 
Flight adapters ( 3 )  delivered to General 
Dynamics, San Diego 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Flight 
Adapter Compatibility Test completed 
MOS Hardware and Software Developnlent 
and Performance Demonstration completed 
for flight certification (transit)  
Start MM17-1 Spacecraft-MOS Compatibility 
Test 
Space Flight Operations Plan ( SFOP) 
( P D  610-29, Volume 111) issued (1s t  issue) 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Centaur 
final assembly completed 
MM71-2 spacecraft subsystems fabrication 
completed Start MM71-1 Spacecraft-MOS Compatibility 
Test Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Atlas 
acceptance completed Spacecraft Subsystem Reviews completed 
(prior to  Preshipment Review)  MOS hardware and software delivered and 
performance demonstration completed for 
integration (transit ) Spacecraft System Review completed (prior to  Preshipment Review) 
TDS Near-Earth Phase Operations Plan- 
Interface Description ( P D  610-138, Volume 11) 
issued 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Flight 
Adapter Compatibility Test completed 
hIM71-1 Spacecraft Subsystem Flight Accept- 
ance ( FA ) Test completed Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Atlas 
acceptance completed MM71-1 spacecraft delivered t o  SAF 
Flight adapters delivered to  JPL from General 
Dynamics, San Diego 
MM71-2 spacecraft subsystems delivered to  
SAF 
MM71-2 Spacecraft Subsystenls Flight 
Acceptance Test completed 
DSN Test/Training Plan-Deep Space Instru- 
mentation Facility ( D S I F )  Engineering Test 
Procedures (Volume V I )  issued 
MM71-1 Spacecraft System Functional and 
Environmental Test completed AlOS Implementation Plan ( P D  610-44) 
issued (transit) 
MOS Hardware and Software Development 
and Performance Demonstration completed for 
integration (nominal orbit)  
MM71-1 spacecraft system test and analysis 
completed 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Centaur 
checkout and acceptance completed Spacecraft Subsystem T y p e  Approval Test 
completed 
Preliminary Maneuver Analysis Document 
( P D  610-34, Part 1 )  issued MM71-3 spacecraft reassembly completed 
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Date completed Milestone 
AFETR Test Directives issued 
Spacecraft support equipment sets 1 and 2 
delivered to launch complex 
Space Flight Operations Facility Mission 
Support Area available for beneficial occupancy 
MM71-2 Spacecraft Functional and 
Environmental Test completed 
TDS Hardware and Software Development 
and Performance Deinonstration completed 
(model 1 )  
Space Flight Operations Plan-Sequence of 
Events (PD 610-29, Volume IIA) issued 
( 1st issue) 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Centaur 
checkout and acceptance completed 
Launch VehicleAtlas Centaur 24, Combined 
System Test completed and prepared to ship 
Launch Complex Checkout completed, AFETR 
PAD 36B (spacecraft peculiar) 
Launch Operations Plan (PD 610-37) issued 
Spacecraft Hardware Reviews completed 
MM71-3 Spacecraft informal Preshipment 
Hardware Review completed 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, launch 
vehicle 2 delivered to AFETR 
MM71-1 Spacecraft-MOS-TDS Compatibility 
Test completed 
MOS Hardware and Software Developnlent 
and Performance Demonstration completed 
for flight certification 
MOS and TDS System Test completed for 
DSN (model 1 ) 
MM71-3 spacecraft delivered to AFETR 
MM-71-1, MM71-2, MM71-3 Spacecraft 
Preshipment Hardware Review completed 
MOS and TDS Integration, System Test and 
Performance Demonstration completed for 
near-Earth (model 1 ) 
MM71-1 spacecraft delivered to AFETR 
MM71-2 Spacecraft-MOS-TDS Compatibility 
Test completed 
TDS Hardware and Software Development 
and Performance Demonstration completed 
(model 2 )  
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, MM71-3 
Spacecraft/Launch Complex Compatibility 
Test, PAD 36B, completed 
Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Terminal 
Countdown with MM71-3 spacecraft, PAD 
36B, completed 
Date completed Milestone 
3/14/71 MZv171-2 spacecraft delivered to AFETR 
3/15 MOS and TDS integration completed 
( model 3 ) 
3/18 Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 23, Joint Flight 
Acceptance Test (J-FACT) with MM71-3 
spacecraft, PAD 36B, completed 
3/19 MOS and TDS Launch Preparations Review 
completed 
3/26 Prelaunch Analysis of Probability of Planetary 
Contamination (PD 610-18, Part 11) issued 
4/1 MOS and TDS System Test completed 
( model 2 ) 
4/1 MOS Implementation Plan, Phase B (PD 
610-44, Volumes 1-5) issued 
4/1 Launch Con~plex Checkout completed, AFETR 
PAD 36A (spacecraft peculiar) 
4/6 Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Spacecraft- 
Launch Complex Compatibility Test completed 
4/7 Mission Profile Studies Through Orbit Insertion 
( Preliminary Orbit ) completed 
4/7 Firing Tables Document issued 
4/8 Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Terminal 
Countdown Demonstration with MM71-3 
spacecraft, PAD 36A, completed 
4/13 Launch Vehicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Joint Flight 
Acceptance Test (J-FACT) with MM71-3 
spacecraft, PAD 36A, completed 
4/14 MM71-3 spacecraft demated and decapsulated 
4/21 TDS Near-Earth Readiness Review completed 
4/23 Launch Readiness Review completed at 
AFETR 
4/23 Launch Readiness completed 
4/23 Midcourse Maneuver Policy (PD 610-34, 
Part 11) issued as an interoffice memorandum 
4/27 MOS Operations Training and Readiness 
completed (transit) 
4/27 MOS and DSN Launch Readiness Review 
completed 
4/30 Mission Plan (PD 610-16, Part 11) issued 
(transit) 
4/30 TDS Near-Earth Phase Operations Plan- 
Launch Operations (PD 610-182, Volunle I, 
Part A) issued 
4/30 TDS Near-Earth Phase Operations Plan- 
Expected Coverage Capabilities (PD 610-133, 
Volume IV, Revision A) issued 
5/3 Space Flight Operations Plan-Operations 
Procedures (PD 610-29, Volume 111) issued 
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Date completed Milestone Date conlpleted Milestone 
5/3/71 hlM71-1 spacecraft available for mate and 
encapsulation 
5/3 Final mate with Mariner H (MM71-1 
spacecraft, Atlas Centaur 24), PAD 36A, 
completed 
5/4 Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test 
(J-FACT)/Electromagnetic Interference Test 
(EMI) ,  PAD 36A, colnpleted 
5/5 Space Flight Operations Plan-Sequence of 
Events ( PD 610-29, Volume IIB, modification 
for Misison A) issued 
5/11/71 Final mate with Mariner I (MM71-2 
spacecraft-Atlas Centaur 23,) PAD 36B, 
completed 
5/13 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)  Test with 
Mariner I, PAD 36B, completed 
5/15 DSN Simulation System Readiness completed 
5/18 Launch Vellicle-Atlas Centaur 24, Launch 
Failure Review colnpleted at General 
Dynamics, San Diego 
5/23 Mariner I Joint Flight Acceptance Composite 
Test (J-FACT)/EMI, PAD 36B, conlpleted 
5/5 Mariner H Radio Frequency Interference 5/24 Mariner I Composite Readiness Test completed 
(RFI)  Test, PAD 36A, completed 
5/25 Mariner I RFI and Launch Vehicle EM1 Test 
5/7 MM71-2 spacecraft available for mate and conlpleted 
encapsulation 
5/26 Mariner I Launch Readiness Review completed 
5/8 Mariner H launcha 
5/30 Mariner I Launcha 
aMariner H was designated Mariner 8 even though the Centaur 
failed to inject it into the trajectory to Mars. Mariner I was 6/4 Mariner 9 trajectory correction maneuver 
designated Mariner 9 after launch. completed 
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Appendix B 
Mariner Mars 1971 Problem List (P-List) 
Number Problem description 
Required 
Assigned to Date closure Date 
assigned date closed 
Status 
P1 Delivery of the radio subsystem R. Stevens 11/13/70 2/15/71 2/24/71 IOM 3300-71-097, 
is dangerously late due to: Stevens/Hunter to 
( 1 ) Corona problem-fix needs Schneiderman, dated 
to be qualified (pacing 2/22/71. 
problem). 
( 2 )  TWT delivery and 
changeout. 
P2 Confidence in the propulsion R. Rose 11/13/70 2/16/71 2/12/71 IOM MM71-71-086, 
system is reduced due to a series Rose to Schneiderman/ 
of check valve failures, some of Forney, dated 2/9/71. 
which may be contamination in 
the valves. In at least one case, 
contamination is not the cause. 
P3 The CC&S operation is question- J .  Scull 11/13/70 2/16/71 2/12/71 IOM 3611-71-29, Scull 
able due to the following un- to Schneiderman, dated 
explained problems : 1/27/71. 
( 1 ) Motor burn variation times. 
( 2 )  Missing commands. 
( 3 )  Five-second timing error. 
Schedule delays are in prospect 
i f  the causes of these problenls are 
not understood in the near future. 
P4 Confidence in the IRIS ability to J .  Small/ 11/13/70 2/16/71 3/17/71 IOM, Snlall to 
operate reliably and to be de- R. Hanel Schneiderman, Subject: 
livered on schedule is lacking. "MM71 P-List," dated 
3/9/71. 
P5 Failure of MOS/TDS simulation G. Lairmore 12/8/70 12/22/70 IOM 295-70-393, 
system to meet readiness dates Rodriguez to Rygh. 
for support of testing and train- 
ing. Specific current problenls 
include 6050 upper inemory fail- 
ure and 6050/1108 interface 
delays. 
P6 360/75 launch capability schedule G. Lairmore 12/16/70 4/1/71 4/2/71 IOM GEL-71-86, 
does not allow sufficient training Lairmore to 
for reasonable risk launch support. Schneiderman dated, 
3/31/71. 
P7 360/75 schedule does not allow G. Lairluore 12/16/70 7/1/71 2/1/71 IOM GEL-71-31, 
time to incorporate into orbital Lairmore to 
operation the capabilities Schneidern~an, dated 
required to meet the mission 1/29/71. 
objectives, particularly in the 
generation of data records. 
P8 DSS tape degradation causes J .  Scull 1/4/71 2/16/71 2/12/71 IOM 3634-71-028, 
some loss of  data (actually, an Grumm to Schneiderman 
alignment problem damaged ( approved by Scull), 
tape). dated 2/11/71. 
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Required 
Number Problem description Assigned to Date closure Date 
assigned date closed 
Status 
P9 IRIS electronics failure caused J. Small/ 1/19/71 2/16/71 3/17/71 IOM, Small to 
loss of data (Flight 2 IRIS failed R. Hanel Schneiderman, Subject: 
in  solar thermal vacuum). "MM71 P-List," dated 
3/9/71. 
P10 DSS drive belt breakage J. Scull 1/19/71 2/16/71 4/16/71 IOM, 3634-71-083, 
(PTM DSS). Grumm/Scull to 
Schneiderman, dated 
4/12/71. 
P11 CC&S relay failure-mechanical J. Scull 1/19/71 2/16/71 2/12/71 Relay mounting changed 
mounting suspect (Flight 1 in all units-all units 
CC&S ) . have successfully passed 
environmental requalifi- 
cation tests and have 
been delivered to SAF. 
P12 MM71-2 radio circulator switch R. Stevens 
anomaly repair, retest, and 
delivery to Cape is critical. 
P13 Insufficient reliability of DSIF R. Stevens 
Command System resulting in 
inability to complete com~nand 
sequences. 
2/24/71 3/15/71 3/24/71 MM71-2 switch retest 
and delivery accom- 
plished. IOM 33M1-71- 
014, 3300-71-171, from 
Stevens/Hunter to 
Schneidennan, dated 
3/23/71. 
4/16/71 4/30/71 5/7/71 IOM 3300-71-270, 
Stevens to 
Schneiderman, dated 
5/6/71. 
P14 Radio exciter power output R. Stevens 8/16/71 10/8/71 10/28/71 IOM 33M1-71-033, 
decrease not understood; model 330-71-572 from 
needed which duplicates Stevens/Hunter to 
spacecraft and ground test data. Schneidennan, dated 
10/8/71. 
P15 CC&S Assembler/Compiler Pro- J. Scull 9/28/71 10/10/71 10/25/71 IOM 360-71-104 
gram has not been completed. from Scull to 
This program is a serial program Schneiderman, dated 
in the Adaptive Mode Planning 10/22/71. 
Set (AMPS ) and is delaying 
readiness for orbital operations. 
P16 The on-site telemetry and com- R. Stevens 9/28/71 1 0 1 1 7 1  11/19/71 IOM 3300-71-623 
mand processor (TCP) currently from Stevens to 
has faults in the command system Schneiderman, dated 
which could cause loss of the 11/10/71. 
flight spacecraft. A version of 
the TCP which corrects these 
faults has not been delivered. 
P17 Radio receiver appears to have R. Stevens 11/19/71 11/26/71 1/13/72 IOM 33M1-72-001 
taken a static offset of best lock from Stevens/Hunter 
frequency; evaluation of cause to Schneidennan, dated 
and projection of effect needed. 1/3/72. 
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